For decades, Russia and other authoritarian regimes have mastered a simple yet devastating strategy to control their neighbors: invade, occupy a portion of their land, then stall the war through endless diplomacy. The pattern is familiar: military aggression followed by a ceasefire that legitimizes territorial gains, all framed as a negotiated peace. The West, eager to avoid escalation, has repeatedly played along, treating these uneasy pauses as a form of stability. But Ukraine has proven this illusion false.
The war in Ukraine has proven that frozen conflicts do not prevent full-scale war. They postpone it at best and guarantee it at worst.
The Minsk Agreements (2014-2015), seen at the time as diplomatic breakthroughs, did not resolve the Donbas crisis; they gave Russia time to build defenses around separatist territories, militarize Crimea, and prepare for the full-scale invasion that came in 2022.
The same playbook has been used elsewhere: in Georgia, where Russia’s 2008 invasion led to an indefinite occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in Moldova, where Transnistria has remained a Kremlin-controlled proxy for three decades.
Ukraine’s response is rewriting the rules. Unlike in 2015, Kyiv is refusing a new Minsk-style ceasefire, recognizing that any “pause” now would only allow Russia to regroup for another war in the future. As Ukraine fights not just to reclaim its territory but to end the cycle of frozen conflicts once and for all, the West must recognize what is at stake. Minsk-style diplomacy is dead, and the world must bury it for good.
Russia’s last “Ukraine peace deal” led to Europe’s biggest war since WWII. Here’s why this one could be worse.
How “frozen conflicts” became Russia’s favorite weapon
For more than three decades, Russia has mastered the art of war without definitive victory. Rather than a full annexation or prolonged occupation, the Kremlin has relied on a subtler approach: limited invasions followed by indefinite ceasefires that lock its adversaries in permanent instability.
These frozen conflicts allow Russia to control neighboring states without the burden of fully governing them, creating gray zones where Moscow holds the real power, but responsibility for governance remains elsewhere.
In Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, Russia has occupied breakaway regions, established its military presence, and then played the role of “mediator,” ensuring no resolution was ever reached. The goal was never to formally annex these territories but to use them as permanent pressure points to keep neighboring governments weak, divided, and vulnerable.
Let’s analyze how the frozen conflict strategy has evolved over time.
Moldova (1992–Present) – After the Soviet collapse, Russia backed ethnic Russian separatists in Transnistria, ensuring Moldova remained trapped in a geopolitical uncertainty. Moscow never recognized Transnistria as independent, nor did it seek to fully integrate it, preferring instead to use it as a bargaining chip to block Moldova’s NATO and EU ambitions. Georgia (2008–Present) – When Georgia sought NATO membership, Russia responded with a five-day war that left Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Russian occupation. Unlike in Moldova, Moscow formally recognized these breakaway regions, freezing Georgia’s NATO aspirations indefinitely. Ukraine (2014–2022, 2022–Present) – The Donbas conflict followed the same blueprint: Russia armed and supported separatists in 2014, then used diplomacy (the Minsk Agreements) to strengthen its influence. When Ukraine continued moving toward the West, Russia escalated to full invasion in 2022.
Russia treated frozen conflicts as tools for long-term control, ensuring its adversaries remained weak, divided, and unable to break free. Yet, this strategy only worked because the West repeatedly misread Russia’s intentions, mistaking ceasefires for genuine peace rather than tactical delays. This failure to grasp the true nature of frozen conflicts gave Moscow the space to strike again.
Ukraine’s war has exposed the frozen conflict strategy as a lie
For years, frozen conflicts were regarded as a pragmatic, if imperfect, mechanism for managing Russian aggression.
Western leaders assumed that territorial disputes could be indefinitely placed on hold, avoiding open war while preserving a fragile status quo. Ukraine’s war has proved this assumption wrong. The events since 2022 have demonstrated that freezing a conflict does not prevent war; it merely postpones it, often at a greater cost. The notion that an aggressor can be pacified through partial occupation and diplomatic engagement has proven to be an illusion.
The notion that an aggressor can be pacified through partial occupation and diplomatic engagement has proven to be an illusion.
Unlike in 2014–2015, when Ukraine was pressured into signing the Minsk Agreements under the pretense of diplomatic resolution, Kyiv in 2022 categorically rejected any arrangement that would allow Russian forces to remain in place. T
his decision was not an act of stubborn defiance but a strategic calculation informed by experience. The Minsk Accords had not brought stability; they had allowed Russia to consolidate control over Donbas while preparing for a larger war. Another agreement along the same lines would have led to a similar outcome.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion, many Western leaders, driven by a desire to prevent further escalation, advocated for negotiations. Some argued that freezing the war along existing frontlines could serve as a basis for a long-term ceasefire.
