Donald Trump returned to office on 20 January 2025, promising peace in Ukraine within twenty-four hours.
One hundred days later, Russian missiles still fall on Ukrainian cities. Russian troops still occupy Ukrainian land. And Ukrainian soldiers still die defending their homeland.
What changed wasn’t the war, but America’s side in it.
The pattern emerged with striking clarity: Military aid frozen. Intelligence sharing suspended. Diplomatic support withdrawn. Each move applied pressure not on Russia to end its aggression, but on Ukraine to end its resistance.
This wasn’t peace-building. It was hostage negotiation, with Ukraine as the hostage.
The February 28 Oval Office confrontation laid it bare. What should have been a minerals partnership signing became the moment America’s Ukraine policy changed forever. “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelenskyy in front of cameras. The “deal” required Ukraine to surrender what it had spent three years fighting to defend.
Instead of peace, Ukraine’s position has weakened, Western unity has fractured, and Russia’s leverage has grown. This outcome reflects a broader pattern of the reduction of complex issues into simplistic transactions.
This same flawed strategy – applying leverage against allies rather than adversaries – has defined Trump’s approach to everything from trade wars to NATO. The results are equally disastrous: weakened alliances, emboldened adversaries, and damage to America’s own interests.
The consequences now extend far beyond Ukraine. When America rewards invasion rather than repels it, the message echoes in Beijing, Tehran, and every capital where territorial ambitions simmer beneath the surface.
Unless reversed, the lesson will be clear: coercing partners, rather than confronting aggressors, doesn’t end conflicts – it guarantees new ones.
Trump’s pattern of pressure against the victim

Trump’s initial moves upon returning to office established a consistent strategic pattern that is seen in the application of pressure not against the aggressor, but against the victim.
Within days of inauguration, the administration froze all new military aid to Ukraine. Although shipments authorized under the previous Congress continued temporarily, no new assistance packages were approved.
Simultaneously, real-time battlefield intelligence sharing with Ukrainian forces was suspended, significantly limiting Kyiv’s operational capabilities. As a result, systems dependent on US intelligence inputs, including HIMARS artillery, Patriot air defenses, and F-16s operated at degraded effectiveness.

Trump’s aid freeze just dealt Ukraine a strategic blow no future weapon supplies can repair
Diplomatically, the administration shifted from coalition-building to bilateral negotiation. Beginning with backchannel talks in Saudi Arabia in February 2025, US officials prioritized direct engagement with Moscow, excluding Ukraine from substantive discussions about its own future.
The transactional nature of this approach became unmistakable during President Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington on 28 February. Originally intended to formalize a minerals deal between Ukraine and American firms, the summit instead exposed the new US posture.
Trump linked economic cooperation to political capitulation, demanding that Ukraine commit to a settlement with Russia as a precondition for investment and aid. Zelenskyy’s refusal prompted a public rebuke, and the meeting disintegrated into confrontation.
Pressure was no longer applied to Russia to end its aggression; it was applied to Ukraine to end its resistance.
In Ukraine, the costs of this pattern have become immediate and severe.
From tariffs to Ukraine: the same faulty playbook
Trump’s approach to Ukraine is not a single case of misjudgment. It follows a broader pattern evident throughout his presidency, particularly in his sweeping tariff policy — both reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how leverage actually works.
2 April 2025 – “Liberation Day,” as the White House called it. Trump announced universal tariffs on nearly all imports under the assumption that the threat of economic pain would force trading partners to accept more favorable terms for the United States. These tariffs, applied broadly rather than selectively, disregarded the complexities of global supply chains, existing alliances, and domestic economic interdependence.
Within 48 hours, global markets had plunged 12%, American manufacturers announced production halts as supply chains fractured, and allies from Tokyo to Brussels unveiled retaliatory measures.
Trump’s Ukraine policy shares the same systemic flaw as the tariff campaign:
- Both assume others will capitulate when faced with pressure, regardless of their core interests or values.
- Both have been proven wrong: China didn’t abandon its economic model when faced with tariffs. Ukraine won’t abandon its sovereignty when faced with aid freezes. Russia won’t end its territorial ambitions when rewarded for aggression.
Transactionalism may work in real estate deals where all terms are negotiable. But in international relations, some principles – like territorial integrity and the prohibition against conquest – cannot be bargained away without collapsing the entire system that prevents wider wars.
Contrary to Trump’s expectations, it is precisely his belief that everything is negotiable that led to the weakening of America’s position. The pressure campaign against Kyiv, rather than securing peace, has left Ukraine more vulnerable, Russia more assertive, and America’s credibility within NATO visibly diminished.
Trump’s first hundred days on Ukraine suggest that this fundamental misreading of strategy remains intact, and that, once again, American and allied interests are bearing the cost.
The Oval Office breakdown

