“Most Germans want Ukraine to win. The problem is in the Chancellery. Put pressure on them, isolate them, make them feel uncomfortable.”
This was the message from Dr. Benjamin Tallis, a former member of the German Council on Foreign Relations who participated in EU security missions in Ukraine and the Balkans. Tallis, now Director of the Berlin-based think tank Democratic Strategy Initiative, spoke with us following German local elections that saw a rise in support for populist parties considered pro-Russian.
In the eastern German states of Thuringia and Saxony, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party received around 33% and 32% of the vote respectively. The left-wing Alliance led by Sahra Wagenknecht also achieved significant results.
In a historic shift, the AfD and the Wagenknecht alliance were elected to the state parliaments. These parties vocally advocate for stopping arms supplies to Ukraine.
However, contrary to popular belief, their popularity is not driven by Germans’ desire to halt aid to Ukraine, says Tallis. Euromaidan Press spoke with him to understand what led to these results and what they mean for Ukraine. Read our brief interview to grasp the full picture, including why German long-range Taurus missiles are off the table for now.
EP: Should Ukrainians be worried about the local election results in Germany?
BT: Ukrainians should be worried about the results, but not because of that. Federal state level elections have no say over foreign policy. They don’t engage in foreign policy to that extent. Ukrainians should be worried, because of the reaction of the mainstream parties who are in government and the opposition in Berlin at the federal level.
Mainstream parties are mistakenly linking these outcomes to their Ukraine policy, despite polls showing Ukraine wasn’t a top issue for AfD voters.
This misinterpretation is worrying. So, the question is how will the government react. Already their support was going down for Ukraine and, frankly, hasn’t been where it needed to be from the beginning.
EP: What factors are actually driving the recent success of these parties in German elections, if not opposition to Ukraine aid?
BT: I certainly don’t think more Germans have become massively more racist in the last years or massively more extremist. The concerns these two parties draw on have to do with people’s concerns about the decline of Germany and not having a credible future.
Other concerns are that they’re not being listened to when it comes to inflation, migration, etc that the government have not had good answers to, to be honest and have tried to ignore as best they can.
So, I think we could actually expect to see a further rise of these forces unless the democratic parties get their act together.
EP: How strong is Russian influence in Germany today?
BT: There’s a huge amount of Russian influence through various different channels. Like social media, well-placed people. Also through the narratives that are reproduced unquestioningly by a lot of the mainstream media here from time to time, particularly the broadcast media, including public broadcasters.
The current debate environment falls short of what’s necessary for Germans to fully grasp the implications of the Ukraine war for their own security, the threat a dominant Russia poses to their democracy, and the economic consequences of their government’s policies.
Russian propaganda influences all those things. While there’s well-documented evidence of connections to specific parties like the SPD, the influence extends far beyond politics. [Social Democratic Party of Germany, currently the ruling party led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz – ed.] It’s deeply entrenched in business relationships and long-standing personal networks across German society.
EP: What can Ukraine do about it?
BT: Ukraine is doing everything it can.
At the moment, Ukraine is fighting for Germany’s security, so it’s important to emphasize that.
In terms of changing the German debate and countering Russian influence, I think working through allied actors and just really being clear about messaging, about the consequences of giving in to Russia, and about why Ukrainians stood up and fought for democracy and freedom, which seems to many Germans to be the faraway struggle.
But actually, it’s not. Also, ensuring that those messages are embedded in a wider strategic picture, that this is not just about Ukraine. This is about the future of democracy, about the future of our economic prosperity and a stable security order in Europe.
I’d advise a tougher approach with German officials. Direct, public statements that Germany isn’t doing enough have been the most effective in driving policy changes. In fact, public shaming has been the primary catalyst for progress.
As other allies like Poland, the Baltic states, the UK, and France take more decisive action, Germany risks self-imposed isolation. This reality needs to be made clear to German leadership.
EP: Olaf Scholz isn’t popular in Ukraine due to his cautious approach. Would reinstating a more outspoken ambassador like Andrij Melnyk, who wasn’t afraid to publicly criticize Scholz, be more effective in pushing Germany to act?
BT: There’s some debate about who was more effective here. Both Andrij Melnyk and Oleksii Makeev have been very good ambassadors.
They have different styles.
It’s important to note that Scholz’s unpopularity isn’t limited to Ukraine. He’s currently the least popular post-war chancellor in Germany, leading a deeply divided government that’s struggling to implement its agenda.
That’s another reason why we see the rise of AfD.
EP: Has Ukraine’s Kursk incursion impacted the German government’s perception of the war and “the red lines”?
The German government was not informed in advance, which was a very good move.
The initial reaction on Ukraine’s Kursk operation was horror, followed by a mix of frustration and even a bit of envy. It showed a kind of strategic thinking and agility that many in Germany had thought was impossible in this situation.
Obviously, it was a huge morale boost for Ukraine.
