Wagner group stopped troops 200 km from Moscow. Russian authorities announce "counter-terrorist measures" in Moscow city and oblast. Prigozhin says, the Wagner group to return to field camps.
Prigozhin stops Wagner forces 200 km away from Moscow, says they return to field camps
Daily overview — Summary report, June 24

The General Staff’s operational update regarding the Russian invasion as of 18.00 pm, June 24, 2023 is in the dropdown menu below:

- Volyn and Polissya axes: no significant changes.

- Sivershchyna and Slobozhanshchyna axes: the adversary launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Pavlivka (Sumy oblast), Hatyshche, and Pletenivka (Kharkiv oblast). The invaders fired mortars and artillery at the settlements of Karpovychi, Karabany, Mykhal’chyna Sloboda (Chernihiv oblast), Seredyna-Buda, Shalyhyne, Popivka, Atyns’ke, Iskryskivshchyna, Volfyne, Pavlivka, Stukalivka, Obody, Kindrativka (Sumy oblast), Hur’yiv Kozachok, Udy, Veterynarne, Kozacha Lopan’, Strilecha, Oliinykove, Neskuchne, Ohirtseve, Hatyshche, Vovchans’k, Nesterne, Pletenivka, Budarky, Zemlyanky, Ozerne, Vil’khuvatka, Chuhunivka, Topoli (Kharkiv oblast).
- Kupiansk axis: the adversary shelled Krasne Pershe, Fyholivka, Dvorichna, Zapadne, Kup’yans’k, Masyutivka, Kyslivka, and Berestove (Kharkiv oblast) with artillery and mortars.

- Lyman axis: the adversary conducted unsuccessful offensives towards Vesele and south of Dibrova. The invaders launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Nevs’ke (Luhansk Oblast), Bilohorivka, and Sivers’k (Donetsk Oblast). Nevs’ke, Bilohorivka (Luhansk oblast), Tors’ke, Serebryanka, Verkhn’yokam’yans’ke, Spirne, and Rozdolivka (Donetsk oblast) were shelled with artillery.

- Bakhmut axis: the adversary launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Khromove, Ivanivske, Pervomaiske, and Predtechyne (Donetsk oblast). Vasyukivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka, Chasiv Yar, Ivanivske, Pivdenne, and New York (Donetsk oblast) suffered from enemy artillery shelling.
- Avdiivka axis: the adversary attempted offensive operations in the vicinity of Avdiivka (Donetsk oblast), to no success. The invaders launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Novokalynove, Ocheretyne, Nevelske, Avdiivka, and Sjeverne. The occupant forces fired artillery at the settlements of Berdychi, Avdiivka, Tonen’ke, Karlivka, and Nevel’s’ke (Donetsk oblast).
- Marinka axis: the enemy conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of Mar’inka (Donetsk oblast), to no success. At the same time, the settlements of Krasnohorivka, Mar’inka, and Heorhiivka (Donetsk oblast) were shelled with enemy artillery.
- Shakhtarske axis: the enemy conducted unsuccessful offensives towards Vuhledar and Zolota Nyva. The occupant forces launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Zolota Nyva, Storozheve, Makarivka, and Blahodatne (Donetsk oblast). The invaders shelled the settlements of Paraskoviivka, Novomykhailivka, Blahodatne, Vil’ne Pole, Zelene Pole, Novopil’, Vodyane, Vuhledar, and Storozheve (Donetsk oblast).

Zaporizhzhia Battle Map. June 23, 2023. Source: ISW. - Zaporizhzhia and Kherson axes: the adversary stays on the defensive, focusing its main efforts on preventing the advance of our troops. The enemy attempted to regain the lost positions near Makarivka (Donetsk oblast). The invaders launched airstrikes in the vicinities of settlements of Novodanylivka, Orikhiv, Stepnohirs’k (Zaporizhzhia oblast), Vesele, Kozats’ke, and Antonivka (Kherson oblast). The occupant forces shelled the settlements of Novodarivka, Temyrivka, Levadne, Malynivka, Hulyaipole, Huliaipilske, Charivne, Zaliznychne, Bilohir’ya, Novodanylivka, Omel’nyk, Chervona Krynytsya, Preobrazhenka, Orikhiv, Yehorivka, Novoandriivka, Stepove, P’yatykhatky (Zaporizhzhia oblast), Prydniprovs’ke, Nikopol’ (Dnipropetrovska oblast), Kachkarivka, Respublikanets’, Kozats’ke, Shlyakhove, Burhunka, Zolota Balka, Dudchany, Ivanivka, Molodizhne, Bilozerka, Romashkove, Antonivka, Zelenivka, Kherson, Zymivnyk, Dniprovs’ke, Yantarne, Berehove, Veletens’ke (Kherson oblast).

