Russian shell production reaches 7 million annually, 17 times pre-invasion levels – Estonian intelligence

Russia's military-industrial complex has increased artillery ammunition production more than seventeenfold since 2021, according to the annual report of Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service published in 2026. The agency concludes that Moscow "is highly likely preparing for future conflict even as its war against Ukraine continues."

In 2025, Russian factories produced roughly 7 million shells, mortar rounds, and rockets — up from 4.5 million in 2024, 3.5 million in 2023, and just 400,000 in 2021, according to the report. The growth was driven first by restarting idle capacity in 2022–2023, then by "large-scale investment in the ammunition production chain."

The breakdown of 2025 output, according to Estonian intelligence: howitzer ammunition (122 mm, 152 mm, and 203 mm) accounted for 3.4 million rounds; mortar rounds (120 mm and 240 mm) for 2.3 million; tank and infantry fighting vehicle ammunition for 0.8 million; and multiple-launch rocket system ammunition for 0.5 million.

The procurement cost Russia's armed forces approximately 1 trillion roubles (about 10.6 billion euros) in 2025, the report states. Yet the unit cost remains far below Western levels: "an older-model 152 mm shell costs less than 100,000 roubles (about 1,050 euros) in state procurement, which is several times cheaper than similar 155 mm shells produced in Western countries." These prices are kept low "at the expense of profitability across the state-owned enterprises that make up the supply chain, all of which rely on regular subsidies and other state support."

The assessment states Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any NATO member in the coming year.

Moscow has also no intention of ending the war in Ukraine until its objectives are achieved or conditions are favorable for doing so, according to the intelligence service. The Kremlin "merely feigns interest in peace talks, hoping to restore its bilateral relations with the United States to their previous level and formalise Ukraine's defeat," the report states.

The findings follow warnings from other European military officials. Lieutenant General Gerald Funke, head of Germany's Armed Forces Support Command, said Russia could attack NATO countries within two to three years. Norway's Chief of Defence General Eirik Kristoffersen has said Oslo is preparing for potential Russian aggression.

Imports from Iran and North Korea

Domestic production is supplemented by large-scale imports. "Since 2023, it has acquired an estimated 5–7 million rounds from these partners," the report states, referring to Iran and North Korea. "According to Ukrainian assessments, North Korean ammunition accounted for roughly half of all Russian artillery expenditure on the Ukrainian front in the second half of 2025."

Strategic stockpiling amid ongoing war

The report's central finding is that Russia's production surge goes beyond sustaining its current war effort. "Given this production growth and substantial imports, Russia is highly likely to be able to replenish part of its strategic artillery ammunition reserves even while engaged in the ongoing war against Ukraine," the Estonian intelligence service assesses. "For the Kremlin, maintaining such reserves is almost certainly a critical element of planning for potential future conflicts."

Before the 2022 invasion, Russia's strategic ammunition stockpile was estimated at up to 20 million shells, rockets, and mortar rounds. Russian forces expended most of these reserves in the first two years of the war and "were later compelled to ration ammunition use," with daily consumption stabilizing at 10,000–15,000 rounds after peaking at up to 60,000 rounds per day during the spring 2022 offensive.

Explosives supply chain: vulnerabilities and progress

The report identifies both strengths and weaknesses in Russia's explosives industry. Since 2023, Russia has been working to replace imported cotton cellulose from Central Asia with domestically sourced wood and flax cellulose for nitrocellulose production. "These attempts have highly likely been successful," the report states.

However, a critical bottleneck remains: the production of concentrated nitric acid and "melange" (a mixture of nitric and sulphuric acids) "is manufactured at only one site — the Berezniki chemical plant owned by Uralchem." The report notes that "any major disruption to production at these plants — whether technical or economic — would highly likely cause serious interruptions across Russia's entire ammunition-manufacturing supply chain."

The agency adds what it calls an "ironic twist": "neither of the companies producing these critical inputs for Russia's war industry is subject to EU sanctions," because their other major product is nitrogen fertilisers, and "imposing sanctions against such producers would, according to prevailing narratives, jeopardise global food security."

Peace talks as a time-buying tactic

The ammunition buildup is placed in a broader context by the report. "Russia is setting long-term operational objectives in its war against Ukraine. This confirms that the recent uptick in peace-talk rhetoric is merely a tactic to buy time. Moscow has no intention of ending the war until its objectives are achieved or the conditions are favourable for doing so."

The report warns that Russia's military-industrial complex "will continue efforts to expand artillery ammunition production, whilst reducing dependence on external suppliers, including attempts to procure Western-made industrial machinery through various sanctions-evasion schemes involving intermediaries in third countries."