FILM REVIEW: “A Struggle for Home: The Crimean Tatars”

FILM REVIEW: “A Struggle for Home: The Crimean Tatars”


[article by Adrian Bryttan from THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, 3/20/16]

NEW YORK – On March 29, 2014, the main clock at the Symferopol railway station was advanced two hours in a symbolic ceremony as Crimea now jumped into the time zone of its new masters in Moscow. The former mafioso known as “Goblin” and now the new leader of the peninsula, Sergey Aksyonov, congratulated his partying Russian crowds on “going back home.” The hypocrisy of Mr. Aksyonov’s words amid the centuries-long struggle of Ukraine’s Crimean Tatars to return to their true ancestral home (only to be crushed by Vladimir Putin’s invasion) is the subject of Christina M. Paschyn’s film “A Struggle for Home: The Crimean Tatars.”

Attending the screening at the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York on January 29 were prominent leaders of the Crimean Tatar community: Mubeyyin Altan, publisher of the Crimean Review, and Ayla Bakkali, US representative of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis.

Writer and director Ms. Paschyn returned to this same surreal Symferopol scene near the conclusion of her 44-minute documentary. By that point the audience had viewed the ancient history of the Crimean Tatars and their struggles to survive in the face of Russian Imperial persecution, Soviet atrocities, genocidal deportation and finally the 2014 Russian invasion and takeover.

AStruggleForHomeStill1-1170x655
Crimean Tatars protest the Russian occupation (still photo from Christina Paschyn's film)

“A Struggle for Home” interweaves the director’s running narration with interviews of various eyewitnesses, newsreel footage and the commentaries of historians Brian Glyn Williams and Alan W. Fischer. But perhaps what comes across most vividly are the personal accounts of several individual Crimean Tatars caught up in the whirlwind of events. Appearing several times was the elderly Shefika Consul, a self-described radical nationalist who as a 7-year-old girl dug for potatoes in exile in Uzbekistan.

Safinar Dzhemilev, the wife of Mustafa Dzemilev, recalled her work as head of the League of Crimean Tatar Women and how she was attracted to Mr. Dzhemilev’s courage in the face of persecution and arrests, saying: “I decided to dedicate my life to this man.”

The revered leader of the Crimean Tatar National Movement, Mustafa Dzhemilev was 7 months old when deported to Uzbekistan. Suffering arrests as a Soviet dissident, he mounted a 303-day hunger strike, successfully attracting the world’s attention to his people – the indigenous people of Crimea that few had heard of before.

A member of the Ukrainian Parliament since 1988, Mr. Dzhemilev bravely denounced local Russian organizations for pro-Moscow activities, inciting inter-ethnic conflict and agitating for Crimea to become part of Russia. He declared: “If you really want to leave your country that much, take your suitcases, get on the trains, and go back to Russia.”

Ancient and modern history

As historian Mr. Williams observed during the film, Crimean Tatar roots extend back much further than the establishment of the Crimean Khanate in 1441; he drew connections to the Huns, Crimean Goths and even the ancient Greeks who established trading outposts and cities. Although the Islamic Khanate conducted an extensive slave trade, today’s Crimean Tatars are among the most secular, moderate Muslim societies, in which, in particular, women freely play a major part in the community. (In 1917 Crimean Tatars became the first Muslim people in the world to affirm women’s right to vote.)

Another historian, Mr. Fischer, explained that Empress Catherine II annexed Crimea in 1783 because Russia needed a warm-water port on the Black Sea. The construction of Sevastopol solved their strategic problem, but Catherine also commenced a long-term policy of persecution of the Crimean Tatars, stealing their lands, destroying mosques, gradually displacing them with Russian settlers. A vast demographic shift resulted in the Crimean Tatars becoming a minority, under siege by local hostile Russians.

After a brief flash of independence in 1917, quickly snuffed out by the Bolsheviks, the Soviets installed a so-called autonomous republic, the Crimean ASSR.

