Kremlin's deal with Wagner remains unclear. Russians drop chemical munitions on Ukraine's Armed Forces, but the wind blows toward Russian occupiers. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
Daily overview — Summary report, June 26

The General Staff’s operational update regarding the Russian invasion as of 18.00 pm, June 26, 2023 is in the dropdown menu below:

- Volyn and Polissya axes: no significant changes. [No signs of the formation of an offensive group.]

- Sivershchyna and Slobozhanshchyna axes: the adversary launched an airstrike in the vicinity of Zelene (Kharkiv oblast). The invaders fired mortars and artillery at the settlements of Hrem’yachka, Tymonovychi (Chernihiv oblast), Khodyne, Malushyne, Kozache, Vorozhba, Iskryskivshchyna, Pavlivka, Katerynivka (Sumy oblast), Udy, Veterynarne, Hraniv, Kozacha Lopan’, Krasne, Starytsya, Ohirtseve, Hatyshche, Vovchans’k, Bochkove, Okhrimivka, Mykolaivka, Nesterne, Budarky, Kruhle, Zemlyanky, Vil’khuvatka, Chuhunivka, Hryhorivka, Odradne (Kharkiv oblast).
- Kupiansk axis: the adversary conducted offensive operations in the area west of Kryvoshyivka (Luhansk oblast), to no success. Russian forces launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka (Kharkiv oblast). Kolodyazne, Krasne Pershe, Fyholivka, Novomlyns’k, Dvorichna, Zapadne, Masyutivka, Kyslivka, and Berestove (Kharkiv oblast) came under artillery and mortar fire.

- Lyman axis: the adversary conducted unsuccessful offensives towards Vesele and Rozdolivka (Donetsk oblast). The invaders launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Tors’ke, Dibrova, Bilohorivka, Zvanivka, and Spirne. Nevske, Bilohorivka (Luhansk oblast), Tors’ke, Serebryanka, Verkhn’yokam’yans’ke, Spirne, and Rozdolivka (Donetsk oblast) were shelled with artillery.

- Bakhmut axis: the adversary attempted offensive operations in the vicinities of Min’kivka, Hryhorivka, and Bohdanivka (Donetsk oblast), to no success. The Russian forces launched airstrikes near Khromove and Sukha Balka. Vasyukivka, Min’kivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka, Chasiv Yar, Ivanivske, Ozarianivka, and New York (Donetsk oblast) suffered from enemy artillery shelling.
- Avdiivka axis: the adversary launched an airstrike in the vicinity of Avdiivka. The occupant forces fired artillery at the settlements of Berdychi, Avdiivka, Vodyane, Karlivka, and Pervomais’ke (Donetsk oblast).
- Marinka axis: the enemy conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of Marinka (Donetsk oblast), to no success. The invaders launched an airstrike near Krasnohorivka. At the same time, the settlements of Hostre, Heorhiivka, and Marinka (Donetsk oblast) were shelled with artillery.
- Shakhtarske axis: the enemy conducted unsuccessful offensives towards Novomykhailivka. The Russian forces launched airstrikes near Prechystivka and Blahodatne. The invaders shelled the settlements of Paraskoviivka, Novomykhailivka, Vuhledar, Storozheve, Makarivka, Novosilka, and Novopil’ (Donetsk oblast).

- Zaporizhzhia and Kherson axes: the adversary focuses its main efforts on preventing the advance of Ukrainian troops. The enemy unsuccessfully attempted to regain its position lost in the vicinity of Novodarivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The occupant forces launched airstrikes in the vicinities of Levadne and Novodanylivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The invaders fired artillery at about 30 settlements, including Temyrivka, Novodarivka, Levadne, Ol’hivs’ke, Malynivka, Zelenyi Hai, Zatyshshya, Hulyaipole (Zaporizhzhia oblast), Nikopol’ (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Mylove, Beryslav, Kozats’ke, L’vove, Mykil’s’ke, Antonivka, Zelenivka, Kherson, Dniprovs’ke (Kherson oblast), and Ochakiv (Mykolaiv oblast).

Military Updates


- As part of its broader counter-offensive, Ukraine has gained impetus in its assaults around Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast.
- In a multi-brigade operation, Ukrainian forces have made progress on both the northern and southern flanks of the town.