Military Updates

- In the early hours of 24 June 2023, the feud between Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group and the Russian MoD escalated into outright military confrontation.
- In an operation characterised by Prigozhin as a ‘march for freedom’, Wagner Group forces crossed from occupied Ukraine into Russia in at least two locations. In Rostov-on-Don, Wagner has almost certainly occupied key security sites, including the HQ which runs Russia’s military operations in Ukraine.
- Further Wagner units are moving north through Vorenezh Oblast, almost certainly aiming to get to Moscow. With very limited evidence of fighting between Wagner and Russian security forces, some have likely remained passive, acquiescing to Wagner.
- Over the coming hours, the loyalty of Russia’s security forces, and especially the Russian National Guard, will be key to how the crisis plays out. This represents the most significant challenge to the Russian state in recent times.
- Since summer 2022, the Russian Navy has invested in major enhancements to the security of the Black Sea Fleet’s main base at Sevastopol.
- This includes at least four layers of nets and booms across the harbour entrance. In recent weeks, these defences have highly likely also been augmented by an increased number of trained marine mammals.
- Imagery shows a near doubling of floating mammal pens in the harbour which highly likely contain bottle-nosed dolphins. In Arctic waters, the navy also uses Beluga whales and seals. Russia has trained animals for a range of missions, but the ones housed in Sevastopol harbour are highly likely intended to counter enemy divers.
Losses of the Russian army
As of Saturday 24 June, the approximate losses of weapons and military equipment of the Russian Armed Forces from the beginning of the invasion to the present day:- Personnel – about 223910 (+580)
- Tanks – 4024 (+7)
- Armoured combat vehicles – 7804 (+6)
- Artillery systems – 4015 (+30)
- Multiple rocket launchers –MLRS - 619 (+2)
- Air defence means – 383 (+4)
- Aircraft - 314 (+0)
- Helicopters - 308 (+1)
- Automotive technology and fuel tanks – 6731 (+23)
- Vessels/boats - 18 (+0)
- UAV operational and tactical level – 3460 (+13)
- Special equipment – 548 (+3)
- Mobile SRBM system – 4 (+0)
- Cruise missiles – 1228 (+14)
Humanitarian
Almost 700 cases of death and injury of civilians from mines have been recorded in Ukraine, - State Emergency Service, Censor.net reports, citing Serhii Reva, the head of the humanitarian demining organization department of the State Emergency Service, with reference to Ukrinform. “The war makes its adjustments in people's lives, and citizens have become more cautious. But at the same time, every week in Ukraine one or another case is recorded when there is an injury or, unfortunately, the death of people. And as of today, unfortunately, we have a number in about 700 recorded cases, these are those when people were injured or died from explosive objects," he said. The representative of the State Emergency Service also cited data from the Ministry of Reintegration that about 200 people died from landmines in Ukraine, including children. Therefore, demining work is not only demining of explosive objects, it is also conducting explanatory work among the population, bringing to them the rules, recommendations regarding when a person has discovered something (a suspicious object - ed.), what he needs to do at the same time, - noted Reva.” Ukraine brings back bodies of 51 dead soldiers, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Oleg Kotenko, Commissioner for Persons Missing in Special Circumstances. “On 23 June, Ukraine brought back the bodies of 51 defenders killed in action. […] He added that the process of recovering the bodies of Ukrainian soldiers continues.” Ukraine has potential to produce food for 600M people, Ukrinform reports, citing Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine on Telegram. “Taras Vysotsky, first deputy minister of agrarian policy and food of Ukraine, believes that Ukraine has the potential to increase the number of people consuming Ukrainian food to 600 million in the coming years. Vysotsky noted that a discussion on the importance of the Ukrainian agricultural sector in ensuring international food security was held at Ukraine Recovery Conference in London. According to the deputy minister, during the event, the Ukrainian side received assurances of investors' readiness to invest in Ukraine's agricultural sector. As Ukrinform reported, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine presented a strategy for the agricultural sector’s development for the next ten years at Ukraine Recovery Conference in London. According to the strategy, Ukraine's grain and oilseed production should increase to 150 million tonnes in 10 years.”Environmental
Water level in Zaporizhzhia NPP cooling pond continues to drop insignificantly, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing an announcement by Energoatom, Ukraine's national regulator of nuclear power plants. “A slight drop in the water level in the cooling pond of the Zaporizhzhia NPP was recorded on 23 June, for the second day in a row. As of 06:00 on 23 June, a slight decrease in the water level in the cooling pond has been recorded. Currently, it is 16.60 metres," the message reads. Energoatom also reported a slight decrease in the water level the day before, on 22 June. At that time, it was 16.61 m. For comparison, as of 14 June, when the water level remained unchanged, it was16.67 m. At the same time, even with a slight decrease in the water level, this is enough for the plant to keep running. The situation remains stable and under control, Energoatom notes. The water level in the TPP canal, from where the ZNPP pond is fed if necessary, is currently at 11.15 metres. It should be noted that the water level in the canal has not dropped significantly recently, and its indicators no longer depend on the Kakhovka