Eleven years after Russia seized the Ukrainian peninsula, Crimea still haunts every serious conversation about how this war might end.
As a Ukrainian journalist watching my country burn, I’m desperate for peace. With a child to protect and a husband of military age, every air raid siren is a stark reminder of what’s at stake. I’m not just covering this war — I’m living it. But my family’s story is just one among millions.
The West has never officially endorsed Russia’s annexation, but never seriously challenged it either. Ukraine never received the weapons it would need to take Crimea back — despite years of tough talk from our allies. And yes, I’ve had those late-night thoughts: “What if we just let Russia keep Crimea if it means the killing stops?”
Reports suggest the US might be weighing recognition of Putin’s land grab as a bargaining chip for peace. But that pragmatic instinct collides with a brutal truth: Russia has transformed Crimea into a heavily militarized fortress — one that threatens not just Ukraine, but NATO itself. Even if a peace deal is signed tomorrow, what’s to stop Russia from using Crimea as a launchpad to strike again?
To move beyond personal fears to geopolitical facts, I spoke with former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer and Andrii Klymenko, a top Black Sea expert. A native of Crimea, Klymenko’s blunt tone reflects not just his expertise, but the pain of seeing his homeland occupied — and knowing he can’t return. For him, this isn’t abstract policy — it’s the theft of his home.
Why is the Trump team focused on Crimea?
Pifer suggests the Trump team’s eagerness to end the war — combined with limited engagement with Ukraine — may explain its stance.
“Trump’s envoy Steven Witkoff met Ukrainians once — in Paris with Senator Rubio — and Russians four times. He’s getting only the Russian line. Maybe he fell for it,” Pifer said.
Klymenko is more direct.
“This is the logic of the ignorant — like a child smashing their toys out of spite. People arrogant in their stupidity, indifferent to history. They act on impulse, not analysis,” he said.
Even talking about recognition, he says, creates the illusion that Crimea’s status is negotiable. It isn’t.
Why does the US ask Ukraine’s opinion?
As Ukrainian defense expert Mykhailo Samus has pointed out, Ukraine can’t stop the US from recognizing Crimea. But Washington may be seeking political cover.
Pifer says Ukraine should use any talks to set a firm red line.
“Zelenskyy’s open to a ceasefire — meaning he’ll tolerate temporary occupation. But he’s made it clear: Ukraine will never recognize it legally. That’s already a big concession on Ukraine’s part.”
Even if Ukraine were to publicly tolerate US recognition — and some fear Moscow and Washington might push the issue at the UN for a veneer of legitimacy — it likely wouldn’t shift global consensus.
“Recognition is a country-by-country decision,” Pifer notes. “Fewer than nine recognize Crimea as Russian — not even China, which values territorial integrity because of Taiwan and Tibet. I don’t think US recognition would buy Russia much.“
Andrii Klymenko dismisses the entire scenario with characteristic bluntness.
“They are saboteurs — people trying to blow up the world. And Europe sees that clearly,” he says.
Would recognition kill sanctions?
Ukrainian military expert Oleksandr Saienko warns that US recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea could dismantle the sanctions regime imposed after 2014. Speaking to Euromaidan Press, Sayenko argues such a move would effectively nullify US sanctions originally introduced in response to the annexation. Pifer isn’t sure.
“In 2014, no one was even discussing recognizing Crimea. I’m not sure sanctions law is tied to that,” he says.
Klymenko argues the question is largely irrelevant—because, in his assessment, US sanctions already have minimal impact. He argues that under Donald Trump—a vocal opponent of sanctions and advocate of tariffs—enforcement has deteriorated significantly.
“There’s almost no oversight left. Under Trump, the effect of the sanctions against Russia collapsed — they survive mainly in the banking sector.”
Russia, he says, has worked around them for years — with barter systems and a SWIFT alternative backed by India and China.
Is this really about China?
Some analysts suggest the Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine may be driven by strategic calculations about China. The theory holds that abandoning Ukraine might persuade Putin to break away from Xi Jinping — weakening the Russia-China axis.
Pifer calls that naïve.
“It misunderstands Putin’s dependence on Xi. He won’t ditch Xi for Trump — especially when Trump is unpredictable and might be gone in four years.”