- There has been little evidence that Russia maintains any significant ground forces operational level reserves which could be used to reinforce against the multiple threats it is now facing in widely separated sectors,
- In recent days, Ukrainian forces have re-set and have again been undertaking major offensive operations on three main axes in southern and eastern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces are using the experiences from the first two weeks of the counter-offensive to refine tactics for assaulting the deep, well prepared Russian defences. Ukrainian units are making gradual but steady tactical progress in key areas.
- In Luhansk Oblast, Russian forces have made their own significant effort to launch an attack in the Serebryanka Forest near Kremina. This probably reflects continued Russian senior leadership orders to go on the offensive whenever possible. Russia has made some small gains, but Ukrainian forces have prevented a breakthrough.
Losses of the Russian army

- Personnel – about 225580 (+950)
- Tanks – 4031 (+1)
- Armoured combat vehicles – 7820 (+14)
- Artillery systems – 4055 (+21)
- Multiple rocket launchers –MLRS - 624 (+0)
- Air defence means – 385 (+0)
- Aircraft - 314 (+0)
- Helicopters - 308 (+0)
- Automotive technology and fuel tanks – 6751(+16)
- Vessels/boats - 18 (+0)
- UAV operational and tactical level – 3482 (+10)
- Special equipment – 557 (+5)
- Mobile SRBM system – 4 (+0)
- Cruise missiles – 1259 (+0)
Humanitarian
In May, ICRC confirms captivity of hundreds of missing Ukrainians – report, Ukrinform reports, citing Oleksandr Vlasenko, the spokesman for ICRC in Ukraine, who spoke in an interview with Tyzhden. “Last month, the International Committee of the Red Cross managed to confirm that hundreds of missing Ukrainians are in fact held in Russian captivity. […] The spokesman noted that this information came from the Russian National Information Bureau. Vlasenko explained that only after the status of a prisoner of war is confirmed can the ICRC demand access to a person, although the organization has no coercive tools to apply. He explained that a person shall be considered missing until the ICRC receives confirmation from the National Information Bureau of the Russian Federation that they are held in captivity. Even if the person who opens the case with us saw the missing person in some Telegram channel yesterday, this is not a confirmation for us. We cannot verify that the video wasn’t doctored, and we have to get data from an official body that the person is really in that location. In this case, we can inform the relatives that we have found the person, added Vlasenko. […] As Ukrinform reported earlier, public organizations say over 10,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war are held in Russian prisons.” UN helps develop master plan to rebuild Kharkiv, Ukrinform reports, citing the UN press service. “A UN-supported team of international and local architects has developed a concept for reconstruction of Kharkiv city. It is noted that a team of Ukrainian and foreign architects adopted a concept for a new urban landscape that was submitted by local volunteer, historian, architect, and documentary filmmaker Maxim Rosenfeld. The master plan has been developed on a voluntary basis by the Norman Foster Foundation together with a group of local architects and urban planners as well as with the Advisory Council of International Experts. Supported by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) through a pilot project, the newly created UN4Kharkiv task force has united 16 UN agencies and international organizations. According to the Kharkiv City Council, 3,367 apartment buildings and 1,823 single-family houses have been destroyed in Kharkiv, along with urban infrastructure. The total damage caused to Ukraine’s housing sector since Russia’s invasion is estimated at more than $50 billion, according to the UN.”Environmental
Plan to blow up Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant approved, situation has never been so severe before, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Budanov, in an interview with The New Statesman, as cited by Defence Intelligence website. “Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Defence Intelligence, is convinced that the plan to blow up the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) by Russians has been fully developed and approved, and the threat has never been as great as it is now. […] According to Budanov, Russia has completed preparations for the terrorist attack on the ZNPP. […] Budanov believes that technical assets can be used to accelerate the disaster. According to the head of Defence Intelligence, the cooling reservoir of the station was mined by Russian troops. Without cooling, nuclear reactors can melt within a period from ten hours to 14 days. He believes Russia will be able to increase the voltage in the power lines at the plant, leading to a nuclear accident at the bottom of this time interval. Ukrainian intelligence has determined that Russian troops have moved vehicles packed with explosives to four of the six power units. It is not known whether access to these units was granted to the International Atomic Energy Agency during its visit on June 15, the newspaper writes. According to the head of the Defence Intelligence, Russia's order to commit a terrorist attack on the ZNPP may have been caused by the defeat of the Russian occupation forces on the Left Bank of Dnipro ― Russia considers creation of a nuclear disaster zone a safeguard for the further advance of the defence forces of Ukraine. At the same time, according to Budanov, there is a risk that the Russian Federation may cause a radiation leak at the ZNPP as a preventive measure to stop Ukraine's offensive operation and freeze the front line in its current form. There is frustration in Ukrainian intelligence and government circles that the international community's response to the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam on 6 June was so muted that this could provoke further use of "scorched Earth tactic," the newspaper notes. On 20 June, Budanov said that the threat of an explosion or accident at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant existed because Russians additionally mined the cooler.”Legal