reservoir, Energoatom emphasised.” What to do in case of disaster at ZNPP: Ukrainians advised to stay at home for day, Ukrinform reports, citing Ihor Klymenko, the Minister of Internal Affairs. “If people are at home in the event of a disaster at Zaporizhzhia NPP and it is too far to the shelter, they should not run to it during the day. The first thing is to lock yourself in your home for up to 1 day. Until the local authorities, civil defense authorities give an appropriate order to move to a particular area or move around a certain territory, he said. Klymenko added that the radioactive background that may be in the air will last about 1 day. We are talking about a possible thermal release, which will lose its highest concentration during the day. That is, the radioactive background will decrease by 80% during the day, the minister assured. According to him, during this time, if there are no evacuation measures, every citizen should lock themselves in their rooms and close the ventilation. Ventilation systems - air conditioners, heaters - should be turned off. Citizens should also seal all openings in their homes or apartments with either a dampened cloth or tape. "It is necessary to stay in rooms without windows and external doors - it means that everything should be clearly closed. Radiation is, by and large, dust. And protection from dust, if you are outside, is a regular respirator or a mask, which we used during the coronavirus. This is all you need to know," the minister added. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs urged people to watch the media, which will inform the public about the situation and safety measures. As reported, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky instructed Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko to take the necessary measures and to educate the public about the risks at Zaporizhzhia NPP.” Demilitarization of ZNPP depends on IAEA, international community, Ukrinform reports. “The demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant depends on the IAEA and the international community. Deputy Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Vadym Skibitskyi said this in an interview with RBC-Ukraine. Much depends on the IAEA and its leadership, on the international community, which will still put pressure on the Kremlin to fulfill the basic conditions and secure not just the nuclear facility, but the entire region where the power plant is located, he said. According to Skibitskyi, the intelligence service does not rule out the possibility of either a planned attack or an incident leading to an accident at ZNPP. Therefore, we clearly advocate that the entire territory of the nuclear power plant should be demilitarized. All military units, weapons and military equipment should be withdrawn from there, he said. As reported, on June 22, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that the Russian Federation was considering a scenario of a terrorist attack at the Zaporizhzhia NPP and had prepared everything for this. In addition, Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Kyrylo Budanov informed that the Russians had mined a cooler at Zaporizhzhia NPP, and if it was disabled, there was a significant likelihood that there would be big problems.”Legal
Reintegration of Crimea will be more difficult than in case of other territories, Censor.net reports, citing Deputy Prime Minister - Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk in an interview with Ukrinform. “Yes, the reintegration of Crimea will not be simple. It will be more difficult than the reintegration of other temporarily occupied territories and will require a separate approach. And, perhaps, special legislation. Regarding hardness and softness: we must be tough in our approaches to the restoration of Ukrainian state power and in matters of justice and fairness, Vereshchuk emphasized. At the same time, she added, it is necessary to be flexible in matters of economic and humanitarian reintegration. The main thing is not to repeat the mistakes of the past. There should be no Russian influence on the peninsula. This is the guarantee of our security. Here we are betting on new personnel: young, motivated, and competent. They will do everything properly, she said. According to the Defense Intelligence, a large part of the occupation administration removed their assets and families from the temporarily occupied peninsula. They consider withdrawal from Crimea as one of the real scenarios.Support
For the success of counteroffensive, Ukraine needs more aviation and ammunition, - Kuleba, Censor.net reports, citing EP. “Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that for a successful counteroffensive, the armed forces need more planes, helicopters and MANPADS to end Russian dominance in the air. According to the minister, throwing Russia out of the sky is the second most important challenge after the supply of artillery ammunition. He called for such assistance. The biggest problem of the counteroffensive is the stability of the supply of artillery ammunition, and in sufficient quantity. And the second biggest problem of the counteroffensive is Russia's dominance in the air, Kuleba explained. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the current counteroffensive, or the potential next one, should not be considered decisive. Kuleba also admitted that if his results are not perceived as successful in the West, the voices of those who insist on negotiations will become louder." Ukrainian Pion guns now fire US-made projectiles, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Militarnyi portal, with reference to the Twitter account of one of the fighters of the 43rd Brigade of Ukraine's Armed Forces. “Ukrainian gunners have received US-made 203-mm M106 projectiles for their 2C7 Pion (Peony) self-propelled guns. According to the publication, such projectiles are a part of military aid from the US. The high-explosive M106 projectiles were originally used to be fired from an M-110, the US 203.2-mm self-propelled howitzer. Militarnyi writes that after more than a year of active hostilities, stocks of Soviet-made projectiles for the Pion guns are running low, so the allies decided to help Ukraine replenish the 203-mm ammunition. A 2C7 Pion is a Soviet 203-mm self-propelled gun designed to destroy priority ground-based targets and enemy fortifications.” Rheinmetall to Deliver 20 More Marder to Ukraine This Summer, European Pravda reports. “The German armaments group Rheinmetall has announced that it intends to deliver 20 more Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine this summer. According to Welt, the company confirmed the corresponding contract order announced in early June on Friday in Düsseldorf. The German government will pay for the previously stored equipment in Bundeswehr warehouses. It means that Ukraine will receive 60 Marder vehicles: 40 from Rheinmetall and 20 from Bundeswehr warehouses. Rheinmetall can make a further 60 available, and work on this is already underway at Rheinmetall's plants in Kassel (Hessen) and Unterlüß (Lower Saxony).” Duda: Poland Offered Training for Ukrainian Pilots on F-16, Ukrainska Pravda reports. “Poland could assist with training Ukrainian pilots on Western fighter jets, specifically F-16s, as they possess such aircraft and personnel with experience. We also offer our training when it comes to F-16 aircraft. As you know, we have a certain pool of F-16s. We have pilots with extensive experience working with F-16s, flying them in different places, not only in Poland. So we have the opportunity for this training, stated Polish President Andrzej Duda in an interview with Ukrainian television channels, including Espreso. He added that Poland had offered such training. I believe that this will contribute to Ukraine's victory and serve as a deterrent to the aggressor […]. Providing Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets was discussed during a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the "Ramstein" group) last week. Following the meeting, it became known that Ukraine's partners plan to approve a training programme for Ukrainian pilots, engineers, and technicians for the F-16 fighter jets by July. The training itself will take place in a specially established center in one of the European countries.” Türkiye Licensed Bayrak to Start Production of Drones in Ukraine, European Pravda reports. “The Turkish company Baykar has obtained the necessary licenses from the authorities to manufacture Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones in Ukraine. We have obtained the appropriate license permissions from Türkiye for the full production of Baykar TB2 and Akıncı unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine, Yeni Akit quotes Haluk Bayraktar, Baykar's CEO. The company plans to commence production in Ukraine in 2025. The total planned investment in the enterprise amounts to $95.5 million. […] According to Ukraine's Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov, the drones manufactured in Ukraine will be equipped with engines of Ukrainian production. Additionally, a training center will be established.” Danish, Croatian companies to produce demining equipment in Ukraine, Ukrinform reports. "On the sidelines of the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, two landmark memoranda were signed on the organization of the production of modern equipment for demining in Ukraine," Dmytro Kysylevsky, Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development, posted on Facebook. In particular, the Pozhmashyna industrial company is preparing production at its facilities in cooperation with the Hydrema Danish company. And the A3Tech-Ukraine company agreed on the production of special equipment using the technologies of the DOK-ING Croatian manufacturer of multi-purpose vehicles. If there is state order, the Danish government will provide funding, including grant funding, to meet the needs of the Ukrainian services in such equipment, Kysylevsky added.”New Developments
- "This is real": US highly attuned to situation in Russia, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing CNN. “Officials in the United States are closely following the events in Russia after the latest statements by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Private Military Group (PMC). As the source of the publication notes, unlike Prigozhin's previous statements about the ineptitude of the Russian Ministry of Defence, these comments do not appear to have followed a Ukrainian military breakthrough or tactical success. The source of the publication reports that in the United States, they consider Prigozhin's latest statements to be something more than his usual rhetoric. This is real, said a source of the outlet.”
- Putin informed of Prigozhin's "rebellion" 24/7, access to news being blocked in Russia, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Russian state-owned news agencies TASS; RBK; Novaya Gazeta; Telegram channel Sota; Vazhnie Istorii; Russian Service of the BBC. “Russian security officials have been regularly reporting to Russian President Vladimir Putin about the measures taken to counter the "armed rebellion" of the founder of Wagner Private Military Group (PMC) Yevgeny Prigozhin. There are now issues with accessing the news in Russia. According to TASS, citing a spokesman for Russian President Dmitry Peskov, security officials report to Putin around the clock about the measures they are taking in connection with Prigozhin's attempt to organise a rebellion."
- Putin to deliver video address, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Kremlin-aligned news agencyTASS. “Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, said that Putin would deliver an address "shortly". There is no information on the topic of his speech, but it is expected to be related to the events involving Yevgeny Prigozhin, Chief of the Wagner Private Military Company.”
