Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 320: Fierce fighting near Bakhmut and Soledar continues

1. On the war. 

The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of  January 8, 2023:

We are offered the Korean option, but Koreans regret it – Secretary of Ukraine’s Security Council, Ukrainska Pravda reports. “Oleksii Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, has stated that the Russians are going to propose the so-called Korean option of settling the war with Ukraine, which implies the division of the country.  We are being offered  the Korean scenario now. The infamous ‘38th parallel’ [which separated North and South Korea – ed.]. Here there are some Ukrainians, and over there, there are some other Ukrainians. The Russians will come up with anything now. I know for sure that one of the options they may offer us is the ‘38th parallel’.  Danilov has also reported that Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of the Administration of the Russian President, goes to meetings with politicians from past eras in Europe and delivers messages through them that they [the Russians - ed.] are ready to make many concessions in order to preserve the status quo, as it is today, and force us to come to some kind of truce. The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council has stated once again that many indicators point to an escalation of combat operations in February.” Time is not on Ukraine’s side, Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates write in The Washington Post. “When it comes to the war in Ukraine, about the only thing that’s certain right now is that the fighting and destruction will continue. Vladimir Putin remains fully committed to bringing all of Ukraine back under Russian control or — failing that — destroying it as a viable country. He believes it is his historical destiny — his messianic mission — to reestablish the Russian Empire and, as Zbigniew Brzezinski observed years ago, there can be no Russian Empire without Ukraine. Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that US and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse. For Putin, defeat is not an option. He cannot cede to Ukraine the four eastern provinces he has declared part of Russia. If he cannot be militarily successful this year, he must retain control of positions in eastern and southern Ukraine that provide future jumping-off points for renewed offensives to take the rest of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, control the entire Donbas region and then move west. Eight years separated Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its invasion nearly a year ago. Count on Putin to be patient to achieve his destiny. Meanwhile, although Ukraine’s response to the invasion has been heroic and its military has performed brilliantly, the country’s economy is in a shambles, millions of its people have fled, its infrastructure is being destroyed, and much of its mineral wealth, industrial capacity and considerable agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine’s military capability and economy are now dependent almost entirely on lifelines from the West — primarily, the United States. Absent another major Ukrainian breakthrough and success against Russian forces, Western pressures on Ukraine to negotiate a cease-fire will grow as months of military stalemate pass. Under current circumstances, any negotiated cease-fire would leave Russian forces in a strong position to resume their invasion whenever they are ready. That is unacceptable. The only way to avoid such a scenario is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor. The US agreement Thursday to provide Bradley Fighting Vehicles is commendable, if overdue. Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need. NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months. Increasingly, members of Congress and others in our public discourse ask, “Why should we care? This is not our fight.” But the United States has learned the hard way — in 1914, 1941 and 2001 — that unprovoked aggression and attacks on the rule of law and the international order cannot be ignored. Eventually, our security was threatened and we were pulled into conflict. This time, the economies of the world — ours included — are already seeing the inflationary impact and the drag on growth caused by Putin’s single-minded aggression. It is better to stop him now, before more is demanded of the United States and NATO as a whole. We have a determined partner in Ukraine that is willing to bear the consequences of war so that we do not have to do so ourselves in the future. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech before Congress last month reminded us of Winston Churchill’s plea in February 1941: “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.” We agree with the Biden administration’s determination to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. However, an emboldened Putin might not give us that choice. The way to avoid confrontation with Russia in the future is to help Ukraine push back the invader now. That is the lesson of history that should guide us, and it lends urgency to the actions that must be taken — before it is too late. Why Russia is throwing all its forces on Soledar, and not on Bakhmut, explains the military of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the front line, NV report. “Soledar remains Ukrainian, and Russian reports about the alleged occupation of the city are fake, they say in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. What is happening in this direction of the front, Ivan Varchenko, a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine , told Radio NV. He also explained why Russian priorities have changed and now the invaders are trying to take a city seven times smaller than Bakhmut. […] From Bakhmut to Soledar, the distance is less than 20 km. It is clear that this is the only section of the large front. We understand that Russia is traditionally trying to get at least something for her now, given that the New Year holidays, and it could not take a single more or less noticeable object for the Russians. They, for example, made a huge symbol out of Bakhmut, expecting that Bakhmut would be taken before the new year. When they failed, they are now frantic, because instead of the gingerbread promised to them before the new year, serious lashes await them, that “how yes, with such a great army they could not take a small settlement”, from which they made in their propaganda ideology almost Stalingrad. Today, it seems to Russia, to the Russian command, that they can take at least one of the settlements located on the front line so that they can report to Putin and thus receive less punishment. At the same time, it is known (and this is obvious) [that it is hard] now for our servicemen working in the Soledar direction, working in the city of Soledar itself. The city of Soledar is under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine […]. Regardless of the plans of the Russians and regardless of how they advance and whether they have tactical successes or not, we must understand that any Russian advance is already a Pyrrhic victory. For example, near Bakhmut, which has 70 thousand inhabitants, they put much more of their soldiers. And it is clear that any further actions they take only increase these pyrrhic victories. That is, the invested resources, the expended forces and means absolutely do not justify all the tactical or operational goals that can be achieved, for example, when taking this or that city. Soledar - 10 thousand people. And there the Russians have already put one and a half times more of their soldiers than the total population in Soledar. […]” Russian invaders no longer have a deep rear area on the Tavriia front [Kherson oblast], Ukrainska Pravda report, citing Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, the commander of the Tavriia operational and strategic group of troops. "On the Tavriia front, the concept of a ‘deep rear’ no longer actually exists for Russian forces. We have successfully conducted counteroffensive operations on the Kharkiv and Kherson fronts thanks to a skilful combination of fire and manoeuvre. We also now control all attempts by the occupation forces to organise effective defence and create conditions for active operations. Ukrainian defenders are doing everything they can to destroy the maximum number of the invaders’ military assets and personnel, even during periods when our positions are relatively stable. The more we destroy them now, the less work there will be during the final liberation of Ukraine from the invaders." Russia and Belarus to conduct joint aviation drills, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing BelTA state-owned Belarusian news agency. “Joint tactical flight drills with the aviation units of the armed forces of Belarus and Russia, which are part of the aviation component of the Russian-BelaRussian combined forces, will take place from 16 January to 1 February, the Ministry of Defence of Belarus reported. An aviation component from the Aerospace Force of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation arrived in Belarus on Sunday, 8 January. During joint tactical flight drills, all airfields and training grounds of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus will be involved, the message says. On 5 January, the Ministry of Defence of Belarus stated that personnel, weapons, military and special equipment of the Russian armed forces will continue to arrive in Belarus. It was reported that the Belarusian army had received another 34 armoured vehicles from Russia, which were sent to the Brest district of Belarus. On the night of 6-7 January, another trainload of Russian soldiers (approximately 700-800 people) was moved to Belarus. This train repeated the route of the previous one exactly, which, as it turned out after specifying the data, also arrived in Vitebsk on the night of 6 January and brought about 700-800 people.”