To be frank, it also gave quite a few Western military and government folks a kick in the backside. This level of inventiveness hasn’t really been at the heart of German planning for a long time.
But when it comes to shifting those “red lines,” unfortunately, I don’t think it’s had much impact.
We’ve seen 1300 square kilometers taken and not one red line crossed, but Germany’s policy on targeting Russia hasn’t budged.
That’s because Berlin’s supposed fears of escalation aren’t really genuine.
The fact is that Germany’s government does not want Ukraine to win the war against Russia because they fear a Russian defeat. They’re scared of what a Russian defeat might mean – a potential collapse, loose nukes, and so on.
But I’d argue strongly that this shows they can’t properly calculate risks. They’re not weighing the different dangers against each other. It’s short-sighted and ignores the bigger picture of what’s at stake here.
EP: So, Taurus missiles definitively off the table for Ukraine?
Absolutely.
As long as Scholz is in power, Taurus missiles won’t be coming. It’s a massive mistake.
Ukraine is adapting, though. They’re developing their own long-range precision weapons and increasingly using drones as makeshift cruise missiles. It’s a clever workaround.
The real question is how the West will react to Ukraine’s success with these methods. Will they support this approach and help refine it towards victory? Or will they try to rein Ukraine in, fearing it might be too effective?
EP: What does Germany want out of this war?
BT: It’s important to distinguish between what Germany as a whole wants and what the current German government, I mean, in particular the chancellory wants.
The Chancellery essentially wants the war to end quickly, preserving as much of the pre-2022 status quo as possible.
This approach minimizes disruption to Germany’s existing business model. However, many Germans support Ukraine’s victory, seeing it as a win for themselves too.
The business community is split. Some firms strongly back Ukraine, recognizing that a “gray zone” in Eastern Europe threatens future prosperity. They’ve invested in Ukraine and support recovery efforts, but they need the assurance of Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership to justify further engagement.
The main obstacle is in the Chancellery and parts of the SPD. They’re not committed to a Ukrainian victory because it doesn’t align with their geopolitical strategy.
EP: Speaking of NATO, can Germany be persuaded to support Ukraine’s membership, given their current opposition along with the US?
BT: This was a hot topic at the recent GLOBSEC conference in Prague. Some experts and former politicians were pushing for Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership, arguing it could end the war. There’s logic there, but it lacks broad support among European NATO members.
Interestingly, Czech President Petr Pavel brought up a historical precedent: West Germany joined NATO despite not controlling all of Germany, just as Ukraine doesn’t control all its territory now. West Germany’s NATO membership, including Article 5 protection, applied only to the territory it controlled.
This partial membership model is gaining traction among European allies as the most feasible approach. However, Germany remains a roadblock, still opposing the idea.
EP: How to change that?
BT: Isolate Germany. Confront them directly and publicly on this issue. Clearly articulate why this should happen, making it extremely uncomfortable for them.
There’s uncertainty about the US position, given their support for Germany. A new administration may shift views. However, the war in Ukraine has far more severe consequences for Europeans, who face greater direct exposure and vulnerability to Ukraine’s potential defeat and further Russian aggression.
Washington’s interests don’t always align with European allies. Many are deeply considering how to ensure Ukraine’s security and NATO integration, including options like expanding the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, or creating a similar “coalition of the willing” within Europe.
This would pressure Germany, as NATO countries could be exposed. If attacked due to this activity, it might trigger an Article Five situation. Germany would then face alliance obligations without decision-making power over the new mini-alliance’s actions.
EP: One last question. Why are many Germans, especially in Eastern Germany, nostalgic about the “good old Soviet Union” and generally Russia-friendly? Weren’t they also victims of the system?
BT: I think that’s a somewhat overrated narrative. It depends on what they’re nostalgic for.
Some might reminisce about certain material needs being well met, especially if their post-1989 situation hasn’t been significantly better. The transition was problematic for many communities in East Germany. [1989 marks the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of German reunification – a pivotal moment in German history that dramatically reshaped the country – ed.]
A key factor is feeling belittled by West Germans. This nostalgia partly stems from being viewed differently before, and how the transition was mishandled.
There’s much to explain and research about misunderstandings of the Soviet Union, but generally, I believe this narrative is overplayed.
The larger issue is about disenfranchisement and political disconnection. Some efforts are being made to address this – improved connectivity, company investments, etc. But more is needed.
Read more:
- Budget crunch: Will Germany keep supporting Ukraine?
- Kasparov urges Scholz to boost Ukraine aid instead of cutting, demands Taurus transfer approval
- German defense stocks drop as government debates future Ukraine support
- Germany delivers new military aid package to Ukraine, which includes IRIS-T air defense system, ammunition, drones
- Ukraine dismisses reports of Germany halting military aid as manipulative
- NATO base in Germany raises alert level amid Russian sabotage fears
