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Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 325: Harsh battles for Soledar continue

Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 325: Harsh battles for Soledar continue
Article by: Zarina Zabrisky

Harsh battles continue in Soledar. High-ranking Ukrainian officials continue to forecast an intensification of Ukrainian and Russian operations in the spring of 2023. Ukrainian partisan attacks continue.

Daily overview — Summary report, January 14, 2023

The General Staff’s operational update regarding the Russian invasion as of 18.00 pm, January 14, 2023 is in the dropdown menu below:

Situation in Ukraine. January 13, 2023. Source: ISW.

The three hundred and twenty-fifth day of the heroic stand-off of the Ukrainian people against the russian military invasion began.
Attacking populated areas, the enemy continues to destroy the infrastructure and homes of the civilian population, thereby violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, the laws and customs of warfare.
Over the past day, the enemy launched 15 air strikes and 5 missile strikes, 2 of them on the civilian infrastructure of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast. He carried out more than 95 attacks from MLRS, in particular on Kherson.
The danger of air and missile attacks has not disappeared anywhere in the entire territory of Ukraine. We urge you not to ignore air warning signals.
The enemy continues to focus its main efforts on attempts to seize Donetsk Oblast within the administrative border. Continues to advance in the direction of Bakhmut.
The adversary also conducts unsuccessful offensive actions in the Avdiiv direction. On Kupiansk and Lyman axes – does not stop trying to improve the tactical position.
Over the past 24 hours, units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine repelled the attacks of the occupiers in the areas of the settlements of Ploshanka, Bilogorivka and Chervonpopivka in the Luhansk Oblast and Rozdolivka, Sil’, Krasna Gora, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Vodyane, Kreminna, Pobyeda, Mayorsk, Mariinka and Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk Oblast.
Kharkiv Battle Map. January 13, 2023. Source: ISW.
Volyn, Polissya, Siversk and Slobozhansk axes: no enemy offensive groups were detected. At the same time, the areas of Mykhailivka and Yanzhulivka settlements of Chernihiv Oblast were subjected to enemy shelling; Popivka, Yastrubshchyna, Studenok and Pavlivka – Sumy and Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Budarky, Mali Prohody, Zelene, Neskuchne, Strilecha, Ternova, Bily Kolodyaz, Bologhivka, Dvorichna and Hryhorivka in Kharkiv Oblast.
Kupiansk axis: the enemy shelled the areas of the settlements of Vilshan, Kupiansk, Orlyanka, Kyslivka, Petropavlivka, Krokhmalne, Tabaivka, and Berestov in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast.
Lyman axis: Makiivka, Nevske and Chervonopopivka of the Luhansk Oblast were shelled.
Donetsk Battle Map. January 13, 2023. Source: ISW.
Bakhmut axis: Spirne, Bilogorivka, Rozdolivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Krasna Gora, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Bila Gora, Verkhnokamianske, Vesele, Kurdyumivka, Druzhba and Pivnichne of Donetsk Oblast were damaged by fire.
Avdiivka axis: enemy fire was detected in Krasnohorivka, Avdiivka, Georgiivka, Mar’inka, Berdychy, Vodyane and Novomykhailivka in Donetsk Oblast.
Novopavlivka axis: Vugledar, Vremivka and Zolota Niva in the Donetsk Oblast were affected by enemy fire.
Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map. January 13, 2023. Source: ISW.
Zaporizhzhia axis: the enemy fired from tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Vil’ne Pole settlements of the Donetsk Oblast; Gulyaipil’ske, Dorozhnyanka, Zaliznychne, Gulyaipole, Shevchenko, Charivne, Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, Orihiv, Kamianske, Zeleny Gai and Malynivka of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
Kherson axis: Zolota Balka, Havrylivka, L’vove, Sadove and Kherson were shelled, in particular.
The occupiers are intensifying counter-sabotage and counter-intelligence measures in the temporarily occupied territories. In particular, in the settlement of Velyka Lepetykha, Kherson Oblast, random checks of the phones of local residents are carried out for the presence of photos and videos of russian military equipment. As of January 12, 2023, 3 civilians were detained and taken to an unknown destination.
The Ukrainian aviation carried out 9 strikes on the areas occupied by the occupiers, and units of missile and artillery troops of the Defense Forces of Ukraine hit 2 control points, 8 areas of concentration of manpower, an anti-aircraft missile complex, 3 ammunition depots, as well as 2 other important enemy objects over the past day.