1. Consequences and what to do? 

Battered and strained by war, Ukraine’s economy adapts to survive, The New York Times reports. “After 10 months of Russian destruction, Ukraine’s economy shrank by 30 percent. […] And through nearly a year of war, over a third of Ukraine’s spending is being directed at beating back Russian forces. Despite major battlefield defeats in its invasion, the Kremlin’s relentless war effort has sown economic havoc atop a devastating humanitarian toll in Ukraine. The country’s economy shrank by 30.4 percent in 2022, its economy minister said Thursday, the largest decline since Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. […] Swaths of the country’s industry and infrastructure have been partially or fully destroyed, and may not be rebuilt. Many businesses based in territory controlled by Russia, or in areas of heavy fighting, are not producing near their capacity, if at all. Consumers across the country are buying less because of high inflation and economic uncertainty generated by the war. But the war has also spurred Ukrainians to restructure parts of their economy at lightning speed, in ways big and small, as companies pack up operations or pivot to new business. That has fostered an extraordinary amount of economic adaptability that is not reflected in the dire numbers, and is setting the groundwork for potential rebuilding even before the war ends, the government argued. Yulia Svyrydenko, the economy minister, said in a statement Thursday that the “indomitable spirit” of the Ukrainian people, along with financial support from international donors, had allowed the government in Kyiv to “maintain the economic front and continue our movement toward victory.” And while the damage has been profound, the hit to the economy was slightly lower than the worst forecasts. The biggest damage has come in Ukraine’s major export sectors, which before the war made up the bulk of the country’s income. The conflict caused a 35 percent drop last year in exports of everything from wheat to steel. Agriculture, once a pillar of Ukraine’s economy — making it known as a breadbasket of the world — has been dealt an especially harsh setback as Moscow continues to block most shipments, despite a UN-brokered deal. Compounding the problem, Russia’s attacks on the country’s energy grid have disrupted the flow of food, contributing to a global food crisis. Storage has run out for many harvests, leaving Ukrainian farmers scrambling for makeshift solutions. On average, Ukraine can now export only about 5 to 6 million tons of grain a month, down from about 8 million tons before the war. Ukraine had also been a major exporter of metals and raw materials, such as iron ore. But nearly all of Ukraine’s large factories producing steel and other key metals were located in eastern territories that were captured or severely bombed by Russia. A vast majority of those facilities have more or less stopped operating, said Tymofiy Milovanov, the president of the Kyiv School of Economics. Russian missiles have struck cities and facilities across the country, dealing heavy damage to a huge amount of the nation’s housing, transportation and energy infrastructure. The Kyiv School of Economics has estimated that the direct costs of war-related damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure were $127 billion as of September. Rebuilding the country will run to some $750 billion, Ukrainian officials have said, while the World Bank has put the reconstruction estimate at closer to $349 billion. In order to revive its economy and manage a sustained recovery once the fighting ends — and it has no end in sight — Ukraine is expected to amass large debts. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had both estimated that Ukraine’s economy would shrink by 35 percent in 2022. The I.M.F. had predicted modest economic growth for this year, but that is subject to huge uncertainty about the course of the war: The I.M.F. set the range of outcomes at a potential decline of more than 10 percent, in the pessimistic scenario, to growth of 10 percent in the more optimistic case. Ukrainian officials are clinging to the sunnier outlook, in large part because a type of shadow economy has developed amid the war, said Mr. Milovanov. That has kept economic activity, powered by donated generators or volunteer efforts, for instance, humming beneath the radar of the dry statistical figures, he said. […] Russia’s destruction of critical infrastructure has dealt Ukraine a setback heading into the second year of the war. The path of Ukraine’s economy this year will depend heavily on the ability to keep electricity flowing, limiting the length of blackouts and the need to ration power, according to Mr. Vyshlinsky. He forecasts economic growth to be flat this year — a less optimistic outlook than many forecasters, but also not as pessimistic as those who think that another big drop is in store. In the meantime, international donors are circling Ukraine, which has laid out a blueprint for an eventual Marshall Plan to help rebuild once the war has ended. Ukrainian leaders have also made plans for the short term, recognizing that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia appears determined to continue with the invasion. Ukraine has found ready supporters in the West, where leaders have largely remained unified despite the soaring energy prices caused by the war. So far, countries and institutions in the European Union have committed nearly 52 billion euros, about $55 billion, in military, financial, and humanitarian aid, while the United States has pledged some $51 billion, according to data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German research organization. Many governments and international companies, eyeing the prospect of a vast bounty of postwar contracts, are rushing to help Ukraine now, in the hopes of renewed deals when rebuilding