Klymenko argues China is an economic rival, not an enemy — and America helped build it.
“China didn’t conquer anything — it grew economically. US companies were the first to move into its free economic zones. The same Americans with the think tanks and experts who supposedly know everything.”
Saving Russia?
Klymenko sees no clear US strategy — just a phase Ukraine and Europe must outlast.
“Ukraine needs to buy time — for weapons, intelligence. We’re signing other deals to compensate. Everyone knows this America isn’t reliable.”
He believes change may come through crisis — specifically, a US economic downturn triggered by Trump’s policies.
“We’re waiting for someone to say: ‘We messed up.’ For them to go — and for professionals to take over.”
Israeli military analyst Yigal Levin sees a longer pattern at play. He argues the US has aimed not just to weaken Russia, but to ensure its survival — a strategy that spans both the Trump and Biden administrations.
“Weakening was the last administration’s job. Preservation is the current one’s,” Levin writes.
Pifer believes the US interest in Russia is driven primarily by one thing: its nuclear arsenal.
“Without nukes, we wouldn’t pay Russia much attention. Its economy is weak and shrinking. Nukes are its only claim to great power status.“
Klymenko, for his part, shrugs off the nuclear threat. “Nuclear weapons are not built to be used — only to intimidate.”
Is there a business motive?
Some have speculated that America’s stance might be tied to economic incentives—that potential deals with Russia could influence Washington’s decisions.
Reportedly, Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev has pitched this idea directly, offering the US oil and gas partnerships and promising massive returns through economic cooperation.
Pifer sees no serious case.
“The best year for US exports to Russia was 2012 or 2013 — around $11 billion. That’s out of $1.6 trillion in total exports. Less than 1%. It’s a rounding error.”
He also dismisses Dmitriev’s claim that American companies missed out on $360 billion in Russian business over the last three years. “I ran the numbers. That would mean US firms account for 4–5% of Russia’s GDP. It’s not credible.”
He recalls a failed attempt at deeper cooperation during the Bush-Putin era.
“Other than a couple of projects, it went nowhere. American firms pulled out — too much corruption, unclear tax rules, no way to guarantee returns.”
Klymenko takes a harsher view. He sees the Trump administration’s approach less as geopolitics, more as the mindset of a real estate developer: profit over everything.
“This is classic developer logic. Every patch of land must be built on. Parks, heritage sites — none of it matters. Just build the Trump Tower. That’s the mindset.”
Why recognition would be a costly mistake
Pifer argues that US recognition of Russia’s annexation would be a serious — and unnecessary — error.
“If you want to negotiate a ceasefire, you don’t have to recognize the territory on the other side as Russian,” he says.
To him, such a move would legitimize territorial conquest — and violate long-standing commitments, particularly the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances.
“What we told Ukrainians 30 years ago — in return for giving up nuclear weapons that threatened us — that was a big deal. I’d be very uncomfortable seeing the US now recognize Crimea as Russian.”
Andrii Klymenko agrees. He warns that redrawing borders by force undermines the very foundation of European security.
“In Europe, borders are sacred. Even the Soviet Union broke up along its internal republic borders — that was the principle.“
Recognizing the annexation of Crimea, he says, would carry dangerous historical weight.
“It would mean that all the blood spilled in World War II — the foundation of the modern world order — meant nothing. It’s not just about Crimea. It’s about everything since 1945.”
11 years don’t equal legitimacy
11 years may sound like a long time, but when it comes to territorial occupation, time alone means little.
“In 1955, people would have said the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union. But the US never recognized that,” says Steven Pifer.
He refers to the 1940 Welles Declaration, in which the United States refused to acknowledge the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — even while allied with the USSR during World War II.
Pifer remembers, “My childhood maps showed the Baltics as Soviet — but always with a note: the US does not recognize this. Pompeo echoed that in 2018 about Crimea. So there’s a clear precedent.”
Klymenko believes the West should stick to that precedent — and let Trump’s team learn from its own errors.
“Trump is growing disillusioned with Putin. Europe is trying to steady the ship — because they understand what’s at stake.”
For Klymenko, there is only one path forward: “There can be no deals with today’s Russia. Only military victory. The regime must fall — or the war will never end.”