Military Updates

Shelling by Russian Troops. Icelandic Data Analyst.

Ukrainian soldier denies Russia has captured Soledar but says heavy fighting is ongoing there. Ukrainian soldier Madiar says heavy fighting continues in Soledar, refuting Kremlin claims that the city in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast was captured today. He is operating drones in the city, showing it in the video which was shared by Ukraine’s General Staff.

Battles in Soledar continue; possible capture is unlikely to lead to imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. The night in Soledar of the Donetsk Oblast was difficult; Ukrainian defenders are trying to hold the defense, battles continue, Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine Hanna Maliar reported. “The enemy threw almost all the main forces in Donetsk direction and maintains a high intensity of offensive. Defenders of Ukraine are valiantly trying to hold the defense,” Maliar wrote. She added that “this is a difficult stage of the war”, but Ukraine “will undoubtedly win.”

The first video of the new Ukrainian-made drone Shark over occupied Donetsk appears. The video was published by Serhiy Prytula, founder of Ukraine’s second-biggest volunteering fund. The drone can fly 60 km behind enemy lines. Its development was finished in October 2022, during the war.

Russia prepares for new offensive in spring; Ukraine is de facto NATO member – Ukraine defense minister. In an interview with the BBC, Oleksiy Reznikov said he was sure Ukraine would receive long-sought weapons, including tanks and fighter jets, as both Ukraine and Russia seemed to be preparing for new offensives in the spring.

“This year is decisive. Modern tanks, and effective artillery will allow Ukraine to throw back the Russian army—Zelenskyy. In his address to the Lithuanian Parliament, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that 2023 will be a “decisive” year. “This year is decisive. Now we need even greater mobilization – throughout the free world. This is the only way to end full-scale aggression with total terror. We need urgent solutions from our entire anti-war coalition. New defense solutions will give Ukrainian soldiers the opportunity to throw the Russian army off our land. And this applies primarily to modern tanks and effective artillery.

Russia may announce another major wave of mobilization in the coming days – Ukraine intel. According to the military intelligence of Ukraine, Russia is preparing for another mobilization and is trying to create an army of two million. “During the first wave of mobilization, 300,000 people were drafted into the Russian Armed Forces. After a short training, those mobilized are sent to the combat zone in Ukraine. Military intelligence of Ukraine does not rule out that the leadership of Russia will announce another wave of mobilization in the coming days. Another 500,000 Russians will enter the Russian Armed Forces, which will allow the terrorist country to create strategic reserves,” Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence reports.

According to British Defence Intelligence, (last 48 hours): 

  • On 11 January 2023, a group of at least 10 vessels of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) departed the Novorossiysk Naval Facility.
  • Given the type and number of vessels putting to sea at the same time, the activity is likely a fleet dispersal in response to a specific threat to Novorossiysk that Russia believes it has identified.
  • It is unlikely that the deployment signifies preparation for unusual maritime-launched cruise-missile strikes. It is highly unlikely that the fleet is preparing for amphibious assault operations. The BSF largely remains fixed by perceived threats from Ukraine, and continues to prioritise force protection over offensive or patrol operations.

Losses of the Russian army 

Losses of the Russian Army. Source: Ukraine World.


Ukrainian settlements that no longer exist due to constant fighting – Luhansk Oblast Head. The head of the Luhansk Regional Military Administration, Serhii Haidai, stated at the 12 January briefing that the Russian occupiers practically destroyed the settlements of Bilohorivka, Popasna, Kreminna, Rubizhne, Zolote, Hirske, and Lysychansk after more than four months of heavy fighting.

Ukraine orders deportation of ethnic Ukrainian facing persecution in Russia for opposing Putin and the war. Ukraine’s Migration Service has ordered the expulsion of a young man who has lived in Ukraine for 15 years and is only unable to revoke his Russian citizenship because he would need to do this on Russian territory.  There he would, almost certainly, face persecution for his opposition to the war and support for Ukraine.  The situation is especially shocking as the Migration Service decided to forcibly deport Roman, after Ukraine’s Border Guard Administration posted a photo of the young man’s passport page, which he had painted in the colours of the Ukrainian flag and on which could be seen the words ‘Putin is a dickhead’.  Having thus placed Roman in direct danger from the current regime of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Ukraine is now, in all seriousness, planning to deport the young man.