Russians tear up Ukrainian documents at checkpoints in occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region, Ukrinform reports, citing Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov. "The occupiers are putting more and more pressure on people to impose Russian citizenship: without a Russian passport, it is no longer possible to receive social benefits and medical care. The ferocious occupiers are tearing up Ukrainian documents at checkpoints. People who refuse [Russian] passports are threatened with deportation and confiscation of all their property, he wrote. Fedorov added that passports issued in February 2023 are being handed out to people. That is, the occupiers produced passports in advance so that then forcibly issue them to absolutely everyone by any methods, the mayor said.”Support
Australia pledges $100m in new military support for Ukraine, including vehicles and ammunition, The Guardian reports. “The Australian government has announced a new $110m assistance package as the next round of support for Ukraine, including military vehicles, ammunition and humanitarian funding. This package responds to Ukraine’s requests for vehicles and ammunition, and will make a tangible difference on the battlefield, the prime minister, Anthony Albanese, said. The government has committed 70 military vehicles, including 28 M113 armoured vehicles, 14 special operations vehicles, 28 MAN 40M medium trucks and 14 trailers; a new supply of 105mm artillery ammunition; and $10m to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – for the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund – to assist in the provision of shelter, health services, water and sanitation.” Ukraine will receive 45 Gepard anti-aircraft guns and 2 IRIS-T systems by the end of the year, Militarnyi reports. “Germany, in cooperation with the United States, intends to transfer 45 more Gepard anti-aircraft guns and 2 IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by the end of the year. Brigadier General Christian Freuding shared this in an interview with Welt am Sonntag. According to the publication, Germany has already handed over 34 Gepard anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine, and 15 more will be delivered in the coming weeks. In addition, we want to deliver up to 30 more Gepards by the end of the year in cooperation with the US, Freuding said. Assistance in purchasing Gepard anti-aircraft guns is also provided by the United States. Militarnyi reported that the Pentagon signed a contract with Global Military Products. The $118 million contract covers the purchase of anti-aircraft guns in Jordan. In an interview, Freuding stated that he considers Ukraine’s air defenses to be a key weak point during counteroffensive actions. We are doing everything we can. But, despite all this, does Ukraine have sufficient anti-missile defense? Definitely not!, the Brigadier General declared. He also reminded that Germany will hand over two IRIS-T SLM air defense systems to Ukraine by the end of this year, and four more in the next year. Thus, the approximate number of Gepard anti-aircraft guns in service with the Defense Forces of Ukraine will be about 79 units by the end of this year. The number of IRIS-T SLM air defense systems will be increased to eight by the end of next year.” Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Call With Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, the US Department of Defense reports. “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke today with Ukrainian Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov to discuss regional security developments and dynamics on the ground in Ukraine. Secretary Austin reiterated unwavering US support for Ukraine and discussed security assistance priorities to meet Ukraine's needs on the battlefield.” Pentagon admits it overvalued Ukraine military aid by $6.2 billion, The Hill reported 21 June. An accounting error led the Pentagon to overvalue the military aid the United States has sent Ukraine by $6.2 billion over the past two years, double the amount first estimated. The Defense Department (DOD) earlier this year “discovered inconsistencies in equipment valuation for Ukraine,” specifically that the military services used replacement costs rather than the net book value of equipment that was taken from Pentagon stocks to send to Ukraine, deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters Tuesday. Singh said calculations revealed there was an overestimation of $3.6 billion in the current fiscal year and $2.6 billion in fiscal 2022, which ended Sept. 30. That means the Pentagon has an unexpected influx of money banked to use to bolster Ukraine in its newly launched counteroffensive against Russia. […] The Biden administration has repeatedly used presidential drawdown authority to pull US missiles, vehicles, ammunition and other equipment from Pentagon stockpiles to quickly move to Ukraine. The method gets the security assistance to Kyiv much faster than the sometimes lengthy process of buying weapons directly from defense firms, which must build out orders before shipping them to the embattled country. Washington earlier this month said it had committed more than $40 billion in lethal aid to Ukraine using presidential drawdown authority since Russia attacked the country in February 2022. But under the new calculation, that number is now less than $34 billion. The admission means the administration has some extra room in replenishing US military equipment sent to Kyiv.”New Developments
- Prigozhin possibly promised dismissal of Russia’s Defence Minister and General Staff Chief, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing sources in the Ukrainian special services. “Sources note that in exchange for turning the convoys of Wagner Group’s forces away from Moscow, Prigozhin could have been promised the dismissal of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov and other minor Russian officials with whom the owner of the Wagner PMC is in conflict. The sources also cast doubt on whether the Wagnerites will actually move to Belarus.”
