After six months of operations on Russian soil, Ukraine’s General Staff announced on 15 March the withdrawal from Sudzha, their main stronghold in the region, to “more advantageous positions.” With Ukraine maintaining only a small footprint in Kursk Oblast, the operation has effectively concluded, inviting a clear-eyed assessment of its impact.
The Kursk campaign revealed a stark contrast: Ukrainian soldiers demonstrated exceptional courage and tactical brilliance at the brigade level, while strategic planning at the highest military-political echelons fell short. This misalignment transformed what could have been a strategic victory into merely a prolonged raid without substantial military or political advantages.
This pattern isn’t new. Previous incursions into Russian territory led by Ukrainian military intelligence generated headlines but delivered minimal operational impact while sacrificing elite personnel.
The misallocation of these specialized intelligence operatives—trained for covert information gathering—as conventional combat units revealed coordination problems between military branches and strategic command.
The Kursk operation marked a significant escalation in ambition and execution. Its initial success in penetrating Russian defenses and securing territory showcased Ukraine’s tactical prowess. However, this very success illuminated critical strategic and political oversights. The operation proceeded without clear answers to essential questions: What defined victory? How would forces ultimately withdraw? What contingencies existed for Russian responses?
The anti-Putin Russia that never was
Ukraine failed to achieve the operation’s stated objectives of drawing Russian forces from other fronts and gaining negotiation leverage. With limited military resources, Ukraine could only execute the initial phase of what resembled “the deep operations doctrine” developed by Soviet theorists in the 1930s without the capacity for follow-through.
The Russian General Staff responded deliberately, recognizing Ukraine’s limitations. Rather than weakening other front sections, they methodically assembled blocking forces from internal military districts before building offensive capabilities. The failure to secure the village of Korenevo proved particularly costly, enabling Russia to strike the Ukrainian left flank and eventually compromise the operation.
This tactical setback highlighted broader issues at the strategic level. Ukraine’s political leadership never articulated a coherent strategic vision for the incursion. This communication vacuum created an impression of reactive tactics rather than deliberate strategy, suggesting an impromptu attempt to seize the initiative on a limited front section.
Perhaps most significantly, Ukraine squandered the opportunity to establish an alternative political presence on captured Russian territory.
The Russian Volunteer Corps and Chechen volunteer units—natural allies for such an initiative—were marginalized instead of centered in the operation.
Despite Russian opposition figures and volunteer formations expressing readiness to support this approach, Ukrainian intelligence never launched the complementary political operation needed to establish anti-Putin administrative structures on the territory liberated from his regime.
Instead of Ukraine capitalizing on this opportunity, Russia leveraged the situation to its advantage, notably by introducing North Korean military units to the war—a significant escalation that further complicated Ukraine’s strategic position.
Intelligence gaps left Ukraine unprepared for Russia’s response
The Kursk operation revealed critical shortcomings in Ukrainian intelligence capabilities at the strategic level. Effective intelligence must provide leadership with reliable information on enemy plans and intentions, enabling informed decision-making through rigorous analysis of available data.
Ukrainian intelligence agencies’ failure to anticipate the Russian-North Korean offensive in late February and early March 2025 exemplifies this weakness.
Their focus on tactical “deep strikes” into Russian territory appears to have diverted resources from essential strategic intelligence, compromising Ukraine’s ability to conduct meaningful analysis of evolving threats.
Ukraine’s strategic planning should have incorporated the offensive potential of Russian forces in Kursk, their likely pace of advance, and the broader geopolitical context, including US political transitions and President Trump’s stance on resolving the war.
A strategic opportunity was missed to preemptively withdraw from Kursk—adopting Russia’s own “gesture of goodwill” tactic—which would have undermined Russia’s negotiating position following any subsequent aggression.
Instead, Ukraine squandered time and initiative in an area where it had maintained a proactive posture for six months. Nevertheless, the operation did yield meaningful results: Russia’s military reputation suffered significantly, and Ukrainian forces experienced a notable morale boost during the operation’s initial phase. Ukrainian forces demonstrated their combat effectiveness against Russia precisely when allies questioned Ukraine’s military sustainability, and continued support remained uncertain. The Kursk operation consequently became a pivotal moment allowing Ukrainian diplomacy to continue advocating effectively on the international stage.
Ultimately, the Kursk operation stands as both a tactical achievement and a strategic lesson—highlighting the consequences of missed opportunities, inadequate forecasting, and the need for Ukrainian political leadership to respond with greater flexibility to military successes.
Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.
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Read more:
- Kursk: Ukraine’s success or failure? Western defense experts and a soldier speak out
- After 218 days in Russia, Ukraine is ending its Kursk campaign
- “Plan B was needed yesterday.” Is Ukraine on the brink of withdrawing from Kursk?