Four Ukrainian MPs officially lost their citizenship and status because of collaboration with Russia. The Ukrainian parliament has stripped of MP status four former MPs accused of collaboration. On 10 January they were stripped of Ukrainian citizenship by Zelenskyy’s decree.
Before the war, the group of MPs Andriy Derkach, Taras Kozak, and Renat Kuzmin, led by Putin’s confidant and oligarch Victor Medvedchuk was accused of illegal enrichment. In particular, they were accused of funding pro-Russian TV channels in Ukraine from money earned by their Russian companies as well as coal businesses protected and supported by L/DNR militants which is illegal.

Ukraine urges the UN to support a resolution on the special tribunal for Russia. RBC Ukraine news agency reports, citing the appeal of Emine Dzheppar, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, during the open debate to the UN Security Council, that a special tribunal must be established to investigate the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Russia abducts and imprisons Crimean Tatar, then tries to mobilize him for its war against Ukraine. The prison in Russia where Ruslan Osmanov is illegally imprisoned is trying to force him to accept Russian citizenship.  Osmanov’s wife has told the Crimean Human Rights Group that the prison administration want him to agree to fight in Russia’s war of aggression against his fellow compatriots in Ukraine.  Osmanov is one of many Crimean Tatars and other Ukrainians abducted from parts of Ukraine that have fallen under Russian occupation, and it is likely that others are also facing such pressure.  Attempts to force Russian citizenship on Ukrainian political prisoners began back in 2014-15.  Russia, for example, tried for a long time to claim that Ukrainian political prisoners Oleh Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko were ‘Russians’ despite their own categorical rejection of such citizenship.  The ploy then was the same as now as Russian citizenship would have been used to deny their rights as citizens of Ukraine.


Five countries ready to send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks, waiting for Germany’s permission. In addition to Poland and Finland, three more countries have privately said they are ready to transfer Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, if Germany, as the manufacturer, agrees to this. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said this in an interview with journalist Vadym Karpyak.

More than a dozen senior EU officials will meet with members of the Ukrainian government in Kyiv on 2 February, a day before the EU-Ukraine summit, a European Commission spokeswoman Dana Spinant told AFP.

The only acceptable off-ramp for Putin

New Developments 

Kyivans voted to de-Sovietize two metro station names, following 200 renamed streets. The Kyiv metro station of The Friendship of Peoples will be renamed to Zvirynetska, which is the historical name of the place meaning menagerie. Also, Tolstoy square will be renamed the square of Ukrainian Heroes according to the public voting, the Kyiv city portal.

Lithuanian Opera drops works by Russian composers as “culture in Russia too closely associated with aggressive politics.” Lithuanian National Opera and Ballet Theater (LNOBT) is changing its repertoire, abandoning works by Russian composers. Sergei Prokofiev’s ballet “Romeo and Juliet” and Igor Stravinsky’s “Holy Spring” were substituted by other plays, LNOBT reported.


  1. On the war. 

The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of  January 13, 2023:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 13 that Russian forces seized Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, on the evening of January 12. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces can now form a “cauldron” around Bakhmut and threaten Ukrainian supply lines running southwest of Soledar that support Ukrainian troops in the city.[1] The Russian MoD notably praised assault and army aviation, missile and artillery troops, and Russian airborne forces for seizing Soledar, without acknowledging Wagner Group’s participation in the fighting for the city. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov maintained that the situation around Soledar is difficult and noted that it is unclear if Russian forces control the settlement at this time. At the same time, other Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to fight in Soledar during the night of January 12-13.[2] Ukrainian forces may still occupy some positions on the northwestern borders of Soledar but are unlikely to control significant territory within the settlement itself. ISW assessed on January 12 that Russian forces had likely captured Soledar on January 11, but such a victory is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.[3]

The announcement sparked a significant backlash within the Russian information space due to the Russian MoD’s failure to acknowledge the Wagner Group’s participation in the capture of Soledar. The Russian MoD issued a follow-up announcement six hours later recognizing Wagner volunteers and assault detachments as participants in the Battle for Soledar and noting that the Russian MoD received numerous inquiries regarding its original commemoration of select Russian forces.[4] The Russian MoD attempted to justify their snub of Wagner by claiming that a Russian “heterogeneous grouping of troops” executed a “joint plan” in the Soledar direction and attributed the assault against residential areas to Wagner forces. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin vaguely responded to the Russian MoD’s omission of Wagner, stating that he cannot comment on the situation and noting that journalists’ questions about the matter expose their concern over commemorating Wagner’s “heroic capture of Soledar.”[5]