Then in 1944 Joseph Stalin deported practically the whole Crimea Tatar population to the wilds of Uzbekistan, where 46 percent died within two years. From the mid 1950s, exiled Crimean Tatars worked unceasingly to demand the right to reclaim their homeland. Finally, in 1989, the Soviets allowed their return.

Crimean Tatars return

The second half of Ms. Paschyn’s film outlines what happened next. Prior to the 2014 invasion, Mr. Aksyonov, head of the Crimean Russian Unity Political Party, extolled the deep Orthodox connections across borders, at the same time professing: “Russian people have no problem living with representatives of other nationalities.”

But returning Crimean Tatars encountered ethnic and religious bigotry from local Crimean Russians in schools. Russian nationals deliberately antagonized them with public commemorations of Stalin. In December 2012 an explosion targeted the Great Mosque in Symferopol. Crimean Tatar “squat” settlements were destroyed by members of Russian ultra groups.

AStruggleForHomeStill2-1170x649
Crimean Tatars vote at their Kurultay Congress (still photo from Christina Paschyn's film)

On February 26, 2014, some 1,000 Crimean Tatars clashed with Mr. Aksyonov’s men in front of the Crimean Parliament. The following day, Russia’s “green men” began their invasion. Even though his party previously had received only 4 percent of the vote, Mr. Aksyonov emerged as the new prime minister. The March “referendum vote” – rejected as illegal by the European Union and most of the UN General Assembly, and also boycotted by the Crimean Mejlis, the highest executive/representative body of the Crimean Tatars – started the ball rolling for Crimea to declare independence from Ukraine and to request that it join the Russian Federation.

As Mr. Putin signed the official unification treaty, the clocks at the Symferopol train station were advanced to match Moscow time.

After the 2014 annexation 

Since the annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars have reported a return of Soviet-era repression and persecution. Russia closed the Mejlis headquarters and its supporters were attacked and killed. The Crimean Tatars’ television channel lost its broadcast rights, and Mustafa Dzhemilev was banned from entering Crimea for five years. Currently, Russian authorities still refuse to recognize the Mejlis, whose members now operate out of Ukraine. Mr. Dzhemilev continues to advocate for his people from Kyiv.

“Struggle for Home” concludes with the words of Safinar Dzhemilev: “Our reality is we have our motherland, but it is now part of another state with other laws, at gunpoint… nobody knows what to expect tomorrow… that is why we have to stand firm and prepare ourselves to resist and protect our rights on all levels in a peaceful, democratic way.”

The tragic history of the Crimean Tatars deserves to be widely known. [Last year, The Ukrainian Weekly devoted articles to two other admirable films dealing with common themes: “Crimea Unveiled” (April 10, 2015) and “Haytarma” (August 7, 2015).]

Writer/Director Christina Paschyn

A native of Parma, Ohio, writer/director Ms. Paschyn completed degrees at Northwestern University in Illinois and the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. Since 2011, she has been lecturer of journalism in residence at Northwestern University in Doha, Qatar. Ms. Paschyn’s “Struggle for Home” was the Silver Award winner at the Spotlight Documentary Film Awards for 2015 and is an official selection for the Las Cruces International Film Festival in Las Cruces, New Mexico, (March 2-6) and the DC Independent Film Festival in Washington (March 10).

“Struggle for Home” advocates persuasively for the long-suffering but always hopeful Crimean Tatars. It is all the more regrettable this documentary voiced several opinions that, at the least, seem like a poor choice of words, if not misleading. (In her Internet video, Ms. Paschyn states she purposely did not include Ukrainian historians in this film because they would “promote Ukrainian propaganda.”)

In the first video interview, the elderly Crimean Tatar activist Ms. Consul morally equates Ukraine with Russia, saying both want and love Crimea, “but without the Tatars.” It might strike viewers as strange that Ms. Paschyn chose to begin her film with this extreme statement, which (while reflecting the position of Ms. Consul) would be most dubious as representative of Crimean Tatars.

