Ukrainian strikes on Moscow are likely to increase. It's all because Ukraine has found a way through the multi-layered air defense around the Russian capital, military analyst Ivan Stupak said on 24 Channel.
He is describing not a one-off but a repeatable method — and an open-source analysis of the same strike reaches a parallel conclusion: the decisive factor was not Moscow's air-defense density but intelligence on its blind spots, route planning, and tactics, Militarnyi reported.
Three of four rings breached
By Stupak's estimate, around a hundred air-defense points are arranged in three to four rings around Moscow, with Pantsir systems positioned on the Foreign and Defense Ministry buildings in the city center. At least three of the four rings, he said, Ukrainian drones were able to overcome.
OSINT mapping puts the network higher: roughly 130 air-defense positions in and around the capital, in two dense rings plus inner-city sites, with at least 89 Pantsir-S1 systems verified within 50 km of Moscow as of April 2026.
"I assume such attacks will increase"
Stupak expects the tempo to rise.
"Judging by the intensity, scale of penetration, and audacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, I assume such attacks will increase," he said.
He pointed to two target sets: a roughly 400-kilometer pipeline ring that supplies Moscow with petroleum products, and a microelectronics plant in Zelenograd, north of Moscow, which he likened to Russia's Kremniy El enterprise and said produces components for the Russian military, including air defense systems and components for Iskander and Kinzhal missiles.
A strike on the Zelenograd plant — the Angstrem facility hit during the 17 May attack — was reported, he noted; even an unsuccessful attempt, in his view, would draw further strikes.
The aim is discomfort, not regime change
In Stupak's assessment, the purpose of the strike is psychological as much as physical. Moscow, he said, was meant to feel to Russians like a safe territory where the war is virtual.
Ukraine is now trying to create discomfort for residents, officials, and visitors, and to push businesspeople to leave Russia.
He doubted Russians would protest but said domestic discontent with the war still mattered.
He characterized Russia's public response as denial — "an ostrich with its head in the sand" — noting central TV channels spent about a minute on the Moscow strikes, a minimization independently documented by the Russian outlet Agentstvo and others.