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin staged conditions for such backlash by personally visiting Soledar days prior to its capture and taking his cadre of Wagner-affiliated milbloggers to commemorate Wagner forces’ daily advances on Russian social media platforms.[6] Prigozhin likely attempted to preempt the announcement on January 12 by accusing unnamed bureaucrats and government officials of “constantly trying to steal victory from [the] Wagner private military company” and belittling its merits.[7] Milbloggers independent or affiliated with Wagner subsequently generated a series of criticisms calling out the Russian MoD for its misrepresentation of the claimed capture of Soledar.[8]

The Russian MoD’s announcement highlighted the existing conflict between the Wagner Group and the Russian MoD – a dynamic that ISW has previously observed and assessed. Several prominent milbloggers – including those affiliated with the Kremlin – stated that there is an ongoing conflict between the Russian MoD and Prigozhin behind closed doors and within the information space.[9] Some noted that Prigozhin has overpowered the Russian MoD‘s deliberately vague rhetoric, forcing the Russian MoD, and by extension the Kremlin, to end its long-standing policy of refraining from recognizing Wagner and its war efforts.[10] A Kremlin-affiliate milblogger, in turn, claimed that Prigozhin and the Russian MoD are both equally attempting to undermine each other and accused Prigozhin of refusing to recognize the  Russian Armed Forces as a participating force on the battlefield.

Former Russian officer and prominent nationalist voice, Igor Girkin, condemned the “acute conflict” between traditional military command and unofficial forces (referring to Wagner) during a time of war and claimed that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov seek to disband private military companies like Wagner and incorporate its elements into the MoD structure.[11] Girkin stated that Soledar has exposed a major dilemma for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he framed as having the options of either intensifying his efforts to appease both the Russian MoD and Prigozhin; doubling down on either side at risk of losing support for his war; or becoming an arbitrator and the commander-in-chief. ISW had previously assessed that Putin’s efforts to balance the at times mutually exclusive lines of effort of retaining Russian MoD support for his war, publicly distancing himself from military failures, and exploiting Prigozhin’s parallel military forces, may have ramifications on his power.[12]

Prigozhin likely seeks to use the victory in Soledar as a bargaining tool to elevate his authority in Russia. The Russian MoD’s subsequent mention of Wagner forces in response to public outcry signals a significant victory for Prigozhin, solidifying him as a crucial actor in this war. Reznikov stated that Prigozhin needed a victory in Soledar to deliver proof to Putin that his forces are better than the conventional army.[13] Prigozhin also publicized a journalist’s question about his reported upcoming meeting with Putin to discuss victory in Soledar, singling out the question amidst an array of other similar questions on his response to the Russian MoD’s announcement.[14] Prigozhin told the journalist to read his original statement on Soledar instead of “doing nonsense,” despite his comment stating that questions on Russian MoD’s exclusion of Wagner will “need answers but not now.” Prigozhin, who has used intentionally vague messaging in the past, also noted that everyone will soon understand why he withheld comment. While ISW cannot confirm that Prigozhin will have a meeting with Putin, he had previously offered his critiques to Putin on the progress of the war and will likely seize this opportunity to his benefit.[15]

Putin may be taking measures to cultivate a cadre of milbloggers loyal to Putin and the Russian MoD to undermine Prigozhin’s effort to elevate himself. United Russia Party Central Executive Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin, United Russia State Duma parliamentarian Artyom Turovyi, and Donetsk People Republic Head and Putin ally Denis Pushilin met with several milbloggers on January 13.[16] These senior Putin allies presented a group of over 10 milbloggers – including Alexander Sladkov and a journalist who works for Wargonzo – an official certificate of thanks signed by Secretary of the General Council of the United Russia Party Andrey Turchak.[17] This is the latest event in a string of Kremlin efforts to cultivate ties with select milbloggers.[18] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin undertook efforts to co-opt Sladkov, Wargonzo lead milblogger Semen Pegov, and other milbloggers who were willing to sell out in exchange for political prestige.[19] Putin may seek to cultivate ties with these Kremlin-pliant milbloggers to marshal their media reach against the Prigozhin-aligned milbloggers’ efforts to promote Prigozhin and damage Putin’s reputation in the Russian information space.