- Russian authorities announce "counter-terrorist measures" in Moscow city and oblast, Ukrainska Pravda “Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and Moscow Region Governor Andrei Vorobyov have said that "counter-terrorist measures" are being implemented in the capital of the Russian Federation and the Moscow Oblast; in particular, they provide for additional control on the roads. In connection with the incoming information, anti-terrorist measures are being carried out in Moscow, aimed at strengthening security measures. Additional control on the roads has been introduced. Restriction of mass events is possible. Please treat the measures taken with understanding." Vorobyov also announced enhanced security measures in Moscow Oblast. Security measures have been strengthened in Moscow Oblast; the situation is controlled by law enforcement agencies and the FSB. Counter-terrorist measures are being carried out. Additional checks are possible on the roads in the southern direction; in this regard, I ask [the citizens], if possible, to refrain from using personal vehicles in the south of Moscow Oblast, especially outside the region."
- Prigozhin claims to have taken control of military targets in Rostov and heading for Moscow, Ukrainska Pravda “Evgeny Prigozhin, Head of the Wagner Private Military Group (PMC), claims that he took control of the military facilities of Rostov-on-Don, including an airfield, and that his soldiers have already shot down three Russian helicopters; he says they are now "heading for Moscow". He announced that the Wagner Group has taken control of the local headquarters building, military facilities, and the airfield.”
- FSB and Russian General Surovikin address Wagnerites, asks to stop their "march", Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Interfaxnews agency, Medusa outlet and Russian Telegram channels. “The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation called on the Wagner Private Military Group (PMC) militants not to obey the orders of Yevgeny Prigozhin and detain him, while General Sergei Surovikin recorded a video message, calling on the mercenaries to stop."
- Meeting on Ukraine’s Peace Formula to be held in Denmark, Ukrinform reports, citing CNN. “A meeting of high-ranking officials from Ukraine, as well as a number of Western nations and the Global South, will be held in Copenhagen in the coming days, where the Ukrainian Peace Formula will be discussed. Senior Western and Ukrainian officials are expected to meet in Copenhagen in the coming days to discuss President Volodymyr Zelensky's peace proposal, a Ukrainian government source told CNN. According to the source, representatives from the Global South are expected to attend. As reported earlier, in November 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky presented a 10-point Peace Plan to the G20 leaders in Bali to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The source did not reveal more details about the scheduled meeting.”
- Biden adviser to discuss achieving a just peace in Ukraine with non-Western countries, Ukrainska Pravda “US national security adviser Jake Sullivan is to meet in Denmark with representatives of the Global South to discuss how to achieve a just peace in Ukraine. This was stated at a briefing on Friday by John Kirby, Strategic Communications Coordinator of the White House National Security Council. As Kirby noted, Biden's national security adviser and the entire White House team work closely with the Ukrainians, whether it's talking to them about security assistance or this idea of a just peace and the principles behind that. […] Representatives of India, Brazil and South Africa, as well as Türkiye and possibly China, may attend the meeting, but their list has not yet been finalised.”
- One of Scholz’s party members, Tierze, called Russia invincible and called for diplomacy, net reports, citing European Pravda. The former president of the German Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierze, calls not to abandon the policy aimed at softening and balancing relations with Russia. The politician of the ruling Social Democratic Party believes that Russia is invincible militarily. Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to pay tribute to diplomacy again so that the guns are silenced as soon as possible. At the same time, Tierze emphasized that there should be military solidarity with Ukraine. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, is not the same as Russia, he also said. According to the ex-speaker, Russia remains an important part of Europe and, after Putin, should be part of the perspective of the pan-European security architecture.”
Assessment
- On the war.
