A unit of Russia's foreign intelligence service proposed staging a fake assassination attempt on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban ahead of the country's April parliamentary elections, The Washington Post reported, citing an internal SVR document obtained and authenticated by a European intelligence service.
The proposal came after Russian operatives assessed that Orbán's public support was in sharp decline. According to the document, a majority of Hungarian voters — 52.3% — were dissatisfied with conditions in the country, with discontent extending even into rural areas (50.8%) that had traditionally been Fidesz strongholds.
The operatives called the plan "the Gamechanger." Its stated logic was to shift the campaign "out of the rational realm of socioeconomic questions into an emotional one, where the key themes will become state security and the stability and defense of the political system," the SVR report said, as quoted by the Post. The document was prepared for Directorate MS, the SVR's main unit for political influence operations, also known as the Active Measures Department.
No physical attack on Orbán has taken place. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed the report as "another example of disinformation." The SVR declined to comment. Orbán's spokesperson Zoltan Kovacs did not respond to requests for comment on the SVR document, alleged Russian interference in the election, or the prime minister's relationship with Moscow.
The SVR proposal did not emerge in a vacuum. According to the Post, Russia has taken a range of concrete steps to support Orbán's campaign. European security officials said a Kremlin-backed social media campaign has been promoting the message that Orbán is the only candidate capable of protecting Hungary's sovereignty. One of those officials identified Tigran Garibian, a Russian counselor-envoy at the Moscow embassy in Budapest, as someone who "regularly holds meetings with pro-government Hungarian journalists to give them tasks and instructions."
Additional documents reviewed by the Post describe operations designed to damage opposition candidates: AI-generated videos targeting Tisza party candidate Mariya Gurzo, and fabricated allegations — including forged documents and photos — claiming that another candidate, Ervin Nagy, had beaten a local woman. The disinformation was then spread through national and social media, according to the documents.
One of the European security officials also confirmed the arrival in Hungary of three individuals operating on behalf of Russian military intelligence, corroborating an earlier report by Hungarian investigative outlet VSquare.
The election backdrop helps explain Moscow's urgency. Polls show Orbán trailing opposition leader Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider now running on an anti-corruption platform. The SVR report describes Magyar's Tisza Party as having successfully framed the campaign around rule-of-law concerns — concerns reinforced by the EU's decision to withhold subsidies from Hungary over democratic backsliding, which has further strained the country's economy.
In response, Orbán and Fidesz have sought to reframe the race around security rather than economics. Orbán has accused Ukraine of halting Russian oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline — a claim at odds with the fact that the shutdown was initially caused by a Russian attack on pipeline infrastructure. He has accused Ukrainian officials of plotting physical attacks on his family. On March 19, Budapest banned three Ukrainian citizens from the country and the Schengen zone, alleging they had made threats against Orbán and his family.
The SVR document, according to the Post, instructed operatives to promote Orbán as the candidate of peace and stability, and to portray Magyar as "a puppet of Brussels" leading "the party of war."
Alongside the election maneuvering, the Post outlines what it describes as a long-running institutional relationship between Budapest and Moscow. According to several current and former European security officials, Russian hackers penetrated the computer networks of Hungary's Foreign Ministry, while Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó made regular calls during EU meetings to brief his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov with "live reports on what's been discussed." Through such contacts, "every single EU meeting for years has basically had Moscow behind the table," one official told the Post.
Szijjártó has made 16 official visits to Moscow since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most recently on 4 March, when he met with President Vladimir Putin. He did not respond to a request for comment.
Former deputy foreign intelligence chief Andras Telkes told the Post the relationship has deep financial roots: "The first thing for Orban was about money. They made a deal about Russian energy imports for Hungary." Telkes also assessed the current situation directly: "There is growing panic in the ruling party, and I think they may take some not well-considered steps to hold onto power. The Russians will do everything to keep Orban in power… They consider Hungary as part of their sphere of influence."
A Western official quoted by the Post was similarly blunt: "Orban has been one of Russia's best assets. It is hard to imagine that the Russians would not be standing ready to assist if things go sideways."
April elections
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2026. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in power for fifteen years, has consistently blocked Ukraine's EU accession and new sanctions against Russia.
His main challenger: the opposition Tisza party led by Péter Magyar, currently leading in polls. Analysts caution, however, that actual results may diverge from polling data.
A February 2026 survey by Median put Tisza ahead of Fidesz by about 11 percentage points among the voting‑age population and roughly 20 points among “sure voters,” with Tisza at around 55% versus Fidesz at about 35%.
Around the same time, a survey by the Idea Institute found Tisza at about 48% among committed voters and Fidesz at about 38%, with no change from the previous month.
A victory by Péter Magyar’s Tisza party in Hungary’s April elections would be a crucial shift for Ukraine, as it would likely end Budapest’s current role as a key brake on EU sanctions against Russia and on Kyiv’s path toward EU membership.
Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary has repeatedly used vetoes and procedural delays to block or slow down measures supporting Ukraine, citing minority‑rights grievances and economic concerns. A Tisza‑led government is expected to stop this blocking behavior, allowing sanctions and macro‑financial aid to move forward while still insisting on strict conditionality and domestic oversight.
