Ukraine scrambles to heat homes as Russia bombs gas infrastructure

Russia is weaponizing winter against Ukraine’s civilians, systematically destroying the country’s gas infrastructure.
a house in kyiv damaged on 10 oct 2025 russian attack
A residential building in Kyiv hit by a Russian aerial attack on 10 October 2025. Courtesy photo.
Ukraine scrambles to heat homes as Russia bombs gas infrastructure

Since the Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement expired in early 2025, Russian strikes have intensified against Ukrainian gas production and infrastructure. The strategy is deliberate: disrupt Ukraine’s heating season and freeze millions of Ukrainians out of their homes—a tactic that constitutes genocide under international law.

The numbers tell the story. According to Naftogaz of Ukraine, Ukrgasvydobuvannya, and the Razumkov Centre, Russia’s targeted attacks in late 2024 and early 2025 cut Ukraine’s gas production by 40%—approximately 8 billion cubic meters annually. Direct damages: €2-4 billion. In autumn 2025, Russian strikes on gas production facilities in the Kharkiv, Poltava, and Sumy regions caused devastating damage to production capacities in these critically important areas.

On the night of 10 October, Russia launched nearly 500 airborne weapons at Ukraine’s critical infrastructure: 465 Shahed and Gerbera drones, plus 32 missiles, including hypersonic Kinzhals and Iskander ballistic missiles.

Russia has attacked Ukraine’s civilian gas infrastructure seven times in October. “I am addressing everyone with a request to use gas as sparingly as possible. Today, every cubic metre saved counts,” CEO of Naftogaz Sergii Koretskyi noted.

From self-sufficiency to dependency

Ukraine’s normal production of 20 billion cubic meters annually covers domestic demand. Russia’s systematic attacks have shattered this self-sufficiency.

Russia’s targeting of gas fields, storage facilities, pipelines, compressor stations, and distribution centers has forced Ukraine into critical dependence on EU imports. Worse, Ukraine must now make emergency purchases during winter—when European gas prices peak.

Russia’s attacks extend beyond production to import routes. In August 2025, Russia damaged the Orlivka gas compressor station near Romania twice. The station is critical for alternative gas supplies from Azerbaijan and energy security across the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania triangle.

The message: Russia wants to control all of Ukraine’s gas supply routes.

Despite the attacks, Ukraine’s gas transmission system continues operating normally. September production reached 45 million cubic meters daily, supplemented by imports from Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia—including a third through Naftogaz’s partnership with Polish energy company ORLEN. For the 2025-2026 winter, Ukraine has contracted 450 million cubic meters of American LNG for delivery through terminals in Poland and Lithuania.

A race against time

Russia’s attacks on production, combined with low reserves and cold weather, forced Ukraine into emergency gas imports in February to cover the deficit at the end of the 2024-2025 heating season. According to ExPro data, Ukraine imported nearly 2.1 billion cubic meters in the first half of 2025—more than twelve times the volume from the same period in 2024, and the largest first-half import since 2020.

In September, Ukraine injected 45-50 million cubic meters of gas daily into underground storage, increasing reserves by 26% from the previous month. Since the injection season began, nearly 6.7 billion cubic meters have been stored—1.7 times more than in 2024.

To reach the target of 13.2 billion cubic meters by 1 November, Naftogaz must import an additional 500 million to 1.5 billion cubic meters to compensate for damaged production. By September 2025, Ukraine had imported 3.3 billion cubic meters—compared to just 275 million in the first nine months of 2024.

According to Energy Minister Svitlana Grinchuk, Ukraine plans to increase gas imports by 30% this winter.

Naftogaz secured over €1 billion in international support from the European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Norwegian grants, supplemented by Ukrainian state bank credits to finance these emergency imports.

On 23 October, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers allocated €174 million to Naftogaz for gas imports to purchase 430 million cubic meters of natural gas. Norway will provide an additional $150 million for gas purchases in early 2026.

The EBRD is preparing an additional €500 million loan to cover gas imports made necessary by Russia’s infrastructure strikes.

The infrastructure protection crisis

While securing sufficient gas volumes is crucial, a critical vulnerability remains: Ukraine lacks adequate protection for gas compressors and distribution stations. Having gas in storage means nothing if transmission infrastructure is destroyed.

Further Russian strikes could fragment Ukraine’s gas system into isolated islands—production remnants in the northeast, storage facilities in the west, and import pipelines along the western border, unable to connect.

The damage already inflicted threatens Ukraine’s ability to provide basic needs such as heating, gas, electricity, and fuel.

Ukraine needs effective anti-drone and anti-missile protection for gas extraction, transportation, and distribution infrastructure, air defense for cities, and physical protection of critical facilities.

Government response and price controls

The Ukrainian government is attempting to balance market stability with consumer protection. In October, authorities raised fixed gas prices for gas-fired producers while freezing residential rates to protect 12.4 million consumers.

The government extended obligations requiring state producers to sell gas at fixed, below-market prices through March 2026 to keep Naftogaz functioning. The Gas Transmission System Operator must purchase a minimum of 340 million cubic meters of imported gas to ensure supply security and diversification.

The international imperative

Russia is deploying full-scale energy terror against Ukraine, weaponizing winter to create a humanitarian crisis. The international community must recognize this strategy for what it is: systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure designed to make Ukrainian territory uninhabitable.

Ukraine urgently needs advanced air defense systems, anti-drone technology, and rapid-deployment protective measures for critical energy facilities.

The cost of prevention is measured in millions. The cost of failure will be measured in Ukrainian lives and a humanitarian catastrophe that reverberates across Europe.

As temperatures drop, the question is not whether Russia will continue these attacks, but whether the international community will provide the tools Ukraine needs to defend its people.

Kateryna Kontsur is an energy policy expert at Razom We Stand with over 20 years of experience in regulatory policy, EU energy law, and renewable energy systems. She advocates for Ukraine’s energy independence and supply diversification and holds advanced project management and financial analysis degrees.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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