starts in earnest.” Hans Petter Midttun: Increasingly more voices are being raised, saying what I have said since 2018. The consequences of a Russian victory in Ukraine are unacceptable to Europe and Russia still believes in victory. Additionally, a growing realisation that the war isn’t necessarily concluded on the battlefield is dawning on the West. Nine years of war have played havoc on the Ukrainian economy and made the country dependent upon international financial support to survive. Its GDP has fallen by 30% last year alone. Millions of its workforce have fled. Its industry and critical infrastructure are being destroyed. A great part of its agricultural areas is either occupied or mined. Rebuilding the country is assessed to be a staggering 750 billion dollars. Ukraine has lost control over its maritime exclusive economic zones and is exposed to a maritime blockade. Its export has fallen by 30%. The war itself has a huge impact on international investors' motivation to invest in the country. Its financial ratings are suffering. The expenses on national security and defence make up about 50% of the entire state budget expenses. That does not mean that the situation on the battlefield has no impact on the overall outcome of the war. On the contrary, the situation in the military and non-military spheres are very much interlinked. Russia has been waging a hybrid war – the parallel and synchronised use of both military and non-military means to undermine nations from within – for more than nine years. That did not change on 24 February. It’s the same aggressor, with the same strategic aim and objectives, using the same tools as it has used for nearly nine years. Only the balance between the military and non-military means being employed has shifted. If Russia can uphold the status quo – controlling parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, as well as all of Crimea and the Ukrainian maritime exclusive economic zones – Ukraine will collapse the moment western financial aid dwindles and stops.  From experience, Russia knows that Western support is time limited. That’s why the headline of Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates Op-ed “Time is not on Ukraine’s side” is very astute. “Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that US and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse.” Stressing the need to act both quicker and more resolutely, they refer to what I have consistently called the “tsunami of ripple effects”. When arguing why the US and Europe have no choice but to increase their aid, Rice and Gates highlight that both our common security, stability and prosperity are directly linked to the war. They are in essence echoing the words of Michael Clarke, a professor of defence studies at Kings College London: “Kyiv still has some way to go before it has enough equipment and troops to conduct the sort of offensive that will throw Russian forces out of most, or all, its territory. It needs a lot more of what it already has - and then more overtly offensive weapon systems, including heavier armoured forces, more attack aircraft and more drones and missiles.” The Former US secretary of state and secretary of defence frame the same key message in a strategic context: “Absent another major Ukrainian breakthrough and success against Russian forces, Western pressures on Ukraine to negotiate a cease-fire will grow as months of military stalemate pass. Under current circumstances, any negotiated cease-fire would leave Russian forces in a strong position to resume their invasion whenever they are ready. That is unacceptable. The only way to avoid such a scenario is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south.” That is basically what I argued in my Op-ed in September (“Why an intervention in Ukraine is in NATO’s interest”). While none of them argues in favour of military intervention, their rationale for increased, more comprehensive and faster defence support follows the same line of arguments. Military intervention in Ukraine is in the national interests of all 30 NATO member states because (1) it is a question of integrity. It is about protecting international law and acting following the UN “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. It is about defending our shared values ​​and principles, and about denying countries the right to change borders by force. It’s about doing what’s right. (2) Military intervention in Ukraine is in line with NATO’s strategic concepts from 2010. NATO cannot be seen to be deterred by Russia. (3) A potential Russian victory would undermine European security and stability. (4) The “tsunami of ripple effects” of the war includes increased costs of living, food and energy insecurity, increased famine, recession, and more. This increases the likelihood of social unrest, increased extremism, riots, and the fall of governments. (5) The West must respond to the hybrid war Russia is waging against Europe and the US. To continue to refer to the war as just a war between Russia and Ukraine undermines our own credibility. It is already a broader confrontation between Russia and NATO. (6) The intervention is also inevitable as the West is running out of weapons it can supply Ukraine without extensive training. When the three argue for a fast and dramatic increase in military supplies and capabilities – the latter referring to “heavier armoured forces, more attack aircraft and more drones and missiles” – they implicitly argue in favour of providing both equipment and “NATO operators”. While Ukraine will be very much capable of operating ATACMS, Abrams, Leopards, F-16 and the multi-use Gray Eagle drone, none of these can be provided without time-consuming training. If time is essential – and time is essential as Ukrainians are paying for our common security, stability and prosperity with blood – military intervention is a part of the equation.