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of June 23, 2022:
Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks in the Kupiansk area on June 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupiansk). Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Synkivka and established a small bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, but ISW is unable to confirm this claim. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces only participated in two engagements in the Kupiansk direction and that Russian forces have lost the initiative in the area.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to skirmish south of Kreminna on June 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Bilohorivka (12km southwest of Kreminna). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances west of Kreminna and in Bilohorivka, and that Russian forces entrenched themselves near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kreminna on June 22 and Shyplivka (9km south of Kreminna) on June 23.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 23. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were no combat engagements in the Bakhmut direction and that Russian and Ukrainian forces continued mutual counter-battery fire in the area. Satellite imagery published on June 22 indicates that Russian forces have constructed new fortifications near Semyhiria (16km southeast of Bakhmut) since May 18.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on June 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified successes near Avdiivka and also conducted offensive operations near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and Novomykhailivka. Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances southeast of Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka) between June 21 and June 22. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Staromykahilivka (18km southwest of Avdiivka) and captured unspecified positions. Combat footage published on June 21 reportedly shows Ukrainian forces attacking Russian positions southeast of Krasnohorivka.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on June 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to recapture lost positions near Makarivka, Donetsk Oblast (about 7km south of Velyka Novosilka). […] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border attempted to attack along the Levadne-Priyutne line (about 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and had some success near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka). The Russian MoD and a Russian milblogger confirmed that Russian forces maintain control over Urozhaine (9km due south of Velyka Novosilka). Russian milbloggers indicated that elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and unspecified Eastern Group of Forces units are fighting in this area.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops had partial success on the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line (just south of Orikhiv) and the Mala Tokmachka-Novofedorivka line (just southeast of Orikhiv). The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces deployed reserves to the Orikhiv area to defend against Ukrainian advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an attack on the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line, broke through towards Russian defensive lines, and advanced up to 1.5km in the Robotyne direction. Russian sources claimed that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 70th, 71st, and 291stMotorized Rifle Regiments of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending the area north of Robotyne. Russian milbloggers also claimed that positional fighting continued near Pyatykhatkhy (southwest of Orikhiv).
Ukrainian forces continued strikes on Russian rear areas in southern Ukraine on June 23. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops launched four Storm Shadow missiles at a Russian concentration area, reportedly a Rosgvardia base, in Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, about 175km southeast of Kherson City. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo additionally stated on June 23 that the June 22 Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar Bridge (along the E105 highway connecting Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea) was much worse than initially reported and that it will take 15 to 20 days for the bridge to reopen for traffic. Satellite imagery posted on June 23 additionally shows that Russian forces have begun constructing pontoon bridges under the Chonhar Bridge.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have launched an armed rebellion on June 23 to force a leadership change within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) which is unlikely to succeed. Prigozhin amplified a video from a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel on June 23 which reportedly shows the aftermath of a missile strike on a rear-area Wagner camp and accused the Russian MoD of conducting that strike. ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the video, and it may have been manufactured for informational purposes. Prigozhin used the video to then justify his most explicit rhetorical escalation against the Russian MoD to date and a call for action against the Russian MoD. Prigozhin claimed that the Wagner Commanders’ Council made the decision to stop “the evil brought by the military leadership” who neglect and destroy the lives of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. Prigozhin urged the Russian people not to resist, to remain calm, remain in their homes, and warned that Wagner will “deal” with those who destroyed Russian soldiers before returning to the frontlines in Ukraine after restoring justice for all. Prigozhin also notably accused Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu of personally planning an operation to destroy Wagner and claimed that 25,000 Wagner personnel are prepared to act. Prigozhin later posted an audio message qualifying his previous statements and claiming that there is no “coup,” only a “march for justice.”
Early reports following Prigozhin’s statements suggest that Russian internal security forces are activating in response to Prigozhin’s statements and possible Wagner moves, primarily in Moscow and Rostov, and the Kremlin appears opposed to Prigozhin’s actions. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that security measures have been strengthened in Moscow and that Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) special police (OMON) and special rapid response (SOBR) units have been alerted of the situation. Russian sources posted footage reportedly showing military equipment moving through the streets of Moscow. TASS also reported that Russian military personnel and law enforcement have set up military posts and checkpoints near the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and BBC’s Russia Service reported that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) employees and SOBR units have set up roadblocks along the Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov highway. A Russian milblogger also claimed that the “Grom” special forces detachment of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has additionally activated. The FSB and Russian Anti-Terrorism Committee have both opened cases against Prigozhin. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been informed and is aware of the situation. The emergency activation of the domestic security forces and the Kremlin’s direct response suggest that the Kremlin was very likely not aware of, and is explicitly opposed to, Prigozhin’s actions.
Prigozhin has established the informational conditions for this effort earlier in the day by accusing the Russian MoD and unnamed oligarchs of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in order to launch the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Prigozhin released an interview in which he stated that the Russian MoD intentionally deceived the Russian public and Putin about an impending Ukrainian offensive with NATO support in 2022 and about the increase in Ukrainian aggression before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Prigozhin asserted that the situation in eastern Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was no different than the previous eight years of hostilities. Prigozhin suggested that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was prepared to negotiate with the Kremlin but that the Russian leadership refused to abandon their maximalist positions. Prigozhin accused the Russian miliary leadership of launching the full-scale invasion for self-promotion and claimed that Shoigu advocated for the invasion in order to achieve a higher rank and state awards. Prigozhin accused Russia’s oligarchs of supporting the invasion of Ukraine for similar reasons of personal benefit. Prigozhin claimed that Russia’s oligarchs wanted the Kremlin to install former Ukrainian politician and Kremlin ally Viktor Medvedchuk as the new Ukrainian president after the removal of the Ukrainian government so that Medvedchuk would divide the assets of occupied Ukrainian territories between the oligarchs. Prigozhin’s rejection of the justifications of the war is not a rejection of the war itself, as he argued that the fighting in Ukraine is a “holy war with those who offend the Russian people.” Prigozhin’s attack on the Kremlin’s justifications of the war is likely meant to legitimize the potential removal of the Russian security and business elite from power without directing calling for an end to Putin’s war.
