While farmers in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary have spent three years blocking border crossings to protest Ukrainian agricultural competition, Ukrainian farmers have just sown more than 5 million hectares of spring grain under daily Russian drone strikes.
Despite labor shortages, attacks on logistics infrastructure, and financing constraints, the agricultural sector has refused to contract.
It is the country’s fifth wartime sowing season—and despite labor shortages, attacks on logistics infrastructure, and chronic financing constraints, the sector has refused to contract.
Agriculture remains central to Ukraine’s economy. Half of Ukraine’s exports come from the sector, with roughly half of those going to the European Union. But the deputy minister responsible for agriculture has a stark assessment of one of his biggest problems: there is no solution to Ukraine’s agricultural labor crisis that doesn’t run through the end of the war.
Euromaidan Press spoke with Taras Vysotskyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine, about the 2026 sowing season, the war’s pressure on exports and food security, and why he says the country’s labor crisis can only end when the war does.
Peeter Helme: Ukraine is one of the world’s major agricultural producers, but the sector has been operating under full-scale war for more than four years. How is Ukrainian agriculture doing?
Taras Vysotskyi: This is our fifth sowing campaign under full-scale invasion. Despite the challenges, Ukrainian farmers keep showing resilience. Wherever security conditions allow, the available land is being sown. We are talking about more than 20 million hectares for grains and oilseeds—around 7 million hectares of winter crops and around 13 million hectares of spring crops.
Spring sowing is still ongoing, but most of the crops have already been planted. For spring grains, the planned area is around 6 million hectares, and more than 5 million hectares have already been sown. Corn is the biggest, followed by barley, oats, peas, and smaller crops.
Despite higher fuel, fertilizer, and other prices, the available land is being sown.
For oilseeds, the main ones are sunflower and soybean. The planned sunflower area is around 5 million hectares, with more than 4 million already sown. The soybean plan is 2 million hectares, with more than 1.5 million already in the ground. We also have around 170,000 hectares of sugar beet.
Despite higher fuel, fertilizer, and other prices, the available land is being sown. Farmers keep growing crops, keeping animals, and producing food.
Peeter: Are the rising fuel and fertilizer prices the biggest problems Ukrainian farmers face today? What else makes the list?
Vysotskyi: The biggest problems are still the ones directly related to the war. The single largest challenge is the availability of employees, as many are in the military. We, as a country, keep mobilizing, and many people have also left Ukraine. Finding enough labor to keep operations running is the number-one issue.
For farmers near the frontline—within 20 to 30 kilometers—security is the top problem. FPV drones are a daily reality, and so are the risks to staff, machinery, and assets.
There is no deficit of fuel or fertilizer right now—availability is fine.
Beyond labor and frontline security, there are three or four more challenges that are constant rather than critical. Logistics: there are still strikes on railways and port infrastructure. Financing: insurance markets are underdeveloped, making capital harder to attract. Fuel: agriculture is one of the biggest diesel consumers in Ukraine. And fertilizer prices.
But fuel and fertilizer are actually not today’s problem. They are part of the production cost of future yields. If yield prices rise, those costs will be covered. There is no deficit of fuel or fertilizer right now—availability is fine. The constant daily problems during wartime are logistics and financing.
Peeter: On financing, you mentioned that the insurance markets are underdeveloped, but I know there are support programs. How do those work?
Vysotskyi: There is a state support program offering financing at lower interest rates than the market average—usually 5%, 7%, or 9%. 18 billion hryvnia ($407 million) is in the budget for this program. But this money is not reserved only for agriculture; it covers any business in Ukraine, and up to 40% goes to agriculture.
What we have is enough to keep the sector surviving, not enough to keep it growing.
We also have a war insurance program by the Export Credit Agency, which provides guarantees and partially compensates the cost of expensive insurance. And starting this year, we have agricultural insurance compensation: if a farmer signs a contract with an insurance company to cover yield losses from drought or bad weather, the state compensates up to 50–60% of the insurance premium.
In wartime, holding steady is good. But it is not enough to develop.
These programs make financing and insurance available—but not at the scale needed. Demand is much bigger than supply. What we have is enough to keep the sector surviving, not enough to keep it growing.