- US's Blinken says Russia turmoil shows 'cracks' in Putin's power, Reuters “The unprecedented challengeto Russian President Vladimir Putin by Wagner fighters has exposed fresh "cracks" in the strength of his leadership that may take weeks or months to play out, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Sunday. […] The turmoil in Russia has weakened Putin in ways that could aid Ukraine's counteroffensive against Russian forces within its territory while benefiting Russia's neighbors, including Poland and the Baltic states. I don't think we've seen the final act, Blinken said on ABC's "This Week" program after an aborted mutiny by forces led by Yevgeny Prigozhin. Blinken said tensions that sparked the action had been growing for months and added that the threat of internal turmoil could affect Moscow's military capabilities in Ukraine.”
- US intelligence knew that Prigozhin was planning coup in Russia, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing CNN. “US intelligence believes that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC), had been planning to challenge the Russian military leadership for quite some time. According to those briefed, the ultimate aim of Prigozhin’s plans was unclear. Earlier this week, US intelligence officials briefed congressional leaders known as the Gang of Eight on Wagner's movements and equipment build-up near Russia, two of the sources said. US and Western intelligence officials saw signs that Prigozhin was preparing for such a move, including by amassing weapons and ammunition. In addition, according to one CNN source, they believe that Prigozhin's claims of a lack of ammunition for operations in Ukraine were deliberate deception to help lay the foundation for a potential military challenge to the Russian leadership.”
- Russia mercenary threat revives concern over nuclear arsenal security, Reuters “The Wagner mercenary group's march on Moscow has revived an old fear in Washington: what happens to Russia's nuclear stockpile in the event of domestic upheaval. […] Images of tanks on Russian streets brought to mind the failed 1991 coup by communist hardliners that raised concerns about the security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the possibility of a rogue commander stealing a warhead, said former US intelligence officials. […] The scenario worrying planners now may be the possibility of a rogue military faction gaining decision-making ability over some of the weapons should divisions over the war in Ukraine exposed by Prigozhin's mutiny erupt anew. The United States and its allies would be left to wonder how any new authority would use the weapons, said Hoffman. It’s the ability to extort the West for whatever you want. And they might not play by the same sort of rules that Putin has, he said, noting how the Russian leader has not acted on nuclear threats he has made in response to the West’s support for Ukraine’s fight against Russian occupation forces.”
- China expresses support for Russia after aborted mutiny, Reuters “China supports Russia in maintaining its national stability, the Chinese foreign ministry said on Sunday, a day after an aborted mutinyby the Wagner group of heavily armed mercenaries. […] China's foreign ministry initially said only that Rudenko had exchanged views with China's Foreign Minister Qin Gang on Sino-Russian relations as well as international and regional issues of common concern. It later said China supports Russia in maintaining its national stability and that the recent escalation in tensions in Russia was Russia's internal affairs".
- Yermak outlines results of advisers’ meeting in Copenhagen, Ukrinform reports, citing Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian President's Office. “He wrote that consultations on the key principles of peace were held in Copenhagen with national security advisers and political advisers from Brazil, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the EU, Italy, India, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the USA, Türkiye, Ukraine, France, and Japan. The meeting is a continuation of the dialogue launched at the G7 summit in Hiroshima between the leaders of Ukraine, the G7 countries and the Global South. […] During the consultations, I noted that the meeting of advisers in Copenhagen is a clear signal of respect for Ukraine and our just struggle, support for the territorial integrity of our state and sovereignty, which are the fundamental principles of the UN, which we all share.”
