Russia will be combat-ready again by 2027 — Estonia’s military chief sets a two-year clock for NATO

In an essay first published in the Estonian Defense Forces Yearbook 2025 and republished by public broadcaster ERR, the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, Andrus Merilo, sets a deadline and a formula for his country's preparations against Russia.

"War has not gone anywhere from the European continent. On the contrary, unfortunately it is more real than ever before," Merilo writes, naming Russia's invasion of Ukraine as its clearest proof. The Ukrainians' sacrifice, he argues, has given Estonia the chance to prepare for a kind of modern war no one expected before the invasion — a chance, he writes, Estonia must not waste.

Earlier European and NATO‑aligned intelligence assessments have warned that Russia could be capable of launching an attack on EU or NATO members within the next several years, with some reports pointing to 2030 or even earlier as a plausible timeframe. These analyses suggest Moscow would seek to exploit regional vulnerabilities and test Western defenses, prompting EU states to accelerate military preparations and contingency planning by the end of the decade.

Russia's posture after the Ukraine war

According to Merilo, the war in Ukraine will not end with Russia neutralized in Estonia's direction. After what he calls the de facto end of the fighting, Russia will rebuild while continuing to probe and prepare new targets through destabilization campaigns. "2027 is in my estimation the year when Russia's combat readiness will be restored, and if it then senses a favorable opportunity to use its military somewhere, then it will do so," he writes.

The Russia that emerges from the Ukraine war, Merilo argues, will be a state "whose entire economy is directed at the war industry and which has an army with strong modern war experience, equipment, and a dictator whose hope of remaining in power until the end of his life depends on keeping his country at war." He adds Russia's "imperialist ambitions" to that list.

Citing former US Joint Chiefs chairman General Mark Milley on the start of the war in Ukraine, Merilo notes that warnings alone do not protect a victim from surprise — Milley, he reports, attributed past failures to a human tendency to deny tragedy, a desire not to panic the public, and an overconfidence in understanding Russia. Estonian society, Merilo warns, risks falling into the same trap.

A formula: R = M × W × A

Merilo distills Estonia's task into a single equation: R = M × W × A. R stands for resistance, M for means — people, weapons, vehicles, ammunition, all material — W for the will to fight and endure hardship, and A for authorization, covering both Estonia's own freedom to act in situations short of direct military threat and its allies' freedom to act alongside it from the first moment a need arises. As long as none of the three components breaks, Merilo writes, Estonian resistance cannot be broken.

Quoting Thucydides, he frames the stakes: "Power plays are only between equals. The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."

Five priority areas before 2027

Merilo names five areas the Estonian Defense Forces must lift to a "new normal" before 2027.

The first is the will to fight, which he describes as an individual and collective decision to keep fighting despite the risk of death, and which Russia, in his words, is very skilled at corroding. The second is a sustainable human resources strategy, drafted by the Estonian Defense Resources Agency and centered on motivated, competent commanders at every level. The third is situational awareness translated into a shared understanding of the threat, so that, in Merilo's formulation, "if a private citizen asks on the street what the defense forces are preparing against, then the answer must consistently be the same."

The fourth is combat readiness across air, land, sea and cyber domains, including a review of procurement priorities to bring in capabilities the Ukraine war has flagged as essential, accelerated where needed. Merilo writes that this requires a "gap year" focused on training active-duty personnel to absorb lessons from Ukraine before passing them on to conscripts.

The fifth is an effective kill chain capable of carrying effects preemptively across the border. "We must ensure that we have the capability to identify targets, track them, direct effects on them and assess the results," Merilo writes, adding that Estonia must also have the authorization and the courage to take those effects to the other side of the border when needed.

"We will never start a war"

Merilo is explicit that this is not a doctrine of first strike, but a refusal to wait passively at the line. "We will never start a war, but we must not be passive when it is clear that Russian armed forces are moving towards the Estonian border," he writes.

He also reports that a 24-hour combat watch is already in place inside the Estonian Defense Forces, and says meeting the 2027 benchmark will require the contribution of every service member, including a redesigned conscript training cycle that integrates conscripts into that watch.

A motivated soldier, Merilo writes, needs a reliable rear — families protected and fed, and a society prepared to bear hardship so that the army can keep fighting. The Estonian Defense Forces, he says, must hold society's vigilance without either fueling panic or downplaying the threat. Independent resistance — means times will — reinforced by allies' real authorization to act, he concludes, can eliminate the adversary's options by deterring escalation before it begins.