A Russian pro-government think tank has proposed amending the law to add economic growth as a secondary goal of monetary policy. The note also calls for a coordination mechanism between the Bank of Russia and the government, triggered by a presidential decree during severe supply shocks.
The note from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP) does not mention the bank governor, Elvira Nabiullina, by name. Ukraine’s intelligence service flagged the document on 12 May. Biz NV picked it up the next day. Both read it as a Kremlin move against her.
Personalities matter less
The personnel question is loud and may be partly real—Nabiullina could be losing a specific argument about central bank independence even while remaining aligned with the Kremlin’s overall direction.
The TsMAKP authors frame the proposal in technical terms, citing comparative central bank theory and arguing that Russia’s strict inflation-targeting mandate is too rigid for an economy prone to supply shocks and state-driven price hikes.
“Together, they strangled economic growth in 2025. Entirely self-inflicted.”
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, senior fellow at the Center for Analysis and Strategies, has made the same diagnosis from outside Russia, with a sharper political edge.
He told Euromaidan Press last month that the government and Nabiullina were “actually in full solidarity,” united by a shared fear of public anger over rising prices. “Together, they strangled economic growth in 2025. Entirely self-inflicted.”
Russia’s economic model produces the same outcome no matter who signs the rate decisions.
When Vladimir Putin scolded his economic team on television in April, the audience had seen it before. Yet Russia’s economic model produces the same outcome no matter who signs the rate decisions, and no matter what mandate the law assigns. But the bigger story is quieter.
Better oil, worse rates
The trap is visible in the Bank of Russia’s April projection. The bank raised 2026 oil price assumptions sharply, from $45 to $65 a barrel. The same report revised the 2026 average key-rate forecast up by a full percentage point, to 14.0–14.5%. GDP and inflation forecasts did not move.
Demand without supply is inflation.
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Ukrainian intelligence read the April projection as evidence that Russia is structurally dependent on commodity prices and unable to break the cycle even when conditions improve. Russia’s GDP fell 0.5% in the first quarter of 2026.
The reasoning is mechanical. More oil revenue flows into the budget. The budget spends it on the war. Wartime spending pushes demand into an economy whose labor reserve has fallen by 2.5 million workers since the start of the full-scale invasion, Nabiullina confirmed in April. Demand without supply is inflation. Higher rates—for longer—are how the bank fights it. Better external conditions mean tighter credit at home.
The math won’t change
The Bank of Russia signals that double-digit rates will persist into next year—regardless of who chairs it or what the mandate says. The TsMAKP proposal would change Russian law and place a presidential trigger inside the rate-setting process.
It would not change the basic bind. Wartime spending creates inflation faster than a war-shrunk economy can supply goods. High rates are the only tool the bank has left.
“If the Kremlin feels budget pressure easing, it will simply increase military expenditures.”
Inozemtsev’s broader read is worth holding alongside the “Nabiullina falling” story. “A collapse is not imminent,” he said. “If the Kremlin feels budget pressure easing, it will simply increase military expenditures.” Higher oil revenue does not reach Russians as cheaper credit or stronger paychecks. It funds the war.