- Poland doesn’t rule out tension rise on border with Belarus, Ukrinform reports, citing Radio Poland and the spokesman for the minister coordinator for special services, Stanislaw Zaryn. "We cannot rule out that Prigozhin will be used in Belarus to strengthen at least this hybrid operation that hits Poland directly. This, of course, is an issue that needs to be monitored, which the Polish services will certainly do, said Zaryn. […] In his opinion, the June 24 events in Russia were not an introduction to power change. Zaryn added that this is about the rivalry of the factions that reign over Russia. We are dealing with certain frictions between various groups involved in military operations against Ukraine. But it must be clearly said: until today in Russia, neither among the power elites, nor in the army, nor in society are there any strong resistance movements regarding the main strategic goals and actions, said the Polish government spokesman. He also expressed the opinion that the latest developments in Russian could in fact turn out to be a disinformation campaign intended to conceal real intentions targeting the West.”
- Erdogan tells NATO Sweden must stop Kurdish protests, Reuters “Sweden must stop protests by supporters of outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Stockholm to get a green light on its NATO membership bid, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan told NATO's Secretary-General in a phone call on Sunday.”
- Fire at Bulgarian arms factory of businessman poisoned by GRU agents, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Balkan Radio Liberty “On the night of 24-25 June, a large-scale fire broke out in the storage point of the EMKO arms company near the Bulgarian town of Karnobat. This facility is owned by businessman Emilian Gebrev, and the owner suspects that it was an intentional arson attack. According to Gebrev, the current fire broke out at around 00:40 on Sunday, and fortunately, none of the base's security guards were injured. […] The fire was the second fire in a row at this facility after ammunition detonated in another storage point on 31 July 2022. Since then, an investigation has been ongoing, and the prosecutor's office has not released any official information about its progress.”
Assessment
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023*- On the war.
The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of June 25, 2022:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully tried to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast near Rodionivka on June 25.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove amid claims of continued Ukrainian offensives along the Kreminna-Svatove line on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Berestove, Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove). […]
Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City with Storm Shadow cruise missiles on June 25. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a column of smoke in the vicinity of Luhansk City. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian air defenses operated in the area. ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City on June 25.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a relatively higher number of Russian offensive operations near Bakhmut than over the past few days and stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolikvka (14km northeast) and Vesele (16km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka (10km northwest) and Minkivka (12km northwest); and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivkske (3km southwest). Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces took advantage of distraction caused by Wagner Group’s armed June 23-24 rebellion and launched several counterattacks in the Bakhmut area, including southwest of Bakhmut near Kurdiumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest); northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (3km northwest); and northeast of Bakhmut on the Vasyukivka-Rozdolivka line. […] Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade reported that it defeated elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in the Bakhmut area and destroyed a Russian bridgehead in an unspecified area on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which runs southwest of Bakhmut between Mayorsk and Kurdiumivka.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 25. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and that 13 combat clashes took place near Marinka over the past day. Geolocated footage posted on June 24 and June 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances on the northern outskirts of Donetsk City just south of Avdiivka and between Pisky and Pervomaiske on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade spokesperson Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi notably reported on June 24 that Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” elements and unspecified Russian special forces suddenly withdrew from Marinka. The details of this reported withdrawal are unclear, but some contingent of Akhmat and other special forces may have departed from Marinka to Rostov Oblast in order to guard against the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.
A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 25. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km due east of Velyka Novosilka).
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhzhia oblasts on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize lost positions near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Makarivka (7km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Zolota Nyva (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Priyutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv). Russian sources claimed that neither side controls Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv), although ISW has not observed footage suggesting that Ukrainian forces have lost control of the settlement since they captured it on June 19. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Robotyne.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 24 that fighting occurred between Russian airborne forces (VDV) and Ukrainian forces near the Antonivskyi Bridge (8km northeast of Kherson City). Another Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Ukrainian forces had established positions on the east (left) bank of Antonivskyi Bridge. ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, and it is unclear if floodwaters have receded enough for Ukrainian or Russian forces to establish positions near this area.
Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing unnamed internal Kremlin sources, reported that Prigozhin initially tried to get in touch with the Russian Presidential Administration midday June 24 as Wagner fighters moved north from Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow, but that Putin refused to speak with Prigozhin. Meduza noted that, once Prigozhin observed the lack of widespread military support for Wagner’s actions and changed his mind on Wagner’s prospects, the Kremlin turned to negotiations involving Lukashenko, Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Office Anton Vaino, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov. Vaino and Gryzlov’s possible involvement was not reported on June 24. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also questioned whether the deal will hold Wagner or Prigozhin accountable in any way for the deaths of at least 13 Russian airman on June 24. Prigozhin’s whereabouts cannot be verified beyond his departure from Rostov-on-Don late on June 24. Russian outlet RTVI claimed that Prigozhin’s press service told RTVI that Prigozhin “sends his regards” and will answer all questions “when he is on normal communication,” and a prominent Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an AI-generated image of Prigozhin holding a finger to his lips and stating “plans love silence,” a copy of the phrase commonly used in Ukraine about operational security. As ISW noted on June 24, the specifics of the deal are still unclear in the open source beyond speculation and rumor. The fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion has not yet concluded, and it remains to be seen how the deal will be implemented, if all involved parties will comply fully, how the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intend to do with Wagner personnel - and if Wagner fighters will cooperate, regardless of Prigozhin’s wishes.
The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian MoD also remain ambiguous. Some Russian sources, including internal Kremlin sources cited by Meduza, suggested that the Kremlin may be considering changes to MoD leadership as part of the deal. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov have not been seen or heard from since before Prigozhin announced the beginning of the armed rebellion on June 23. Some Russian sources suggested that Alexei Dyumin, the current governor of Tula Oblast, former security officer to Putin, and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces, may replace Shoigu as the Defense Minister, although ISW cannot confirm these speculations. Any changes to the MoD leadership would notably represent a significant victory for Prigozhin, who justified his armed rebellion by directly accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.
Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows armed Wagner forces driving south away from Moscow near Voronezh City. Footage published on June 25 purportedly shows Wagner forces returning to training camps in southern Russia. The fact that Wagner is returning to their training camps with military equipment indicates that the Kremlin intends to maintain at least certain elements of Wagner’s manpower rather than seek to immediately demobilize them, although the future of Wagner’s command and organizational structure are unclear. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrei Kartapolov announced on June 25 that the State Duma is working on a law that would regulate private military companies (PMCs) but emphasized that it is not necessary to ban the Wagner Group as it is “the most combat-ready unit in Russia.” Kartapolov further noted that the future of the Wagner Group is undetermined and emphasized that the personnel of the Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don were “following orders of their command” and “did nothing reprehensible.” Kartapolov’s efforts to absolve Wagner personnel of responsibility for taking part in an armed rebellion and separate them from Prigozhin may indicate the Russian government’s desire to continue to use Wagner personnel in some capacity, and as ISW assessed on June 24, the Russian leadership could redeploy Wagner to Ukraine or instead commit them to international missions. Russian state-affiliated news outlets reported on June 24 that the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Rozkomnadzor) blocked Prigozhin’s official press service on Russian social media site VKontakte, indicating the Kremlin’s efforts to restrict Prigozhin’s organizational actions.
Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support. Russian sources claimed on June 25 that the first Wagner column that began moving towards Moscow on June 24 consisted of 350 pieces of equipment, including nine tanks, four Tigr infantry fighting vehicles, a Grad MLRS system, and a howitzer. Russian sources claimed that the three other Wagner columns that moved towards Moscow had 375, 100, and 212 pieces of equipment respectively, the majority of which were non-armored trucks, cars, and buses. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 24 that the columns moving towards Moscow were comprised of 4,000 personnel with 40 to 50 pieces of equipment, including MRAPs, T-90M main battle tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Pantsir air defense systems, and Grad MLRS systems. CNN reported on June 24 that US and Western intelligence officials observed Wagner amassing equipment and ammunition for the rebellion for several weeks, indicating that the columns likely comprised Wagner‘s greatest available strength. ISW cannot confirm the exact composition of the Wagner columns at this time, although current reporting suggests that Prigozhin’s force would have struggled to fully occupy Moscow or conduct prolonged engagements with elements of the Russian Armed Forces, if they deployed. ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin likely sought and failed to win military support for his rebellion, and Wagner’s move on Moscow was likely predicated on the assumption that military support would strengthen the rebellion’s forces and capabilities. Prigozhin may have become more amenable to the alleged negotiations with Lukashenko as these insufficient forces drew nearer to Moscow and that time was running out to garner the necessary military support for a potential armed conflict with the MoD.