Secondly, historian Mr. Williams stated that the 1924-1928 Soviet period is one of the periods of their history which Crimean Tatars “relish” the most, concluding that the Tatars therefore “benefitted from Communist rule.” (Would one thus say Ukrainians “relish” and “benefitted from Communist rule”?)

At the 2014 Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) symposium “Crimea: Whose Homeland?”, Mr. Williams’ similar characterization of Crimean Tatar “nostalgia” for this Soviet time was refuted by Prof. Idil Izmirli, a Crimean Tatar, as representing only one viewpoint among others. She explained that even this brief period of relative freedom was part of the Soviets’ “divide and conquer” policy.

In fact, Mustafa Dzhemilev himself asserted in a 2008 interview: “The Soviet authorities and the Communist regime began committing crimes against the Crimean Tatars from the time they got control of Crimea … the defeat of the elected body of Crimean Tatars (Kurultay)… the systematic killing of our intelligentsia.”

Finally, Ms. Paschyn’s narration remarkably declared “thanks to Nikita Khrushchev” for transferring Crimea “as a gift to Ukraine.” Her assertion repeats the widespread Russian mantra dismissing Ukrainian claims to Crimea and, as such, deserves to be addressed.

Crimea as a “gift” to Ukraine?

The cynical charade of a “gift,” presented on a whim, is often advanced along with Moscow’s claim that this transfer was a part of the 300th anniversary of the 1654 Pereyaslav agreement. In fact, the official documentation contains no mention of “re-unification” or of any “gift.” Pravda reported on its front page of February 27, 1954, that the Soviet Supreme Presidium’s reasons were the “integral character of the economy, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties” between Crimea and Ukraine (90 percent of water sources come from Ukraine, as do electricity and gas).

Furthermore, Crimea was hardly Khrushchev’s to “give.” According to HURI Associate Director Lubomyr Hajda, even as late as 1957 Khrushchev’s power was not consolidated, while 1954 was still barely months after Stalin’s death. And at that time, Crimea was pretty much a basket case, after the deportation and the catastrophic results of the USSR’s latest Five-Year Plan.

Bohdan Lisovych, who was deputy UN representative and worked closely with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the US State Department and the Crimean Mejlis in the first years of Ukraine’s independence, wrote to this author, describing how imperial Russia devastated Crimean forests to build its warships. Tree roots had been trapping the scarce water on the peninsula for ages.

The Crimean Tatars developed a system of small water reservoirs called “kaptazhs” (qapqans), later destroyed by the Soviets, who started growing water-intensive crops like wheat and potatoes, thus exacerbating the problem. (Historically, the Tatars cultivated apricots, cherries and grapes – low-water crops more suited to the environment.) So, in addition to purging the indigenous population, the Soviets managed to destroy the Crimean environment.

Ukraine, which still had not finished rebuilding its own Khreshchatyk area in post-war Kyiv, now found itself saddled with the peninsula’s many agricultural and economic problems. Yet, tens of thousands of Ukrainian volunteers went to work in Crimea with the result that, after just two years, electricity, irrigation and water availability, iron ore production, meat and vegetable farming, wine production, etc., were all dramatically improved. In effect, Ukraine transformed and modernized Crimea, something the Russians were unable and unwilling to do.

Significantly, during the same 2014 HURI symposium, Mustafa Dzhemilev stressed that the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Munich had declared that such a transfer could not be done before the native populations had first been resettled and only with their consent.

But the ultimate proof of the pudding that Crimea belongs to Ukraine is that the Crimean Tatars themselves say so.

In the Q&A following the film, Ms. Bakkali stressed that the real motivation for Russia’s bellicose expansion is the same rationale that Spanish conquistadores drew from papal edicts to conquer new territories and peoples. She said Mr. Putin’s 2014 invasion was therefore a direct continuation of Empress Catherine’s annexation of Crimea in 1783. Ms. Bakkali concluded her remarks with a ringing: “Ukraine is Crimea! Crimea is Ukraine!

