"Clear contractual partners." The only clear thing about Siemens' partner was that it was building two power stations in occupied Crimea. On 10 March 2015, Siemens signed a contract with OAO Technopromexport, a Russian company with 100% of shares belonging to the state-owned Rostec technological monopoly. At the moment of signing, Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov was six months since under EU sanctions for OAO Technopromexport’s plans to build energy plants in Crimea, which were announced on 21 August 2014. As well, Rostec itself was six months under US sanctions. The contract to produce 7 gas turbines, four of which were produced, for a power plant in the Taman peninsula on 10 March 2015 was made secretly and bypassed the state tender system required for state companies, in violation of Russian law. It only came to light after the publication of the Russian outlet Vedomosti based on insider testimonies on 30 June 2015, after which Siemens was forced to confirm that such a contract in fact existed, and assured they had no reason to believe the turbines were destined for Crimea. Afterwards, the process of constructing the Sevastopol and Simferopol power plants in Crimea was suddenly and without any comment taken over by OAO Technopromexport's Rostec-owned clone, OOO Technopromexport, which started placing tenders to construct power plants with parameters identical to the SGT5-2000E turbines Siemens had sold in March. It was this OOO Technopromexport which secretly bought the turbines from OAO Technopromexport in 15 October 2015. Siemens is now suing both companies for an alleged breach of contract.SPIEGEL: There have been indications for a long time that from the outset the gas turbines were not intended for a faked power plant project on the Russian mainland, but for Crimea. Were you too gullible, naive, innocent, careless or all of them together? Kaeser: Of course you are always wiser afterward. We found ourselves in a quite plausible situation: we had clear contractual partners, there was project financing and a designated building site that already had some initial preparations... SPIEGEL:... on which no crumb of earth was moved. Kaeser: This only became apparent after the aggregates had been purchased long ago. - Spiegel
Therefore, Siemens had concluded an unlawful secret contract with a Russian company which announced it will build power stations in Crimea, and for which its ultimate chief was punished with US and EU sanctions. After sources leaked details of this secret contract to journalists, Siemens' business partner suddenly received a clone which took over the Crimean power station project. The only thing "clear" about these contractual partners is that the situation with them is not clear at all.

Therefore, the hypothetical power station in Crimea did not have even hypothetical sources of financing, which stands in stark contrast to Kaeser's assertions.
"Designated building site." No information about a specific building site for the hypothetical power plant in Taman is available from open sources. As the said plant did not, and does not have an investor yet, and was not part of any government plans, it's very likely that there was none. Internet searchers and The first time that a specific location for the supposed plant in Taman comes up is a DW publication on 10 October 2016, in which a Siemens official in Munich mentions that the March 2015 contract envisioned using the turbines near the village stanitsa Rayevsakaya in Krasnodar Krai. Apart from these allegations by Siemens, which have been reproduced by numerous media, there is no mention of a power plant project at stanitsa Rayevskaya in any official documents, development plans, energy supply maps or the like. And this despite the fact that it would be a major project with no less than 4 combined-cycle turbine units of 235 MW each.

But even these "cover-up" tenders show that a designated building site was not part of any discussion.
By now, the reader can already outline many things pointing to evidence of an alleged operation in Crimea:Kaeser: ...The order was booked in the second calendar quarter of 2015. Until the handover of the turbines in August 2016, we had investigated rumors about an alleged operation in Crimea very carefully but found no evidence of this. The customer has confirmed the destination several times in writing, most recently immediately before delivery. Only after that were there indications of a potential change in destination, and we stopped all further deliveries. However, it was already too late for the turbines, we no longer had physical control. - Spiegel
- OAO Technopromexport's declaration that it will construct two power plants in Crimea in accordance with government plans, sanctions slapped by the EU and US on Rostec's chief for this very reason;
- These two power plants having exactly identical technical parameters to the turbines Siemens sold to OAO Technopromexport;
- The absence of any official government plans to build a power station in the Taman peninsula, only vague statements by government officials about this hypothetical station, outlining a capacity which was first 1/3, then 1/2 smaller than the capacity of the turbines Siemens sold it, the absence of an investor and contest for this station;
- A "clone" of OAO Technopromexport taking over the construction of power stations in Crimea after media coverage of Siemens' secret contract to provide turbines to the company;
- Tenders for the "software-hardware complex for the automated control system of power plants" were first submitted for the two power stations in occupied Crimea, to which a Siemens-owned company had applied, and then resubmitted with the exact technical parameters as tenders for two (sic!) power plants in Taman, with no construction address.
If we were conducting the interview, here is what we would have asked Joe Kaeser:
- Why did Siemens conclude a secret deal with shady partners under EU sanctions?
- Why didn't Siemens notice that the proposed station was absent in any government plans, had no investor, no construction site?
- Why didn't Siemens notice that its turbines were "oversized" for the vague ideas for the hypothetical Taman power plant that did exist?
- Why did Siemens' subsidiary take part in a contest to develop software for the stations in Crimea?
- Why did it have no plan in case the contract would be abused, a scenario which was more than likely?
- Why did Siemens agree to sell turbines even to a hypothetical station in Taman in the first place, which even if constructed would contribute to the power bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea

Read also:
- How Siemens chose to ignore the obvious. An investigation into the Crimean sanctions break
- Siemens’ Crimea sanctions break – a case of criminal negligence | #SiemensGate
- Two more Siemens turbines delivered to occupied Crimea by same company
- Powering the Anschluss. How Siemens turbines ended up in Crimea despite sanctions
- Siemens set to violate sanctions regime, helping build power stations in Crimea
- Siemens to help provide forbidden power to Crimea
- Russian-German nur geschäft, or strategy for bypassing sanctions