As Ukraine has seen repeatedly, a Russian ceasefire is never a good-faith peace effort. It is an opportunity to regroup, strengthen logistics, and prepare for the next assault. The three-day truce that ended on 12 May produced no withdrawal and no de-escalation — only a launching pad for the next strike wave.
Since then, Russia has launched 96 missiles and 3,029 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas strike drones against Ukraine. Of the ones that penetrated Ukrainian air defense, most hit residential buildings, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure.
In 2026 so far, Russia has launched 30,587 long-range strike drones — an increase of 172% over the same period last year. Ukraine downs about 90% of them. The remaining 10%, multiplied by an escalating launch rate, still translates into rising civilian casualties and accelerating destruction of energy, water, heating, hospitals, and schools.
The outlook is grim. Russia's ability to produce and launch long-range strike drones continues to grow, on top of an escalating campaign of missile strikes and guided glide bombs. In 2026 so far, missile strikes are up 190% over last year, according to Ukrainian Air Force daily reporting. Guided glide bomb strikes are up 173% — and their range is increasing too. Targeting predominantly civilian infrastructure, Russia's strike campaign amounts to war crimes — and it is escalating.
Kyiv now faces two questions: how long can it restrain itself from responding in kind? And how will its western allies react if/when it does?
Vengeance derailed what could have been a winning strategy
In August 1940, the Luftwaffe was about to win the Battle of Britain. RAF bases, radar stations, and aircraft factories were taking daily punishment. Nazi Germany was within reach of the air superiority it needed for an invasion.
Then a German bombing raid accidentally hit London. Britain retaliated with a symbolic raid on Berlin. Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring — furious — ordered the Luftwaffe to abandon the RAF and bomb British cities instead. The Blitz began.
That decision relieved the pressure on Britain's air defense network. The RAF used the reprieve to repair airfields, restore radar, regroup fighter squadrons. Historians widely view Hitler's pivot as the moment Germany lost any realistic chance of invading Britain.
That lesson is becoming relevant again.
On 10 May, Zelenskyy said Ukraine would now respond in kind to Russia's actions. "If the Russians decide to return to full-scale warfare, our 'sanctions' [meaning missile and drone strikes] for this will be immediate and tangible," he said.
On 14 May, a red line was crossed. At a meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Zelenskyy instructed Ukraine's defense forces and special services to identify possible formats for response to the continuous Russian strikes. "I instructed the defence forces of Ukraine and the special services to propose possible formats for our response to this Russian attack."
The phrasing signals a possible shift in strategy. Hypothetically, it could mean adopting Russia's playbook — bringing the war home to Russia by striking civilian infrastructure: residential heating, water plants, civilian railways, civilian airports.
I understand the impulse. I share it. I am still going to argue against it.
It could mean Ukraine adopting Russia's playbook — striking civilian infrastructure
Ukraine's deep-strike campaign — against Russian oil refineries, military airfields, ammunition depots, and drone factories — is the most effective instrument Kyiv has against the Kremlin's war economy. Strike capacity is finite. Diverting it to hit Russian apartment buildings and heating plants would force Ukraine to scale back the strikes that are bleeding Russian gas and oil revenue — the same strikes that are constraining the Kremlin's ability to fund its war.
The second cost compounds the first. If Ukraine begins copying Russia's war crimes, the international support that underwrites its resilience will erode — and with it, the flow of weapons, ammunition, and defense industrial backing that lets Ukraine absorb the strikes in the first place. The moral argument is also a strategic one. Both end in the same place: less Ukrainian capacity to fight.
Despite years of evidence to the contrary, Western heads of state have argued against decisive action for fear of crossing Russia's red lines. Ukraine has repeatedly proven them wrong, but the fear of nuclear escalation lingers in the West. A shift in strategy that mirrors Russia's air campaign would almost certainly trigger sharper pushback from Ukraine's partners.
This would not be Britain's symbolic raid on Berlin. It would be Hitler ordering the Blitz — abandoning the targets that decide a war for the targets that satisfy rage.
Kyiv should not even consider mirroring Russia's strategy
12 years of holding back
For 12 years, Ukraine has made it a matter of policy to uphold international law where Russia does not — a deliberate demonstration of the historical and cultural gap between the two countries. That distinction is part of Ukraine's strategic identity. Throwing it away to satisfy a moment of rage would be the deeper cost.
But Ukraine's partners also have to face the dilemma they have created. If Ukraine does nothing, more civilians die and more Ukrainians are forced to flee abroad. The country slides toward demographic catastrophe. The call for vengeance grows.
The current Western strategy is not stopping the missiles and drones. It has allowed the Kremlin to shift away from manoeuvre warfare and toward attrition from the air — without consequences. Russia is doing this because the West has shown it can.
European capitals should be doing exactly what Zelenskyy ordered his staff to do: identifying possible formats for response to the large-scale and continuous Russian strikes on Ukraine. Bringing military options back to the table should be the first decision. Planners need the freedom to develop a strategy that actually works.
Until that happens, Ukraine waits. Russia escalates. And the trap closes.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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