The 28 February meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the consequences of the administration’s strategic shift clear.
Nominally convened to finalize a Critical Minerals Partnership, the summit quickly unraveled when Trump linked economic cooperation to political concessions. He demanded that Ukraine commit to a settlement with Russia, effectively tying future US investment and aid to Kyiv’s willingness to accept territorial losses and renounce NATO ambitions.
Zelenskyy’s refusal was immediate. Ukraine would not, he affirmed, exchange sovereignty for survival, nor would it legitimize aggression through forced concessions. The confrontation ended without agreement, without a joint press statement, and with a further erosion of the US-Ukrainian relations.
The breakdown exposed, for allies and adversaries alike, the reorientation of American policy, in which support for Ukraine was based on a conditional transaction contingent on Kyiv’s acceptance of terms set largely by Moscow.
The consequences were immediate. Within days, European leaders moved to contain the fallout. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer both visited Washington in urgent diplomatic efforts to maintain a united front. Their appeals privately reflected growing alarm that unilateral US pressure on Ukraine would fracture NATO cohesion and embolden further Russian escalation.
The Oval Office meeting revealed the full nature of the administration’s strategy: not peace through strength, but capitulation through pressure.
The USA’s new strategy: not peace through strength, but capitulation through pressure.
The collapse of moral clarity
By the end of Trump’s first hundred days, the consequences of the administration’s policy reversal were measurable and severe.
First, Ukraine’s battlefield position deteriorated. The suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing reduced the effectiveness of Ukraine’s precision strike capabilities and air defenses.
In March and April, Russian forces intensified missile attacks on critical infrastructure, capitalizing on Ukraine’s diminished early warning and interception capacity. Ukrainian counteroffensives stalled due to shortages of munitions and operational intelligence.
Second, Ukraine’s diplomatic isolation deepened. By mid-April, the Trump administration had formally communicated through envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg that it would no longer support Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. At the same time, drafts circulated between Washington and Moscow proposed international recognition of Crimea as Russian territory in exchange for a general ceasefire.
Although Kyiv rejected these terms, the signal was clear that the United States had decoupled its position from Ukraine’s core security objectives.
Third, Russia’s strategic position strengthened. The Russian ruble appreciated by approximately 40% relative to January levels, reflecting improved market confidence amid the prospect of a Western political settlement on Moscow’s terms.
Fourth, NATO unity showed visible fracture. Although France and the United Kingdom increased diplomatic engagement with Washington, internal European discussions revealed diverging approaches to Ukraine.
Collectively, these developments ruined the moral and strategic clarity that had sustained Western support for Ukraine.
The loss of moral clarity is not a secondary effect. It is a strategic defeat in its own right, and one that adversaries will seek to exploit far beyond Ukraine.
The loss of moral clarity on Russia’s war against Ukraine is a strategic defeat in its own right.
What must be done
Despite the damage incurred during the first hundred days, the situation remains recoverable but only through immediate, deliberate action.
- First, the United States must resume full military and financial support to Ukraine without precondition. Restoring the flow of advanced munitions, air defense systems, and real-time intelligence is critical to stabilizing Ukraine’s defensive lines and reestablishing deterrence.
- Second, the administration must reaffirm that any political settlement requires Ukrainian consent and must uphold Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, including Crimea. Ambiguity on these points weakens Kyiv’s negotiating position and incentivizes further Russian demands.
- Third, Washington must re-anchor its policy within a revitalized NATO framework. Isolated diplomacy invites division, integrated strategy restores coherence.
- Fourth, sanctions enforcement against Russia must be intensified and expanded. A step back in economic pressure sends the wrong signal to Moscow and undermines the leverage necessary for any durable settlement. Financial networks enabling sanctions evasion must be targeted aggressively.
- Finally, the administration must reframe the conflict in its proper strategic context: as a defense not merely of Ukraine, but of the international order predicated on sovereignty, non-aggression, and alliance reliability. Failure to uphold these principles in Ukraine will have consequences extending far beyond Eastern Europe.
Peace negotiated from a position of strength deters future conflicts. Peace negotiated from a position of appeasement invites them.
The choice remains open, but not indefinitely.