Hungary’s opposition Tisza still leads the election, but the gap is closing—and a win may not be enough for Ukraine

A poll by 21 Research Center, conducted 2–6 March and published by news site 24.hu, shows Tisza at 53% of decided voters against Fidesz at 39%—a 14-point lead, down from 16 points in January. Among all voters, the gap narrows further: 38% to 30%. Based on those figures, Tisza could win 115 seats in Hungary's 199-seat parliament; Fidesz, 78. Only the far-right Our Homeland party appears set to clear the 5% threshold for seats.

With four weeks until the 12 April vote, Fidesz's campaign—heavy on fear of war and EU overreach—is clawing back ground. The narrowing lead is the story.

Hungary is the only EU member actively blocking Ukraine's accession talks and vetoing military aid packages—and whichever party wins on 12 April will inherit a bilateral relationship that has been corroding since 2018, shaped by narratives that neither a ballot box nor a change of government can quickly undo.

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What another Orbán term would mean

A Fidesz victory means continuity. Orbán has spent years blocking Ukraine's EU accession, vetoing military aid packages, and providing Moscow with a reliable shield inside the EU. His government has consistently amplified Russian-made provocations in Zakarpattia, converting manufactured outrage into leverage in Brussels. Another term of that is not a domestic Hungarian matter—it's a structural problem for Ukraine's Western integration.

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Why a Magyar win might not change Ukraine's situation

Péter Magyar has positioned himself as less anti-Ukrainian than Orbán. However, he has explicitly avoided taking pro-Ukraine positions, calling the topic "too divisive." When Zelenskyy sharply criticized Orbán earlier this year, Magyar largely came to the prime minister's defense, a telling signal of the political constraints he already operates within.

Tisza's own manifesto opposes Ukraine's fast-track EU accession and sets 2035 as the target for phasing out Russian energy—eight years behind the EU's own deadline.

Tisza's voting record tells the same story. An analysis of Tisza's European Parliament record by Eulytix for the European Policy Centre found that Tisza MEPs repeatedly voted against amendments strengthening language on support for Kyiv and condemnation of Russia—doing so through abstentions in more than half of cases.

The deeper problem outlasts any government. Vitalii Diachuk, an analyst at the Institute for Central European Strategy (ICES) in Uzhhorod, told Euromaidan Press that dismantling Hungary's anti-Ukrainian media ecosystem—its foundations, affiliated NGOs, and party networks—would take years, not months.

The narrative that Zakarpattian Hungarians face persecution at Kyiv's hands has become genuinely believed by large parts of Hungarian society.

"Hungarian youth have never lived in a country with free media or quality democracy"—making the myth politically costly to correct even for a successor government.

Moscow, meanwhile, has every reason to keep producing that content—regardless of who governs in Budapest.

A Tisza victory would matter. It wouldn't be enough on its own.