- Adrian Bryttan, "The Ukrainian Weekly" 3/20/16

To suggest a correction or clarification, write to us here

You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter

Please leave your suggestions or corrections here



    Leave a Reply
    Euromaidan Press

    We are an independent media outlet that relies solely on advertising revenue to sustain itself. We do not endorse or promote any products or services for financial gain. Therefore, we kindly ask for your support by disabling your ad blocker. Your assistance helps us continue providing quality content. Thank you!

    Related Posts

    February 12: ”Normandy Four” negotiations concluded in Minsk with a disappointing result for Ukraine

    February 12 – "Normandy Four" negotiations concluded in Minsk with a disappointing result for Ukraine. Putin did not give in on a single point – there will be no withdrawal of Russian troops (they are, of course, nowhere close to Ukraine), no immediate resumption of control over the border, no reinstatement of sovereignty over occupied Crimea or Donbas. There are, however, the obligations on behalf of Ukraine to service social needs of separatists, legalize their armed gangs and hold fake elections under their watchful eye. The situation looks a lot like the surrender of Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia) to Hitler.

    February 12 – Total financial assistance to Ukraine from the IMF and other organizations could amount to 40 billion dollars over 4 years, – said IMF's Managing Director Christine Lagarde.

    February 12 – Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations has announced the preparations for the 14th so-called humanitarian aid convoy destined for Donbas – more weapons will be transported, no doubt.

    February 12 – Russia has transferred another lot of military equipment and artillery to the territory of Ukraine, controlled by militants – approximately 50 tanks, 40 "Grad", "Uragan" and "Smerch" multiple rocket launch systems and 40 armored vehicles crossed Russian-Ukrainian border at border crossing point Izvaryne, – said NSDC spokesman Andriy Lysenko.

    February 12 – The transfer of the amphibious assault ship "Vladivostok" (Mistral-class) to Russia could begin as early as next week.

    February 12 – EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini does not expect sanctions against Russia to be discussed during the summit of EU member-states leaders to be held on Thursday.

    February 12 – Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Lamberto Zannier hassaid that at present it is impossible to determine whether the militants in Donbas are also soldiers of the regular Russian army. OSCE has completely exhausted itself as a security-oriented organization.

    February 12 – Agreements reached in Minsk during the meeting of the leaders of the countries of the "Normandy quartet" are absolutely weak. This was stated by the President of Lithuania, Dalia Grybaskaite, to journalists in Brussels before the EU Summit. "The fundamental part of the resolution is the control of the borders. It was not agreed upon and not resolved," she noted. "This means that the border is open for crossing by whatever soldiers and whatever artillery," remarked Grybaskaite. "This means that the resolution is totally weak," emphasized the President of Lithuania. She is also not very optimistic about the agreements on the cease-fire.

    "Five months ago we already had one agreement about a cease-fire which was not implemented. Let's see what happens with this one," underlined Grybaskaite. "We will observe in the next few days how at least these partial agreements will be implemented," she added.

    War is hell! (photo report from occupied Vuhlehirsk)

    Russia lies... great start to Minsk agreement (Savchenko cannot be released!!)