Prigozhin likely intends to truly conduct an armed rebellion against the Russian MoD, rather than expecting Kremlin support to compel MoD leadership changes or only escalating rhetorically. Prigozhin may have wildly miscalculated and called for an armed rebellion incorrectly thinking that he would have Putin’s backing, considering Putin’s past tenuous relationship with the MoD and Shoigu. This contingency is however extraordinarily unlikely, considering that Putin has recently more firmly aligned himself with the MoD, and the Kremlin’s responses to Prigozhin’s posturing thus far have indicated surprise and a lack of agreement with Prigozhin. Prigozhin’s actions and statements may alternatively be a rhetorical overreach in his ongoing dispute with the MoD and his campaign to retain his wavering influence within the Russian information space following the culmination of Wagner’s Bakhmut effort. However, this contingency is also highly unlikely, as initial indicators of actual Wagner movements are observable and the Kremlin is not responding to Prigozhin’s statements as only rhetoric.
It is therefore most likely that Prigozhin fully intends for Wagner to move against MoD leadership and forcibly remove them from power, more likely against the Southern Military District command in Rostov-on-Don but possibly also against Moscow. ISW is unable to confirm exactly where the bulk of Wagner forces are currently located, but it currently appears more likely that Prigozhin intends for Wagner to move on the MoD assets in Rostov. Following Wagner’s withdrawal from Bakhmut in late May and early June, a large contingent of Wagner forces likely remained in rear areas of Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, or else at Wagner’s training facility near Molkino, Krasnodar Krai. Considering the relative proximity of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Krasnodar Krai to Rostov Oblast, the more likely course of action may be that Prigozhin views the MoD in Rostov as the most viable target of a Wagner armed rebellion. Prigozhin claimed at 0200 local time (1900 EST) that Wagner forces have crossed Russia’s international border into Rostov Oblast and claimed they face no resistance, but ISW has not observed visual confirmed of any Wagner movements as of the time of this publication.
An armed Wagner attack against the Russian military leadership in Rostov-on-Don would have significant impacts on Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. Rostov-on-Don houses both the headquarters of the SMD, whose 58th Combined Arms Army is currently decisively engaged in defensive operations against Ukrainian counteroffensives in southern Ukraine, and the command center for the Russian Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine as a whole. Rostov-on-Don is therefore a critical command and control membrane for the Russian army, and any threats to the MoD’s presence are likely to have ramifications on some critical aspects of the war effort.
Prigozhin’s apparent start of an armed rebellion is the culmination of his campaign to retain control over his military forces, and he likely views the rebellion as an existential survival effort. Prigozhin’s largely independent control over Wagner forces has been the cornerstone of his campaign to become the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist movement. Prigozhin has long overstepped existing norms within the Russian information space that limit criticism of Russian leadership because he likely believed the Kremlin’s need for Wagner to fight in Ukraine shielded him from punishment. Prigozhin primarily used Wagner’s responsibility for tactical gains in and around Bakhmut to advocate for more influence and responsibility for himself and Wagner, and the effectiveness of this mode of self-promotion has likely declined since Wagner withdrew to rear areas following the capture of Bakhmut on May 21. The MoD recently ordered Wagner personnel to sign MoD contracts in an effort to fully subordinate Wagner to the MoD, and likely did so to seize on the opportunity of Wagner’s weakened relevance to Russian operations in Ukraine.
The MoD’s recent demands that Wagner fully subordinate itself to the MoD would entail Prigozhin losing control of his parallel military structure, and therefore both his main source of influence and his means for avoiding the consequences of his public self-promotion. The MoD reportedly gave Wagner an ultimatum between subordination to the MoD or the recognition of Wagner’s continued operations on the frontlines as illegal. Prigozhin may have attempted to negotiate continued independence for Wagner with his own contract outlining how Wagner and the MoD would coordinate continued Wagner operations, although the MoD outright rejected this possible attempt at negotiation. Prigozhin likely reached a perceived crucial decision point between surrendering his independent armed forces and actively resisting the MoD, and appears to have chosen the latter. The severe consequences that would result from a failed armed rebellion suggest that Prigozhin viewed his alternatives to be just as threatening.