Ukraine, however, had already witnessed the consequences of such an approach. A premature ceasefire in 2022 would not have ended the war but merely delayed it. The occupied territories would have remained under Russian control, serving as staging grounds for future offensives.
Instead, Ukraine pursued full resistance, recognizing that any lasting peace would have to be achieved through victory on the battlefield rather than a temporary diplomatic pause.
By refusing to accept partial occupation as a settlement, Ukraine forced the international community to confront a reality that had long been ignored. Russia does not respect ceasefires; it exploits them. Diplomatic agreements that fail to hold Moscow accountable do not resolve conflicts; they incubate them.
The peace trap: Five ways Putin wins if Ukraine freezes the war
The collapse of the “neutral buffer state” strategy
For decades, NATO expansion was restrained by the belief that integrating countries like Ukraine or Georgia would provoke Russia. Western policymakers assumed that maintaining these states as neutral buffer zones would preserve stability in Eastern Europe. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that this premise was fundamentally flawed. NATO’s hesitation did not prevent war, it invited it.
Russia does not respect ceasefires; it exploits them.
Before 2022, there was a widely held assumption that offering security guarantees to post-Soviet states would trigger Russian retaliation.
The reality was the opposite. Moscow did not attack NATO members; it targeted Ukraine precisely because it lacked membership in the alliance and therefore had no formal security protections.
This realization has led to a dramatic shift in the strategic thinking of European nations that had previously remained outside of NATO. Finland and Sweden, long proponents of neutrality, swiftly reversed their positions and joined the alliance, recognizing that being outside NATO’s security umbrella made them more vulnerable, not less.
This shift has broader implications for European security. NATO now views expansion not as a destabilizing act but as a necessary measure to deter future conflicts. The lesson learned from Ukraine’s war is that allowing geopolitical gray zones to persist only emboldens authoritarian regimes. Rather than preventing war, neutrality in the face of Russian aggression has proved to be a strategic liability.
A new doctrine must emerge: The West should not push Ukraine into another Minsk-style pause, nor should it pressure Kyiv to negotiate while Russian troops remain on Ukrainian soil.
The only path to a sustainable peace is through full resolution, either through the complete military defeat of Russian forces or a negotiated withdrawal that does not leave occupied territory under indefinite Russian control.
If Ukraine is forced into a ceasefire now, history suggests that a new war will erupt in the coming years once Russia has replenished its military strength.
No NATO membership until full territorial control is a strategic mistake
Prior to 2022, NATO’s hesitation to extend membership to Ukraine was rooted in the fear that it would provoke Russian aggression. The assumption was that keeping Ukraine out of the alliance would prevent war.
Yet, as Putin’s full-scale invasion demonstrated, it was precisely Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO that made it a target. The lesson is clear: countries outside NATO’s security umbrella are more vulnerable to Russian attacks, not less.
Delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership until it has full territorial control plays directly into Putin’s hands.
It incentivizes Russia to prolong the war indefinitely, ensuring that as long as even a small portion of Ukraine remains occupied, Kyiv will remain outside the alliance.
This logic mirrors the situation in Georgia, where Russian troops have occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008, effectively preventing Georgia’s NATO accession for over a decade.
In 1955, West Germany joined NATO while East Germany remained under Soviet occupation, proving that security guarantees can work without total reunification. A similar model would allow Ukraine to integrate into the alliance now, deterring Russia while preventing another frozen conflict.
Such a move would fundamentally alter the balance of power in Ukraine’s favor:
- it would send a powerful message to Moscow that its military campaign has failed;
- Russia would be forced to negotiate from a position of weakness, knowing that Ukraine’s sovereignty is now backed by the full weight of the alliance;
- more importantly, it would eliminate Russia’s ability to manipulate the frozen conflict dynamic: if NATO membership is not contingent on full territorial restoration, then occupying parts of Ukraine no longer serves as a useful bargaining tool for the Kremlin.
No more illusions
Frozen conflicts were never peace; they were Russia’s waiting game. From the Minsk Accords to the ceasefires in Georgia and the long stalemate in Moldova, these so-called diplomatic solutions were nothing more than traps, delays that allowed Moscow to regroup and strike again. Ukraine has destroyed that illusion, refusing another Minsk because it knows that any pause today is simply a path to the next war.
The world may hesitate, but Ukraine cannot afford to. If this war ends with another Minsk, then everything sacrificed will have been for nothing. The only way forward is through victory, because anything less is just an invitation for the next invasion.
Ukraine does not need another uneasy ceasefire. It needs to finish what Russia started and ensure that this time, it truly ends.