    Timothy Ash

    Ukraine – deal thoughts


    I guess with hindsight, a deal was always going to be done. Merkel was not going to get on a flight to Minsk, after Kyiv, Moscow, and Berlin, and not get something. And Putin needed to try and rebuild some bridges with Merkel, after seemingly upsetting her at Brisbane. Merkel is probably the honest broker in all this. She really feels for the Ukrainian position, but understands the real threat from Russia – she reads Putin better than any other Western leader, and cannot be bought. But it is Bismark-style real politik for Merkel, and she was desperate to stop the fighting – almost at any cost, which is entirely understandable. Hollande will likely get his aircraft carriers delivered, and sees all this as offering the hope of ressurection in terms of his presidency at home – a global leader, strutting the international stage and making Cameron, et al look like poodles, or rather a bulldog with no teeth. Putin gets his aircraft carriers, which will no doubt have a nice shiny berth now awaiting in Sebastopol. Putin also fended off near term threats of sanctions from the West, and can sell himself to allies in Europe (there are many) as a peacemaker – again heading off further sanctions threats. He has also not agreed to very much, as I don't think his signature is on the document, so if it fails (and it likely will) he can blame others. He has also headed off the threat of the US arming Ukraine – and therein he is in cahoots with Obama himself, who will see this deal as being useful in fending off calls from the DC consensus (including within his own administration) now to arm Ukraine – and can return to his own "splendid isolation" or "strategic patience" as it is now called stateside. That's a nice term for doing as little as possible. Poroshenko gets his IMF programme, and can try and roll out reforms attached to this to try and assure the supporters of Maydan that this team is really the Real Deal in terms of the reforms they so desire. Note the IMF press release was timed for 10am, just as news of the Minsk deal broke – so my sense is that someone was telling the Ukrainians that an IMF deal was contingent on a Minsk ceasefire deal. No ceasefire – no IMF deal. And the IMF gets to roll out its new programme, which it has been working on for months. Poroshenko probably also thinks that the ceasefire will buy time for Ukraine to regroup, rearm against the clear and present danger of further Russian intervention. But will it all stick/last? I just do not think so, as I still fail to see from this deal what is different to Minsk I in terms of delivery on Russian strategic objectives in Ukraine. Minsk I clearly did not deliver for Russia, hence that ceasefire did not last long, so let's see what is really different this time around. The issues of real autonomy/federalism, and border control don't appear to be properly addressed in this document. Constitutional reform towards the Russian agenda will be impossible for Poroshenko to deliver. And finally and fundamentally why I do not think that the status quo is sustainable – one year ago Russia felt the need to annex Crimea, and intervene in eastern Ukraine. But one year ago Ukraine was no threat to Russia as a) it was non aligned; b) popular support for Nato membership was low single digits, and there was little support in parliament or amongst political elites to drive Ukraine NATO membership. C) the west really did not want Ukraine in NATO as they saw this as a red rag to the Russian bull, and as events have proved could not defend Ukraine under NATO's TOR; c) the Ukrainian military had limited fighting capability as was proven in the early days of the conflict, but subsequently changed; d) the govt in Kyiv was weak and disarray and the Ukrainian economy on the brink of collapse; e) and as events have proven Russia had de facto control of Crimea via the stationing of 26,000 troops and the long term BSF agreement. And f) and finally Ukrainians were not anti-russian or even particularly anti-Putin. If Moscow was not a real threat a year ago, but Moscow felt compelled to intervene, look at the risk from a Russian perspective now from Ukraine – a) Ukraine is no longer non aligned. B) it now wants to join NATO and opinion polls now show majority support for this. C) Ukraine is rebuilding military capability and the military doctrine is now against the threat from Russia; d) Ukraine has a reform admin in Kyiv, which has a real chance of succeeding now with imf support. It can offer a rival and successful model of development to Putin's power vertical and sovereign democracy. E) Opinion polls show strong ukrainian opposition/distaste for the Putin regime. So, net-net the above still suggests the risk of further future Russian intervention in Ukraine.

    P.S.: Please spread this appeal as much as possible.

    February 14: Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is part of a broader, and more dangerous, confrontation with the West

    February 14 – Prosecutor General of Ukraine in cooperation with Security Service of Ukraine has detained a former Chief of the Party of Regions Oleksandr Yefremov, – said Prosecutor General of Ukraine Viktor Shokin in his comment to Internet media "Ukrainska Pravda".

    February 14 – At 0:00 the Armed Forces of Ukraine will cease fire along the contact line, – stated the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko during his address from the General Staff on February 14th.

    February 14 – President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has said that peace agreements are in jeopardy as a result of the situation at Debaltseve lodgement. "The whole world is waiting tensely for tomorrow's morning with bated breath. Those who would like to derail the peace process at its outset, have been warned about the consequences. I am not going to say what Ukraine will do if the peace process is disrupted. I will say one thing – we will not turn another cheek if we are provoked and may the Lord forgive me for that", – said Poroshenko.