High-ranking Ukrainian officials continue to forecast that Ukrainian and Russian operations will likely intensify in the spring of 2023, while a Russian offensive from Belarus remains unlikely. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated in a January 13 interview with the BBC that “spring is the best period to refresh [military] movement for all sides” and that Ukrainian officials understand that Russian forces will be ready to start a higher pace of operations in the spring and therefore Ukrainian forces need to be ready to do so as well.[20] Reznikov also stated that the Russian military could be trying to accumulate forces, ammunition, and weapons for an offensive from areas it already occupies in southern and eastern Ukraine.[21] Reznikov’s statement follows Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov’s statement that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring.[22] ISW has still not observed any indicators that Ukrainian forces intend to halt currently ongoing counteroffensive operations this winter in favor of conducting a major counteroffensive this spring. Ukrainian forces may instead use ongoing counteroffensive operations to set conditions for a potential larger counteroffensive operation this spring.[23] Reznikov’s forecast of a higher pace of Russian operations in the spring partially supports ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are likely preparing for an intended decisive military effort in 2023.[24]

Reznikov also stated that it “would take a lot of time” for Russian forces to prepare an offensive from Belarus and that the Russian military currently “has no resources” to support such an effort.[25] Ukrainian officials continue to routinely state that Russian forces are unlikely to invade Ukraine from Belarusian territory.[26] ISW continues to assess that the most dangerous course of action (MDCOA), a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus, remains unlikely and that Belarusian forces are highly unlikely to join the fighting in Ukraine.

Disagreement over how to respond to Russians who have fled abroad risks dividing Russian officials and exposing the gap between the Kremlin and certain extreme nationalist actors. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin proposed on January 12 that Russia amend its criminal code to confiscate the property of Russians who fled the country.[27] Occupation Head of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov praised Volodin’s proposal to punish the “scoundrels” who “betrayed” Russia.[28] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified Volodin’s proposal and polled his subscribers, finding that the majority supported or strongly supported Volodin’s proposal.[29] Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov opposed Volodin’s proposal, however.[30] Peskov claimed that Russian citizens who left the country “are all our citizens, all equally, and could have different reasons for leaving” and stated that Russian authorities should create conditions to entice Russians abroad to return.[31] The Kremlin may support the return of Russians abroad in hopes of solving growing labor shortages and demographic challenges, avoiding the ostracizing of more moderate Russian audiences, or distancing itself from the demands of the nationalist community. The Kremlin has rhetorically distanced itself from the prevalent nationalist milblogger demands by re-appointing widely criticized and favored military officials and may be attempting to regain control over the Russian information space.[32]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly ordered Russian occupation authorities to deport Ukrainian children to Russia using medical schemes at a meeting with members of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on December 7. The Kremlin published a list of official orders on January 12 that Putin gave to HRC members on December 7. The document includes an order for Russian occupation officials to take unspecified measures to “meet healthcare system needs” in occupied Ukraine.[33] Zaporizhzhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov stated on January 12 that Putin personally ordered occupation authorities to administer preventative medical examinations to children in occupied Ukraine and that over 110,000 Ukrainian students have undergone medical examinations in occupied Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[34] Rogov stated that over 450 Russian “specialists” from Crimea and Adygea are conducting these examinations and are discovering thousands of children with undiagnosed medical conditions and sending them – possibly to Russia – for “treatment.”[35] Putin previously thanked Russians for their efforts to send children from occupied Ukrainian territory on “holidays” in Russia in his annual New Year’s speech.[36] ISW has previously reported instances of Russian officials using the guise of “holidays” and vacation schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea.[37] ISW maintains that the forced deportation of Ukrainian children represents a possible violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Key Takeaways

  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 13 that Russian forces seized Soledar on the evening of January 12.
  • The MoD’s initial announcement (which did not mention the Wagner Group) sparked a significant backlash within the Russian information space, forcing the MoD to issue a second announcement crediting Wagner.
  • Prigozhin likely seeks to use the victory in Soledar as a bargaining tool to elevate his authority in Russia.
  • Putin may be taking measures to cultivate a cadre of milbloggers loyal to Putin and the Russian MoD to undermine Prigozhin’s effort to elevate himself.
  • High-ranking Ukrainian officials continue to forecast an intensification of Ukrainian and Russian operations in the spring of 2023 and that a Russian offensive from Belarus remains unlikely.
  • Russian officials’ responses to Russians who have fled abroad risks dividing the Kremlin and the ultra-nationalist pro-war community even further.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly ordered Russian occupation officials to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under medical relocation schemes.
  • Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line while Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka.
  • Ukrainian Intelligence reported that Russian forces seek to raise personnel numbers to two million by an unspecified date.
  • Ukrainian partisan attacks continue to divert Russian resources away from the frontline to rear areas in occupied territories.

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