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Putin always faces a serious problem in the Middle East, Portnikov argues, primarily because he wants to show that he can support a totalitarian regime that has loyally supported Moscow. If he doesn’t back Syria’s Assad, he will have shown that he won’t or can’t support even his allies, not a message the Kremlin leader wants to send. “But the resources of the Kremlin adventurist are really limited, and for sending forces to Syria, Putin needs relief in the Donbas,” and hence the current reduction in violence there. In this situation, what concessions is Putin prepared to make, given his own goals and given the attitudes of the West? According to Portnikov, it is quite likely that even Putin hasn’t decided yet and that he realizes that what will happen in Paris on October 2 will depend to a large extent on what happens over the next three weeks. Putin may very well keep violence in the Donbas at a low level: that will help him with his Western interlocutors. But he will beyond any doubt “rock the boat” of Ukraine “because it is important to him that [Ukrainian President] Poroshenko will arrive in Paris without any sense of prospects and be ready for new concessions” of his own. Moreover, over this period, the Ukrainian analyst suggests, Putin may also take actions in the Middle East designed to drive up the price of oil, something that will give him more leverage and reduce that of the West on Russian behavior. With regard to Ukraine, it seems clear that Putin will now “throw all his reserves into the destabilization of the situation” there, making use of everyone from “the most anti-Ukrainian chauvinists to the most patriotic patriots” to embarrass and weaken Ukraine both in reality and even more in the eyes of the West. Thus, Portnikov says, the next few weeks are critical because “the stakes in October are really high.”“...The resources of the Kremlin adventurist are really limited, and for sending forces to Syria, Putin needs relief in the Donbas,” and hence the current reduction in violence there.