A decade ago, Russia deployed troops to Syria to support Bashar al-Assad, motivated in large part by its gas interests. Two major pipeline projects posed significant threats to Russia’s dominance in the European gas market:
- The Qatar-Türkiye pipeline would have transported Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Türkiye to European markets. This would have aligned with the EU’s Southern Energy Corridor vision and connected with the proposed Nabucco pipeline.
- The Iran-Syria Pipeline would have moved Iranian gas through Iraq and Syria to Mediterranean ports for LNG shipment to Europe via a Shiite corridor.
Russia’s intervention in Syria was less about “conflict resolution” and more about strategic disruption. Moscow’s approach was clear: foster sufficient military and political instability to render pipeline construction infeasible. By ensuring that no infrastructure could be safely built in a conflict zone, Russia achieved its objective: maintaining control over all gas flows to Europe, either directly or indirectly.
This was not a new tactic. The Kremlin successfully employed it in Ukraine in 2014, where the Russian occupation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas derailed major gas development projects with Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron.
A decade later, the energy landscape has shifted dramatically. Europe’s commitment to decarbonization and hard lessons about dependence on authoritarian regimes have transformed its energy outlook. The continent relies increasingly on Norwegian gas, American and Qatari LNG, and Algerian supplies. While Russian energy still reaches European markets through backdoor channels and at heavy discounts, the era of new Russian pipelines has ended.
Qatar, too, has moved on. Modern LNG technology allows it to ship gas worldwide without fixed pipeline infrastructure. This flexibility makes far more sense than building thousands of kilometers of pipelines from the North Dome/South Pars field it shares with Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Why Türkiye really wants Syria
Türkiye plays a complex game in Syria. At its heart lies the Kurdish question: while Syria’s Kurdish population is smaller than those in neighboring countries, their control of territories along the Turkish border makes them a critical concern for Ankara.
This fits into Türkiye’s broader regional chess game. While Turkish authorities have grudgingly found a way to coexist with Iraq’s de facto independent Kurdish region, Syria presents a different challenge. Their primary concern? The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – the militant force that has spearheaded Kurdish independence ambitions for half a century.
Religious dynamics add another layer to Türkiye’s ambitions. Both Turks and most Syrians are Sunni Muslims, contrasting sharply with Assad’s Alawite minority. These Alawites, making up just 15% of Syria’s population, cluster along the Mediterranean coast in Latakia and Tartus – yet have managed to maintain their grip on power.
Modern Türkiye’s approach reveals a fascinating tension. While its leaders still pay lip service to Atatürk’s secular vision, their actions echo Ottoman ambitions. After all, both modern Syria and Iraq were once Ottoman territories. Through this lens, Türkiye’s patient maneuvering in Syria looks less like opportunistic intervention and more like a modern version of historical Turkish influence in the region.
This patient, strategic approach explains why Türkiye has remained deeply involved in Syrian affairs, carefully waiting for moments to advance its interests.
The perfect storm Türkiye was waiting for
Türkiye waited patiently for the perfect storm: US political vulnerability during the presidential transition and, more crucially, Russia’s increasing weakness from its own military adventures.
The first sign came in 2023, when Türkiye helped Azerbaijan reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh, with a weakened Russia abandoning its Armenian allies. Then, watching Russia’s massive losses in Ukraine and Putin’s desperate appeals to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Erdogan saw his Syrian opportunity – Moscow could no longer effectively prop up Assad.
Russia’s diminishing footprint in Syria told the story. While Russian aircraft and a handful of ships remained at Tartus base – ready to retreat to sea at the first sign of trouble – the ground reality had shifted dramatically. Most Russian personnel had been withdrawn, leaving only a skeleton force of a few thousand.
This wasn’t entirely surprising. Since their 2015 intervention, Russia’s role had been limited mainly to aerial bombardment, with only special forces and Wagner Group mercenaries on the ground. The real muscle came from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, following a simple division: Russia controlled the skies with air defense and bombing campaigns, while Iran handled the ground war through its forces and proxies.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, necessity forced it to withdraw Wagner forces from Syria. Meanwhile, Iran’s position weakened after Israel’s strikes against Hezbollah and Hamas destroyed weapons depots and disrupted Syrian supply lines. For Erdogan, this confluence of his rivals’ weaknesses presented the perfect moment to act.
Beyond Syria, these developments signal a broader regional transformation. A decade ago, pipeline politics seemed to explain Russia’s intervention and Syria’s strategic importance. Today, as Assad’s regime crumbles, we see a different reality: Türkiye’s calculated patience in pursuing its regional ambitions, Russia’s diminishing power, and the end of Moscow’s ability to project force beyond its borders.
The fall of Assad marks not just the failure of Russia’s Syrian gambit but also reveals how regional powers like Türkiye have learned to wait out and exploit Moscow’s weaknesses. While Putin seeks help from North Korea, Erdogan’s long game—focused on Kurdish containment, Sunni influence, and neo-Ottoman ambitions rather than energy routes—has paid off.
Yet Erdogan’s victory lap might be premature. Syria has a habit of defying expectations, and even under the best circumstances, stabilizing the country will prove challenging. The window for ambitious gas transit projects has long closed. What matters now is who will shape Syria’s future – and Türkiye, having outlasted both Russian power and Iranian influence, seems best positioned to try.
Read more:
- What Syria means for Ukraine
- Assad’s fall makes a mockery of Putin
- Russia’s African presence at risk from potential Syria naval base loss, expert says