For the past three years, results have been more or less the same year to year. In wartime, holding steady is good. But it is not enough to develop. We are still looking for more resources.
Peeter: How are Ukrainian agricultural exports doing? What are the main export channels?
Vysotskyi: The sector is export-dependent—the internal market is not large enough to consume the production volumes. Between 65% and 70% of agricultural output is exported, directly or after processing. Agricultural exports themselves account for more than 50% of total exports. In some years, the agricultural share has even reached 62% in a quarter.
The three Odesa region ports—Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chornomorsk—are the main outlets.
The EU is our most important market. Roughly half of Ukraine’s agricultural exports go there.
Most exports move by sea, as it is the cheapest route. The three Odesa region ports—Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chornomorsk—are the main outlets. For grains and oilseeds, around 85% goes through the sea corridor, 8 to 10% by rail, and the rest, 5 to 7%, by truck.
Sea logistics is vital. Keeping the corridor operational is one of our highest priorities.
In 2022, when the sea was blocked, it became clear that such large volumes cannot be transported otherwise. Sea logistics is vital. Keeping the corridor operational is one of our highest priorities—both economically and from a military-security standpoint.
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Peeter: Many EU farmers, especially in neighboring countries, fear that Ukrainian agricultural products will undercut them. How do you respond to that?
Vysotskyi: The potential of Ukrainian agriculture is being significantly overestimated in this debate. It is a good sector, it is efficient, but I see no preconditions for fear.
In terms of EU consumption shares, Ukrainian agricultural products account for less than 5%—perhaps slightly higher in some specific goods, but not more than 10%. Much of the data cited in the EU debate is also outdated and inflates the scale of our sector.
Ukraine can substitute for products that the EU currently imports from elsewhere.
This is more a political topic than a question of real numbers. We try to explain it as a matter of cooperation, not competition. Ukraine can substitute for products that the EU currently imports from elsewhere. That is where the conversation should be.
Peeter: You said earlier that labor is the most serious challenge for the agricultural sector at the moment. What can actually be done about it?
Vysotskyi: First of all, end the war as soon as possible. Solving this without ending the war is impossible in the long term.
After the war, we will see what can be done to bring back people who left Ukraine. We can encourage them, but we cannot force them. We will also see how many workers return from military service, and the size of the postwar army is still an open question.
That balance—between the needs of the economy and the needs of the military—is what we manage day to day.
For now, the goal is a hard balance. Farmers can reserve a minimum number of essential employees from mobilization to keep operations running. That balance—between the needs of the economy and the needs of the military—is what we manage day to day. Promising anything more under these conditions would be dishonest.
Peeter: What about short-term labor migrants from abroad?
Vysotskyi: This is an active discussion in Ukrainian society. Different views exist. Business and economic sectors need that labor, but society is divided. It is not going to be an easy topic—it would require a change of mindset. Our strategy as a government is to participate in this discussion and to moderate it.
We can’t yet say where the consensus will land, but we need to reach it quickly.
We are not hiding from it. We have presented a draft Labour Code for public comment, and we are facilitating the conversation across different platforms. We can’t yet say where the consensus will land, but we need to reach it quickly—not drag the discussion out—and then implement the result honestly.
Peeter: Let’s talk about domestic food security. Are Ukrainians experiencing any shortages?
Vysotskyi: There is no physical deficit. All food categories are available on supermarket shelves. There are social issues—people with lower incomes who need direct payment programs to afford food—but there is no hunger. Basic needs are covered, both physically and economically.
The one category in sharp decline is small-scale cow-keeping and home milk production.
Many Ukrainians still grow their own food on household plots. That tradition is one of the main reasons for seasonal price changes: these are non-professional producers without storage, so when harvest comes, supply surges and prices fall. In winter, supply contracts and prices rise.
Household production is in slight decline overall, but it remains widespread for fruits, vegetables, chickens, eggs, and pigs. The one category in sharp decline is small-scale cow-keeping and home milk production. That practice is likely to disappear from the household sector within five to seven years. For everything else, the shift is much slower—measured in decades rather than years.
Peeter: Where do you see Ukrainian agriculture going from here?
Vysotskyi: Right now, we are surviving. We are looking toward the end of the war and toward moving from the survival stage to the development stage. We will always welcome partners who want to be part of that.
