“The are few reasons [for creating the NCC]. The main one is an attempt to concentrate by one office the access of the state mines and state coal unions, including repair enterprises,” said Yuri Korolchuk, Member of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of Energy Strategy.So let’s take a closer look at the possible risks associated with the creation of the NCC.
Risk number one – centralization

“Creating this company will allow to form a single state policy: to conduct centralized purchases and save UAH 1.5 bn ($52 mn) on the administrative apparatus of coal associations,” told Volodymyr Kistion, the Deputy Minister on Energy.It was announced that the company will unite 19 state enterprises and 33 mines in Ukraine’s government-controlled territory - this is roughly ⅓ of the total 102 mines, most of which are now on the territories controlled by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics.” Compared to private mines, these state mines are immensely inefficient: although there are only 17 private mines on Ukrainian territory, they produce more than 85% of the coal. Moreover, only three of them make profits; the rest are sinkholes for state subsidies. The UAH 1.5 bn in savings are mere pennies compared to the debts of the state mines. Speaking to Euromaidan Press, Oleksandr Lemenov, an anti-corruption expert of the Ukrainian reform coalition Reanimation Package of Reforms, countered the words of Kostion:
“The absolute majority of these 33 mines are too unprofitable. Moreover, maybe Volodymyr Kostion forgot, but it is the corresponding ministry which forms the state policy in the sector, not the newly created company.” Lemenov said that Ukrainian society had been fed various promises about potential savings over the last 25 years, however each time the result is additional operational expenditures and new corruption schemes.Lemenov assumes that it is quite possible that that the key aim of creation of the NCC is redistribution of funds allocated in the form of subsidies and spent through the procurement system:
“Centralization of any structure in Ukraine turns into creating additional corruption risks. Usually they appear during public procurement, the services of coal dressing and carrying out functions which structures are not eligible to implement.”
Risk number two – the managers

“The question with appointing the head of NCC raises the most questions. The company hasn’t been created yet, but there is already a queue of those who want to head it. To be honest, the majority of these people don’t even imagine what the purpose of the company is and what tasks it should implement. There is fear that those with sticky fingers will try to take the company under control.”Also, Volynets stated that the authorities tried to receive a formal agreement from the trade unions, in order to say later on that it were the trade unions which asked to create the NCC, “to cover up the corruption aspects which are literally embedded in this company.” Also, the expert said that one of the candidates for the position of the head of the NCC was Maksym Fedotov, who allegedly used to work in the structure of the son of the runaway president Viktor Yanukovych, Oleksandr Yanukovych. According to Ukrainian media, the unofficial curator of coal matters in Ukraine from the President’s Office is an MP from Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc and President Poroshenko’s old business partner Ihor Kononenko.
“As a result, not a single global decision is not made without preliminary agreement with him,” says Lemenov.

And what about the main actor in the energy sector?

“Of course we should not forget about the role of Rinat Akhmetov [the richest oligarch in Ukraine, who has strong assets in the energy sector - Ed], and his holding DTEK which is a significant player on the domestic market. Moreover, his interests are deeply related to the president Poroshenko through the scheme Rotterdam+,” says Lemenov.Rotterdam+ is a methodology for calculating the price of coal in the production of electricity from thermal power plants in Ukraine, which account to nearly half of all energy production, based on the price of coal in the eponymous international exchange in The Netherlands. Introduced in 2016 to account for the lack of anthracite, a high-energy type of coal, the mines of which are now in non-government controlled parts of Donbas, Rotterdam+ has been widely criticized for giving super profits for energy producers, was named as the “Corruption scheme #1” by the Ukrainian business outlet Liga.net, and has led to energy price hikes for domestic and business consumers. As Akhmetov’s company, DTEK, controls 70% of the thermal plants and 80% of the private mines, he is considered to have profited from Rotterdam+ the most. Lemenov explains that the newly created NCC will not affect Akhmetov’s business, as the cost of mining coal at his mines is nearly two times cheaper than at the state mines which will be united in the company. However, the oligarch can earn huge amounts of money on the supply of mining equipment through the companies of NCC.
Not the first state giant

“There can be attempts to sell coal from kopankas under the guise of coal from NCC [to the state energy production ]. It is direct corruption and it can be implemented only with the involvement of the so-called ‘observers’ who have the support of the top-officials.” Experts name Kropachov as one of those observers.In 2014, the total debt of Vuhillia Ukrayiny amounted to UAH 3 bn (almost $104 mn). Its main part was formed in 2010, when there were not enough subsidies for the sector. It lead to a significant decrease of extracting at state mines. And Vuhillia Ukrayiny is not NCC’s only predecessor. According to Yuri Korolchuk, after 2014, two more short-lived players appeared - and vanished shortly afterward - on the state energy market: the State Coal Company and Derzhvuhlepostach. The Head of the Bureau of Integrated Analysis and Forecasts Serhiy Diachenko drew parallels between NCC and the gas giant Naftogaz:
“It is not a secret that Naftogaz was created in 1996 for financing the election campaign.Of course, it would be a state company, but it would be controlled by the people from the inner circle of the president.”Lemenov doubts that society can significantly influence the situation. However, some mechanisms of control exist. Among them, the expert names monitoring of the public procurement, and amounts of state subsidies and appointments from the viewpoint of political connections.
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