Ukraine imported $1.7 billion worth of gas-fired power plant equipment over four years of full-scale war—enough, on paper, for 1.6 gigawatts of new generation capacity. By January 2026, only 500–600 megawatts actually works, according to Ekonomichna Pravda’s customs data analysis. And the state built barely any of it.
“Zelenskyy’s gigawatt” has become a measure of how far political promises travel before they hit the ground.
“Zelenskyy’s gigawatt”—as Ukrainians dubbed the president’s December 2023 pledge to build 1,000 MW of new maneuverable generation by winter—has become a measure of how far political promises travel before they hit the ground. That original target later grew to four gigawatts “in the coming years.”
The state’s own project portal lists 144 planned projects totaling 3.68 GW, with a budget of 143 billion hryvnia ($3.3 billion). Almost none are finished.
Former Ukrenergo chairman Volodymyr Kudrytskyi—who synchronized Ukraine’s grid with Europe in the first weeks of the invasion and was dismissed in September 2024 in what critics called political retaliation—told Texty that government efforts and state companies delivered just 10–15% of the capacity that came online in 2025. Private businesses built the rest—roughly 85–90% of what actually generates electricity today.
The installation bottleneck
The customs data tells a story of massive private-sector investment. Cogeneration equipment imports surged from $22 million in 2021 to an estimated $940 million in 2025—a 43-fold increase. Transformers, diesel generators, and gas-fired mini power plants flooded into the country.
The actual operational figure—500–600 MW per Kudrytskyi, or up to 762 MW per the Energy Ministry—tells you how wide the execution gap runs.
But importing a power plant and connecting it to the grid are different things. Equipment can sit in warehouses for months awaiting installation, certification, and grid connection. At an average cost of roughly $1.1 million per megawatt, the $1.7 billion in imported cogeneration stations should yield about 1.6 GW. The actual operational figure—500–600 MW per Kudrytskyi, or up to 762 MW per the Energy Ministry—tells you how wide the execution gap runs.
The ministry’s figure is the highest among competing government capacity estimates. Vice Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba puts the number at 570 MW. The State Energy Efficiency Agency says about 500 MW.
The discrepancy matters: the ministry that claims the most is the same one engulfed in the Energoatom corruption scandal—an affair that toppled two ministers, forced the resignation of presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak in late November 2025, and triggered Zelenskyy’s largest wartime government reshuffle.
The tender that corruption froze
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Recognizing it could not build four gigawatts alone, the government launched a competition inviting private companies to construct gas-fired power plants of 5–80 MW each. Ukrenergo would compensate capital costs—up to €855,000 per megawatt—over ten years.
The first round targeted 700 MW. In April 2025, winners were announced for over 300 MW. Then, the commission stopped meeting. Most proposals were rejected. In December, the commission’s chairman, Yurii Sheik, was detained on corruption charges related to a scheme at Energoatom.
The Energoatom affair runs deeper than one arrested chairman.
The tender was blocked for eight months. The government allowed it to resume only at the end of 2025. By then, business confidence in state-run energy tenders had taken a beating—during the very winter when those megawatts were needed most.
The Energoatom affair runs deeper than one arrested chairman. Euromaidan Press reported in November that one energy expert estimated the corruption scheme’s real scale at up to $1 billion—ten times NABU’s official $100 million figure.
The scandal reached Zelenskyy’s inner circle: his former business partner Tymur Mindich is suspected of orchestrating the kickback network, and Yermak—once the country’s second-most powerful figure—resigned after NABU raided his home.
Why there are no quick fixes
Ukraine’s centralized power system—thermal plants, substations, transmission lines—has been systematically destroyed. Russia launched 612 targeted energy attacks in 2025 alone, Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal told parliament. Peak winter demand hits 20 GW. Available capacity plus imports reaches about 13 GW.
The solution that energy experts, international donors, and private investors all agree upon—distributed generation, hundreds of small gas-fired plants scattered across the country rather than concentrated in a few large, vulnerable facilities—is exactly what private businesses have been building.
Cities like Zhytomyr, which invested early in cogeneration with international help, kept power running longer during attacks that blacked out Kyiv—not immune to disruption, but far more resilient.
But scaling distributed generation from hundreds of megawatts to the four gigawatts Ukraine needs takes years, not months. Equipment must be manufactured, shipped, installed, certified, connected, and protected from Russian strikes.
Each step has its own timeline. Each has its own bureaucratic and financial bottleneck. The State Energy Efficiency Agency’s latest target—250 cogeneration units producing 1.1 GW within two years—requires €1.9 billion ($2.26 billion) in investment that has not yet been secured.
For millions of Ukrainians enduring rolling blackouts and burst heating pipes in subzero temperatures, the gap between announcements and operational megawatts is measured in frozen apartments, shuttered factories, and a grid that cannot be rebuilt faster than Russia destroys it—especially when corruption blocks the people willing to build.