The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion had exposed. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger praised all of the parties for bringing the rebellion to an end and avoiding bloodshed, ignoring the fact that Wagner forces killed at least 13 Russian pilots and airmen during the rebellion. Other Russian sources continued to characterize the rebellion as solely Prigozhin’s doing and called on Russian authorities to show clemency towards the Wagner fighters who have fought for Russian interests in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger specifically accused Moscow Oblast officials and the MoD of failing to stop the Wagner advance towards Moscow. The milblogger questioned how the MoD would be able to respond to external incursions if it was unable to stop Wagner’s movement towards Moscow. A former Russian occupation official criticized how the internal Russian structures were slow in publicly addressing the rebellion. Several other Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian elites for failing to publicly support Putin and for fleeing Russia. Another Russian ultranationalist bemoaned that Prigozhin’s rebellion indicated that Russia is one step closer to its final and irrevocable death. A prominent milblogger asked how Russian authorities will punish those involved in the deaths of Russian servicemen, indicating that clemency for the Wagner fighters that participated in the rebellion may become a longstanding grievance for elements of the Russian military and the ultranationalist community.
The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion. The Angry Patriots Club is a pro-war social movement that aims to correct perceived issues in the war-effort in Ukraine so that Russian forces can achieve victory, and the club’s members have used that mission to launch routine scathing criticisms of the MoD, the Kremlin, and Putin himself. The Angry Patriots Club has also notably called for “revolution” if the Kremlin freezes the war in Ukraine or pursues negotiations. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin spoke at the livestreamed event in Moscow and delivered a set of longstanding theses on what Russia needs to do to win the war in Ukraine. Girkin publicly reiterated that Putin needs to legally transfer certain presidential authorities to other parties if Putin is unwilling to assume control over the war in Ukraine as the supreme Commander-in-Chief. The Angry Patriots Club had promoted the event for several weeks, and Russian officials were likely aware of it to some extent. If the Kremlin intends to use Prigozhin’s rebellion as pretext to start immediately suppressing antagonistic ultranationalists, then this event would have likely been a prime candidate to start that effort. The Kremlin likely risks Prigozhin’s armed rebellion expanding the window of acceptable anti-Kremlin criticism, particularly if the Kremlin does not intend to retaliate further against Prigozhin. The Kremlin’s continued careful response to the armed rebellion will likely prompt other Russian nationalists to test Russian official reactions to more explicitly critical rhetoric.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut, along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka, although ISW is unable to confirm this claim. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated in an interview with Fox News published on June 25 that the main assault of the counteroffensive has not yet started.
Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion. Russian and Ukrainian sources both reported that fighting continued as usual along the entire frontline, with Russian forces conducting a relatively higher number of ground attacks near Bakhmut than over the past few days. Some Russian sources used the armed rebellion as a rhetorical device to preemptively exculpate Russian forces from any Ukrainian gains made on June 24 and 25.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Budanov stated that Russian forces have mined the ZNPP’s cooling pond and have moved vehicles loaded with explosives to four of the six ZNPP power units. As ISW previously assessed, intentional Russian sabotage of the ZNPP resulting in a radiological catastrophe would potentially be more detrimental to Russian forces on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir than to Ukrainian forces on the opposite bank. Russia has frequently invoked threatening rhetoric surrounding the ZNPP in order to dissuade potential Ukrainian counterattacks into occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Russian forces may be disseminating information about mining of the cooling pond and power units to discourage Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. However, Russia demonstrated a willingness to put its own troops in harm's way after the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP), so ISW cannot rule out the potential that Russian forces may be setting conditions to sabotage the ZNPP.
Key Takeaways
- Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin’s chief of staff.
- The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.
- Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.
- Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.
- The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.
- The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front.
- Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.
- Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
- A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.
- Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.
- Consequences and what to do?