    February 14 – Battalion Donbas soldiers captured 17 fighters in the area of the village Lohvyn in Donetsk region.

    February 14 On February 14, terrorists are preparing a massive provocation, which may result in the entry of armed forces from RF. This was aired on Channel 5 by the spokesman of Sector M, Dmytro Chalyj. And they did accomplish this – they shelled with Hrads the Russian territory. Now Russia will blame the Ukrainian side for this.

    February 14 In the internet there appeared a video which testifies to the gathering of armored artillery by the Russian side from Crimea to the administrative border with Ukraine.

    February 14 – As a result of constant artillery shelling of Debaltsev by the fighters, "the city is burning", the building of the city police was hit directly by Hrad units. This was stated by the Head of the Regional Headquarters of MVS in Donetsk region, Viacheslav Abroskin.

    February 13 – 11 Ukrainian military were killed and 40 injured in the ATO area in the last 24 hours, – NSDC spokesman Andriy Lysenko.

    February 13 – According to new Minsk agreements, the city of Debaltseve should remain under Ukraine's control. However, Russian terrorists were given an order to gain control over the cities of Debaltseve and Mariupol by February 15th, – informed Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Petro Mekhed: "According to information available and taking into account the fact that there has been an agreement to cease fire on February 15th (0:00), Russian troops and pro-Russian militants were ordered to occupy Debaltseve and Mariupol".

    February 13 – Soldiers of 79th brigade of Ukrainian army have detained a terrorist "Gnom" ("Dwarf") who is allegedly second in command at the detachment of Russian terrorists named "Somali". He personally participated in torturing Ukrainian military prisoners.

    February 13 – A tank battle for the village of Shyrokine and an artillery battle for the village of Stakhanka have taken place – both are located close to Mariupol, – reports Ukrainian regiment "Azov".

    February 13 – When the terrorists were shelling the town of Shchastya (Luhansk region), they killed and injured civilians at a local café.

    February 13 – Right wing party "Pravyi Sektor" believes that that any agreements with separatists are unconstitutional and thus the party reserves its right to active military operations, – stated party leader Dmytro Yarosh.

    February 13 – Russian terrorists have shelled the city of Artemivsk, which is located behind the combat line protected by Ukrainian forces.

    February 13 – 4 people were killed and 16 injured as a result of shelling by Russian terrorists at the city of Hirnyk (Donetsk oblast).

    February 13 – US Senate has passed a resolution on the release of Ukrainian pilot and member of Ukrainian Parliament Nadiya Savchenko.

    February 13 – In the last hours before the beginning of the ceasefire, foreseen by the mutual agreements in Minsk, the danger of bloodshed only increases. This was stated by the German official Gernot Erler, an advisor to Merkel on Russia, reported the Bayerischer Rundfunk: "The risk is truly very high. In the last hours before the ceasefire, there exists the danger that the sides will attempt to increase losses among each other," he said. According to him, the heightening may lead to the reality that the readiness for a ceasefire will dwindle to nothing. "There is a diffference between Minsk-1 and Minsk-2. I see more concrete definitions in the new agreement. Also, backing up the new document are three preidents and a chancellor," noted the politician.

    What Russia wants:From cold war to hot war

    Russia's aggression in Ukraine is part of a broader, and more dangerous, confrontation with the West

    Marco Bojcun: MINSK II: Land for a ceasefare, but not for pease

    Lithuania's view on Minsk2

    Putin's war on the West

    Flawed deal in Minsk

    Polish view on Minsk2

    Ukraine's other war – on corruption (NATO Review)

    Lilia Shevcova: The Kremlin Is Winning

    By Taras Kuzio

    What will the west do when Minsk-2 unravels?


