Zelenskyy publicly criticizes air defense—but problem runs deeper than personnel, says expert

Ukraine lacks sufficient radar and alternative detection systems to enable more accurate targeting of Russian attack drones, defense expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi says, Radio NV reports. This shortfall is increasingly affecting the effectiveness of intercepting aerial targets. 

They actively collect real-time reconnaissance data, enabling Russia to adjust routes and evade mobile fire groups and other air defense elements, Khrapchynskyi adds. 

Shaheds in the clouds: weather becomes weapon

Russian operators are increasingly using weather conditions as a tactical advantage. In particular, Shahed drones are launched directly into cloud cover, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of visual detection and interception.

Under such conditions, mobile groups effectively lose one of their key tools — visual contact with the target — and, without sufficient radar or sensor systems, interception becomes far more difficult.

Harsh assessment from Zelenskyy

In January 2026, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his evening address, publicly criticized the performance of the Ukrainian Air Force, calling it “unsatisfactory” after a massive drone attack that hit energy facilities in Kyiv Oblast.

The president stressed that even with interceptors, mobile groups, and F-16 fighters available, the organization of air defense operations needs to change. Following this, he held a coordination call with Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov to draw conclusions and reallocate resources.

As early as 6 February, Zelenskyy announced personnel rotations within drone countermeasures units, particularly to strengthen protection in Zaporizhzhia and other regions that regularly come under attack.

Warnings issued a year ago

However, the issue is not only about assessing results but also about the Air Force's real capabilities, continues Khrapchynskyi. He recalled that earlier a significant portion of personnel from mobile fire groups had been transferred to the Ground Forces.

“Such steps at the beginning of 2025 led to the fact that at the beginning of 2026, we are demanding increased or improved capabilities from the Air Force after having taken away their main tool at the start,” the expert notes.

Khrapchynskyi also stresses that Moscow troops are systematically adapting, while Ukraine’s drone countermeasures system is forced to operate under conditions of limited resources and personnel decisions made earlier.

“Besides simply expressing dissatisfaction with the work of the Air Force, we also need to talk about the capabilities they have actually been given,” he emphasizes.