Russian forces are "likely unable to simultaneously replace losses suffered in Ukraine and build out their strategic reserves," according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). A Ukrainian military analyst says Moscow’s plan to expand its ground forces has already fallen apart, with only a few incomplete divisions formed and no real strategic reserve in sight.
Russia fails to create planned divisions as losses mount
In its 7 January daily report, ISW says that Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russia had managed to create only four out of the 17 maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades originally planned for 2025. The new formations include the 68th and 71st Motorized Rifle Divisions under the Leningrad Military District, and two naval infantry divisions—converted from the 155th and 336th units of the Pacific and Baltic Fleets respectively. According to Mashovets, these units are likely not manned to their doctrinal levels and appear structurally weakened.
He assessed that the Russian military has stopped forming divisions based on pre-2022 templates. Instead, it is now focused on creating assault infantry-heavy formations that rely on light vehicles, with minimal air defense, artillery, and logistics components. This shift reflects Russia’s changing battlefield approach, characterized by mass infantry assaults and infiltration tactics rather than mechanized operations.
ISW concluded that this restructuring aligns with heavy wartime equipment losses, poor armored vehicle production, and tactical adjustments forced by conditions on the ground. The result is a military posture increasingly suited to positional warfare, not mobile mechanized combat.
Manpower gap undermines Russia’s strategic reserve goals
Mashovets believes Russia will be unable to generate the necessary manpower to build out its planned force structure in 2026. He estimated that more than 70,000 additional troops would be needed to form the 17 divisions originally envisioned—but that Russia is unlikely to produce that surplus.
Then-Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate chief Kyrylo Budanov stated on 27 December that Russia has not built a strategic reserve to its intended standard because it “constantly” deploys its operational reserve to sustain current fighting in Ukraine. The use of forces meant for future contingencies to prop up existing fronts has further strained Russia’s ability to plan for long-term operations.
Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered approximately 416,570 casualties throughout 2025. That translates to an average of 1,141 personnel lost each day—or roughly an entire division’s worth of soldiers every 10 days. According to Mashovets, Russian casualties are expected to increase further in 2026 as troops face heavily fortified Ukrainian lines, including the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
