Belarus uses imprisoned opposition figures as tools to pressure the West, the Lithuanian Defense Ministry notes in its annual report on national security threats. In reality, Minsk acts as a Russian tool of intimidation of European countries.
Recently, Belarus has deployed Russia's intercontinental Oreshnik missile on its soil, capable of reaching any European capital.
Belarus as a Russian satellite: nominal autonomy in exchange for loyalty
Belarus remains largely a satellite of Russia due to deep military, economic, and political dependence. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka maintains only nominal autonomy in return for loyalty to the Kremlin.
Sanctions relief would strengthen the regime’s economic stability but would not reduce its dependence on Russia.
Despite claiming interest in normalizing relations with the West, the Lukashenka regime does not intend to soften its authoritarian course.
Public meetings with Western officials are cynically used for propaganda, promoting the narrative of Belarus’s “indispensable role” in regional security.
Political prisoners are bargaining tool, not goodwill
Lithuanian intelligence considers the release of prominent opposition figures and other political prisoners purely transactional.
“Using political prisoners as leverage is a longstanding tactic of the Belarusian regime,” the report states.
The goal is to obtain concessions or sanctions relief from the West, not to show genuine goodwill.
“Warm relations” rhetoric does not match reality
Despite rhetoric about “warm relations,” Belarus’s behavior toward Lithuania and neighboring countries remains aggressive. Minsk denies involvement in hostile acts while propagandizing that Lithuania is the aggressor.
The report also highlights increased activity by the Belarusian KGB, recruiting members of the diaspora in Lithuania via messengers in exchange for financial rewards, document restoration, and freer entry into Belarus.
The objective is to gather intelligence on diaspora communities and democratic forces.
Additionally, the report notes the Belarusian defense industry’s participation in supplying the Russian army, efforts by Minsk and Moscow to acquire dual-use technologies through front companies, exercises such as West‑2025, and plans to expand the Belarusian nuclear power plant.
