North Korea has played a crucial role in sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine, enabling Moscow to continue its offensive in Donbas and effectively push Ukrainian forces out of parts of the Kursk Oblast, says Hugh Griffiths, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
North Korea has dramatically deepened its military and strategic partnership with Russia, marking a significant shift in the global security landscape. Pyongyang has not only supplied Russia with vast quantities of ammunition—covering up to 50% of Moscow’s war needs, including millions of artillery shells, rockets, and ballistic missiles—but has also deployed thousands of troops to support Russian operations in Ukraine.
“It’s fair to say that North Korea has prevented Russia from losing this war. Pyongyang’s contribution has been strategically vital. North Korean artillery shells are a strategic necessity. Without their support, Vladimir Putin would have faced defeat in Ukraine,” says Griffiths.
Uk Yang, a fellow at South Korea’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies, emphasized that North Korea is the only country capable of supplying Russia with munitions at such a massive scale.
“North Korea has undoubtedly sent its own military stockpiles to Russia. If Moscow needed only limited supplies, it could have turned elsewhere. But only North Korea can deliver in such large quantities,” he says.
Military expert Yurii Fedorov also notes that Russia’s defense industry is incapable of meeting the army’s demands for ammunition despite significant investments.
“Even with huge financial injections and the hiring of hundreds of thousands of new workers, the Russian defense sector still cannot fulfill its most basic wartime needs,” Fedorov stresses.
Meanwhile, military expert Robert Farley reports in 19FortyFive that the war in Ukraine could make North Korea’s army stronger. Pyongyang’s forces have gained significant combat experience in Kursk Oblast—an opportunity rarely available to armies that lack the chance to develop battlefield skills on their own.
Farley notes that the performance of North Korean troops during their initial deployment in Kursk was poor, with attacks in open terrain leading to heavy casualties.
“But as time has gone on the North Korean performance has improved. North Korean soldiers appear to be fit, competent, and loyal to their commanders. Ukrainians at the front have reported that North Korean soldiers fight to the death and commit suicide in order to avoid capture,” Farley writes.
Through these operations, North Korean forces have gained valuable experience fighting on a battlefield dominated by drones. Additionally, Farley says that Russian forces have improved their coordination with North Korean units, providing them with air and drone support during attacks.
“Moreover, there’s little reason to hope that the North Koreans are about to go home. Moscow and Pyongyang can easily find legal justification for the use of KPA troops in the Donbas, and despite the efforts of the Trump administration the war does not appear to be grinding to a close,” he concludes.
Farley adds that North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia are acquiring firsthand experience with modern tactics and technologies—knowledge that South Korean forces can only simulate in virtual environments.