Prigozhin’s likely intention was to gain the allegiance of senior Russian officers and military personnel, but he is unlikely to secure sufficient military support considering that Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin denounced Prigozhin’s call for armed rebellion. Prigozhin explicitly called for the entire Russian military and all of Russia to join Wagner in its effort to remove the Russian military leadership. Prigozhin’s longstanding calls for supplies and ammunition for Wagner indicate that Wagner likely does not have the necessary level of independent access to the materiel required to militarily depose the MoD leadership, and therefore MoD elements with their own supplies will need to support Wagner’s armed rebellion if it has any real chance at lasting success. The desired outcome of Prigozhin’s armed rebellion also relies on senior Russian officers and military personnel recognizing the legitimacy of the supposedly new Russian military command that would follow any attempt at an armed rebellion. Prigozhin likely sought to rally military support for the effort earlier in the day by seizing on longstanding grievances about high Russian losses in Ukraine, accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of sending tens of thousands of Russian personnel unnecessarily to their death and calling on Russia to hold Shoigu and Gerasimov responsible for the claimed deliberate “genocide” of Russian citizens. Prigozhin has likely miscalculated the level of support for Wagner, as one of Wagner’s most high-profile alleged allies, Surovikin, called on Wagner personnel to not follow Prigozhin’s orders. Wagner likely previously relied on its relationship with high-profile allies like Surovikin to retain access to supplies and its responsibility for operations in the Bakhmut area. Surovikin’s rejection represents a major blow to Wagner’s ability to rally elements of the MoD to its cause, and other high-ranking officers with Wagner affiliations and sympathies are less likely to support Wagner given the public statement from a high-profile senior officer like Surovikin.
Even if the Wagner Group can credibly threaten the MoD, Putin is incredibly unlikely to acquiesce to a successful effort by Prigozhin to topple the MoD. Should Wagner be able to tangibly attack the MoD in Rostov, Moscow, or elsewhere, and actually force a change in the military leadership (which is as of this time highly unlikely due to the apparent lack of backing for Wagner amongst senior officers and military personnel), it is unlikely that Putin would accept this at outcome. ISW has not observed any indications that Putin will accept such a change in MoD leadership. The violent overthrow of Putin loyalists like Shoigu and Gerasimov would cause irreparable damage to the stability of Putin’s perceived hold on power, and Putin would be highly unlikely to accept any armed rebellion even if he supported the figures conducting it.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on June 23. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area and made marginal gains southwest of Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces made gains in western Zaporizhzhia south of Orikhiv on the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line and southeast of Orikhiv on the Mala Tokmachka-Novofedorivka line. Milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defenses north of Robotyne and advanced to positions within 1.5km north of the settlement.
Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on June 23, primarily targeting a Ukrainian airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 14 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from strategic aviation over the Caspian Sea, targeting Khmelnystkyi Oblast and the Khmelnystki airfield, and reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the missiles. Satellite imagery published on June 22 shows that Russian forces deployed strategic aviation to an airfield near Mozdok, North Ossetia as of May 24, and Radio Liberty reported that Russian strategic bombers that targeted Khmelnystkyi Oblast took off from this airfield.
Key Takeaways
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have launched an armed rebellion on June 23 to force a leadership change within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) which is unlikely to succeed.
- Early reports following Prigozhin’s statements suggest that Russian internal security forces are activating in response to Prigozhin’s statements and possible Wagner moves, primarily in Moscow and Rostov, and the Kremlin appears opposed to Prigozhin’s actions.
- Prigozhin set informational conditions for this effort earlier in the day by accusing the Russian MoD and unnamed oligarchs of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in order to launch the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- Prigozhin likely intends to truly conduct an armed rebellion against the Russian MoD, rather than expecting Kremlin support to compel MoD leadership changes or only escalating rhetorically.
- It is therefore most likely that Prigozhin fully intends for Wagner to move against MoD leadership and forcibly remove them from power, more likely against the Southern Military District command in Rostov-on-Don but possibly also against Moscow.
- An armed Wagner attack against the Russian military leadership in Rostov-on-Don would have significant impacts on Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
- Prigozhin’s apparent start of an armed rebellion is the culmination of his campaign to retain control over his military forces, and he likely views the rebellion as an existential survival effort.
- Prigozhin’s likely intention was to gain the allegiance of senior Russian officers and military personnel, but he is unlikely to secure sufficient military support considering that Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin denounced Prigozhin’s call for armed rebellion.
- Even if the Wagner Group can credibly threaten the MoD, Putin is incredibly unlikely to acquiesce to a successful effort by Prigozhin to topple the MoD.
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on June 23.
- Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on June 23, primarily targeting a Ukrainian airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
- Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks in the Kupiansk area, and Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to skirmish south of Kreminna.
- Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
- Russian federal subjects and the Wagner Group continue efforts to conceal the true scale of Russian and Wagner losses in Ukraine.
- Consequences and what to do?