Thus Russia, China, North Korea, Iran have not only utilized IW for years (in Moscow’s case at least since 1917 and in China’s case since 1949 abroad if not previously in China) even before the advent of information technology and social media. Russia has even outlined in extensive writings what amounts to a comprehensive set of theories about the use and utility of IW in contemporary politics. And China hardly lags behind in that respect and certainly not in its own idiosyncratic use of IW. In addition, the ubiquity and constancy of IW are likely to increase as the technology involved in deploying IW becomes more easily available globally. This concern is particularly important in regard to the phenomenon of deepfakes. We now have the technology to undermine the entire concept of factuality, i.e. objective truth, by rearranging personages and events to suit any “producer’s” taste and to obtain thereby a decisive (or at least intended to be decisive) impression upon the minds of “consumers” of that information whether they be individuals or collective entities and even whole societies.The purpose of IW is to unhinge or derange the audience’s perception of reality and thus its mooring to objective facts and truth.
Example of producing a deepfake video
This can become an utterly disruptive mechanism for disputing memories of events and any attempt to establish historical truth. Or it can also be used to enhance or destroy an individual or institution’s reputation and even their perceived social reality. For example, airbrushing (a kind of precursor to deep fakes) was already used in the Soviet Union to erase leading figures from the history of the Russian Revolution and this effort can now be replicated on a much grander scale. But again, these techniques that seek to exploit racial, ethnic, class, or other social tensions in targeted communities apply not solely to attacks on governments or on societies. As noted above,private, public, and governmental corporations have also been regularly and systematically attacked by existing means such as disinformation and fake news stories planted to embarrass them, destroy their reputation, or even to destroy them, or finally, merely to make clear that the perpetrator –- who as often as not -- cannot be definitively identified – has the power to take them down.

Thus, in military terms, this was not only a preemptive strike against Sony and other producers but also a manifestation as to how cyber capability could be used as a form of active defense deployed asymmetrically against the US or other countries.

Since these interests are utterly intertwined in Putin’s Russia, the geopolitical and commercial motives for attacking SilkWay West and other such airlines becomes clear and parallels the kinds of possibilities we have seen in analogous attacks by Russia and other adversaries upon US and other foreign corporations.
Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council.