Copyright © 2024

The work of Euromaidan Press is supported by the International Renaissance Foundation

When referencing our materials, please include an active hyperlink to the Euromaidan Press material and a maximum 500-character extract of the story. To reprint anything longer, written permission must be acquired from [email protected].

Privacy and Cookie Policies.

Report reveals Russian six-year-long disinfo operation that relied on forged docs, targeted Ukraine, West

Report reveals Russian six-year-long disinfo operation that relied on forged docs, targeted Ukraine, West
The New York-based social media analysis company Graphika researched Russian information operations throughout six years which resulted in the report Exposing Secondary Infektion. The disinformation operation dubbed “Secondary Infektion” started in early 2014. The materials in several languages published on more than 300 online platforms target Russia’s perceived enemies, aiming at sowing discord between them. The actions of the actor behind Secondary infection differ from those of the infamous “Kremlin troll factory” and the Russian military intelligence (GRU).

Secondary Infektion

Secondary Infektion, a long-running Russian information operation, was first revealed in 2019 as the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) analyzed the activities of 16 fake accounts emanating in Russia that were taken down by Facebook in May. The researchers uncovered the large-scale influence operation that involved scores of fake accounts writing in nine languages on over 30 social media and blogging platforms.

Graphika went deeper and from November 2019 to May 2020 found the traces of the Secondary Infektion activities spanned over 300 online platforms, from industry giants such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube to “niche discussion forums in Pakistan and Australia.” In total, the researchers uncovered over 2,500 pieces of content posted across six years.

According to Graphika, Secondary Infektion is “a series of operations run by a large-scale, persistent threat actor from Russia” that worked in parallel to the Internet Research Agency (IRA, better known as Putin ally Prigozhin’s “troll factory”) and the GRU but was systematically different in its approach. The central entity behind multiple campaigns on social media “was already active in 2014 and was still running in early 2020.”

Key finds

According to Graphika’s report, the activities of the group began in January 2014 and extended into early 2020.

Rather than inauthentic but well-developed personas like those typically used by Prugozhin’s trolls, most accounts used to spread “Secondary Infektion” content were “single-use burners” abandoned after one post.

Image: Graphika
The group used fake accounts and forged documents to inflict conflict between the Western countries, and primarily targeted Ukraine.

Researchers also found that the group was active on campaigns such as the elections in the US in 2016, France in 2017, and in Sweden in 2018. And it was part of the Russian efforts to discredit the World Anti-Doping Agency.

What made this group different from IRA and GRU is that it consistently used sophisticated techniques to cover its tracks while trying to achieve any measurable engagement.

Key narratives and targets

Secondary Infektion wasn’t a static campaign and its subjects shifted over time, however, the report stresses, “Ukraine was a perennial target.”

Countries mentioned or targeted by Secondary Infektion, total number of stories. Infographic: Graphika


Posts on Ukraine from May 2015 (left) and May 2019 (right).

Graphika identified nine main topics among the narratives pushed by Secondary Infection which happened to be widely present among those surfacing in the Russian propaganda outlets,

  • Ukraine as a failed or unreliable state.
  • US and NATO aggression or interference in other countries.
  • European divisions and weakness.
  • Elections.
  • Migration and Islam.
  • Russia’s doping scandals in sporting competitions.
  • Türkiye as an aggressive, destabilizing force.
  • Defending Russia and its government.
  • Insulting Kremlin critics including Alexei Navalny and the Bellingcat investigative group.
Secondary Infektion: main themes over time. Graphic: Graphika

Forged documents

The report says that Secondary Infektion stands out “for its routine use of forged documents, sometimes surprisingly poorly crafted.” None of the other actors used this tactic with such volume and persistence. The researchers identified over 250 suspected forgeries that impersonated various Western leaders.

Tweet by Natalia Jaresko correcting the formatting of another Secondary Infektion forgery and calling out its poor English.

”It included fake letters, tweets and blog posts from leaders and officials including US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former White House Chief of Staff General John Kelly, various members of the US Senate Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees, representatives of the German, British, and Ukrainian governments, and former national leaders including Carl Bildt (Sweden) and Mikheil Saakashvili (Georgia),” the report reads.

Here are a few examples of forgeries mentioned in the study:

Secondary Infektion image
Screenshot of a tweet attributed to US Senator Marco Rubio, accusing the UK of interfering in the USmidterm elections of November 2018. Screenshot: Graphika
Secondary Infektion image
Forged letter attributed to members of the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and addressed to then-Secretary of State John Kerry, urging him to support exiled Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen against the Turkish government. Screenshot: Graphika

However, the report names only one effort of the campaign that really had an impact on the mainstream discussion of the countries it targeted: “the leak of apparently genuine US-UK trade documents on the eve of Britain’s general election in 2019, as exposed by [Graphika] in November 2019.”

The actor

The researchers didn’t find a confirmed attribution of Secondary Infektion to a specific group which poses a number of unanswered questions about the identity, goals, capabilities of the threat actor behind the operation.

Example of spreading a story from the (left) through Reddit, Medium and (center) to,, and (right). Graphic: Graphika

However, the more general attribution to the Russian origin of Secondary Infection has multiple indicators “both technical and contextual.” For example, Facebook first attributed a set of accounts to Russian actors in May 2019, so did Reddit in the case of the US-UK trade leaks.

The initial target of the operation at its very beginning was the Russian opposition, then it shifted focus to Ukraine just when Russia invaded Crimea and unleashed war in the Donbas.

“The content of the campaigns closely mapped Russian preoccupations. The most striking example is the way that Secondary Infektion suddenly began attacking Türkiye after Türkiye shot down a Russian jet: the downing happened on November 25, 2015, and Secondary Infektion’s first attack on Türkiye came just one week later, on December 1,” the report reads.

Other topics also matched Kremlin’s narratives as well.

More clues came from the use of language with specific errors characteristic of Russian native speakers that would be insufficient for attribution alone, but can be viewed as a point of corroboration. Among the typical erors the report mentions,

“…difficulties with the use of “a” and “the,” as in the phrase “first the Europe, then the world,” difficulties with the word order in questions, as in “Why the truth is concealed?“, and difficulties with the possessive genitive, as in “3.15 million Germany’s new citizens.”

“Mayday! First the Europe, then the rest.” Secondary Infektion video dated August 2, 2016. The language error is especially glaring in the mid-screen, all-caps format. Screenshot: Graphika

Read the full report here

You could close this page. Or you could join our community and help us produce more materials like this.  We keep our reporting open and accessible to everyone because we believe in the power of free information. This is why our small, cost-effective team depends on the support of readers like you to bring deliver timely news, quality analysis, and on-the-ground reports about Russia's war against Ukraine and Ukraine's struggle to build a democratic society. A little bit goes a long way: for as little as the cost of one cup of coffee a month, you can help build bridges between Ukraine and the rest of the world, plus become a co-creator and vote for topics we should cover next. Become a patron or see other ways to support. Become a Patron!

To suggest a correction or clarification, write to us here

You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter

Please leave your suggestions or corrections here

    Euromaidan Press

    We are an independent media outlet that relies solely on advertising revenue to sustain itself. We do not endorse or promote any products or services for financial gain. Therefore, we kindly ask for your support by disabling your ad blocker. Your assistance helps us continue providing quality content. Thank you!

    Related Posts