    European leaders desperate to avoid going down an Iranian-style route of economic and financial sanctions and to dissuade the US from sending weapons signed a second agreement to end the fighting in Ukraine on Thursday in the Belarus capital, Minsk. But it will be as unworkable as the first Minsk agreement signed in September 2014. The new agreement has weaknesses similar to those of its predecessor and will unravel in the next few months.

    How will the weak Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) go about removing foreign troops and mercenaries? Will Russia really permit Ukraine to take control of its border next year, after local elections in March and the adoption of a new Ukrainian constitution that outlines some form regional devolution to the Donbas?

    Indeed, could elections ever be considered free and far if they are held under the barrel of a gun? With crime rampant in the separatist-controlled Donbas, will it be safe to transfer funds for social payments and pensions from Kiev to the region and for taxes to be transferred back to the central government?

    The reaction from leaders in the region was sceptical or cautious at best. Dalia Grybauskaitė, Lithuania's president, said Minsk-2 was a "weak" document; Bronisław Komorowski, Poland's president, said peace was still a faraway goal.

    The main reason Minsk-2 will not hold is that the person who began the conflict – Russian President Vladimir Putin – has not achieved his strategic goal of destroying Ukraine as an independent state. Western sanctions have not served as a deterrent.

    As Andrey Illarionov, a former economic adviser to Putin, reminded us this week:

    the goal of Putin's war against Ukraine is an attempt at the inclusion of it, Belarus, and also Russian-speaking enclaves in other countries in some kind of geopolitical union called 'the Russian world,' with the liquidation or at least the limitation of their sovereignty.

    The Donbas conflict will only end, he argues, if Putin gives up "the policy of denying the statehood, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and other states with Russian or Russian speaking population".

    Putin has always confused Russian speakers in Ukraine with Russians, and has talked of "17m Russians" living in Ukraine. That this is a misnomer can be seen from the weak support for separatism in the six Russian-speaking regions of eastern and southern Ukraine outside the Donbas.

    US and EU leaders are unwilling to face the implications of a return to the Europe of the 1930s, with one country seeking to destroy another. They are desperate to put off the inevitable confrontation with Russia through negotiation. A year ago, when former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made an analogy between Nazi Germany and Putin's Russia defending their co-ethnics in other countries, she was ridiculed. But today, her critics agree with her.

    Putin's demand for Ukraine to become a federal state is a non-starter. It has no support among the Ukrainian public or its elites and is an attempt at 'Bosnianising' the country. No federal country in the world gives its provinces a veto over foreign and defence policy, as Putin is insisting the Donbas must be given in Ukraine.

    Putin's objective to install a pro-Russian leader, parliament and government presupposes the annulling of presidential and parliamentary elections held in May and October of last year that were recognised as free and fair by the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. No sovereign country in the world would accept such a demand from its neighbour.

    Putin's paranoia about Nato and EU enlargement into what he views as Russia's 'zone of privileged interests' is a misnomer. Although an April 2008 Nato summit in Bucharest named Ukraine and Georgia as future members, France and Germany have said they would veto this. The EU has never offered membership to Ukraine.

    And who will persuade the Ukrainian parliament to overturn a December vote by a constitutional majority of 302 to move away from the non-bloc status that Putin wants Ukraine to return to?

    When Minsk-2 unravels, what will US and EU leaders do next?

    Ukraine will not agree to a Minsk-3. If Russia and the separatists again fail to implement the agreement, the only options open will be to remove Russia from the Swift international payments system, blacklist its president, prime minister and its foreign and defence ministers, and supply Ukraine with defensive military equipment, training and satellite intelligence.

    You can't make the same mistake twice. The second time you make it, it's no longer a mistake. It's a choice.

    Taras Kuzio is a research associate at the Centre for Political and Regional Studies, Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta and non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.

    P.S.: Please spread this appeal as much as possible.

    Ads are disabled for Euromaidan patrons.

    Support us on Patreon for an ad-free experience.

    Already with us on Patreon?

    Enter the code you received on Patreon or by email to disable ads for 6 months

    Invalid code. Please try again

    Code successfully activated

    Ads will be hidden for 6 months.