Russia could generate enough combat power to initiate a regional conflict against NATO within a year of the end of hostilities in Ukraine, under circumstances most favourable to Moscow, the Netherlands' Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) reports in its 2025 annual report, published on 21 April 2026.
While Russia continues to fight in Ukraine, a conventional war against NATO is "virtually ruled out," the Dutch service writes. At the same time, "Russia is already taking concrete preparatory steps for a possible conflict with NATO," according to the MIVD.
The objective of such a conflict, as described in the report, would not be to defeat NATO militarily. Dutch intelligence states that Moscow would aim to use limited territorial gains to pull NATO apart politically — "if necessary under the threat of nuclear weapons use."
Dutch MIVD's 2026 assessment echoes a broader European intelligence consensus. Germany's BND and Bundeswehr reported Moscow is preparing for a potential "large-scale conventional war" with NATO by the end of the decade, with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius citing 2028–2029 as a possible timeline. Denmark's FE warned that Russia could be ready for a regional war against Baltic states within two years of Ukraine hostilities ending, and a large-scale European war within five. Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service notes no attack is intended in 2026 but flags long-term force reconstitution, mass drone integration, and expanded troop deployments along NATO's eastern flank.
Why the Kremlin sees the war as existential
The MIVD frames the war in Ukraine as part of a long-standing Russian effort to fundamentally reshape Europe's security architecture and the international legal order. According to the service, the war has an existential character for the Russian regime: the report states it is not only about territory, but above all about Russia's position in the world and the future of the Russian nation, culture and what the MIVD calls "appropriated traditional values."
Internal and external security of the Russian state are described by the MIVD as inseparable, with the liberal-democratic value system presented by Moscow as a threat to internal stability and to the leadership's grip on power.
Force reconstitution despite heavy losses
The MIVD estimates Russia has suffered around 1.2 million permanent personnel losses since the 2022 invasion, including more than half a million killed, against roughly half a million permanent Ukrainian losses. The report notes a "worrying trend" in 2025, in which the daily casualty ratio has been moving in a direction unfavourable to Ukraine.
Even so, Russia has managed to rebuild and expand its armed forces. The Dutch service writes that investment is concentrated on personnel recruitment and training, production of heavy weapons systems, and strategic ammunition reserves. Priority areas include ground-based air defence, long-range weapons and, above all, capabilities in and against the unmanned domain.
Whether these plans are economically sustainable over the long term is unknown, the MIVD states. As long as Ukrainian defences hold, the report adds, the build-up of a potential Russian military threat toward NATO territory is being slowed.
The threat is not only quantitative. The MIVD concludes that combat experience gained in Ukraine since 2022, and the way Russia integrates that experience into its own training cycle, has produced "a significant qualitative improvement," particularly in the unmanned domain. The Russian armed forces, according to the assessment, are not only larger but also more effective than before the war in Ukraine.
Hybrid activities: sabotage, espionage, cyber
Russia is using means that remain just below the threshold of open military conflict, the report states, with the aim of generating fear and unrest, influencing decision-making in states and international bodies, and creating conditions favourable to Moscow.
Sabotage activity attributable to Russian intelligence services peaked in Europe in the summer of 2024, then declined. The MIVD reports that since the summer of 2025, a cautious increase in activity preparing for sabotage has again been visible, which the service says suggests Moscow retains the option to escalate or de-escalate.
The Dutch service notes that after mass expulsions of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover from 2022 onward, Moscow's services have shifted to "layered networks" consisting of coordinators, facilitators and so-called low-level agents carrying out physical and digital sabotage. This construction, the MIVD writes, makes it easier for Russia to conceal its involvement.
No physical sabotage incidents have taken place on Dutch territory, the report says, though the Netherlands remains a potential target given its substantial support to Ukraine and its role as a transport and information hub in Europe.
On the cyber front, the MIVD assesses that the number of different Russian cyber actors is growing and that their capacity to conduct attacks — partly automated, including through artificial intelligence — is expanding.
Nuclear and missile developments
The report flags several developments on nuclear weapons in 2025. Russia tested two new nuclear-powered systems in October, the "Burevestnik" cruise missile and the "Poseidon" torpedo, both of which, according to the MIVD, are to be equipped with nuclear warheads. Moscow also ended a temporary moratorium on deploying intermediate-range ground-launched weapons and has likely stationed the "Oreshnik" intermediate-range ballistic missile in Belarus.
These weapons have "an extremely destabilising effect" during crises, the MIVD states, because of their very short warning times.
Absent dampeners
Unlike the Cold War, the MIVD writes, the factors that once dampened great-power confrontation — a manageable bipolar order, a functioning arms-control architecture, shared understanding of strategic deterrence, and formal and informal channels for dialogue — are largely absent. The report adds that a technological revolution involving artificial intelligence, quantum computing and the biosciences is now unfolding, the consequences of which cannot yet be foreseen.
According to the Dutch service, this combination of factors creates "a real risk of unintended, and therefore hard-to-control, escalation." The MIVD adds that the unpredictable course of current US security policy may influence Moscow's cost-benefit calculations.
Part of a wider European intelligence consensus
The MIVD's assessment echoes a broader European intelligence consensus. Germany's BND and Bundeswehr reported that Moscow is preparing for a potential "large-scale conventional war" with NATO by the end of the decade, with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius citing 2028–2029 as a possible timeline. Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service (FE) warned that Russia could be ready for a regional war against Baltic states within two years of Ukraine hostilities ending, and a large-scale European war within five. Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service assesses no attack is intended in 2026 but flags long-term force reconstitution, mass drone integration, and expanded troop deployments along NATO's eastern flank.
