When diplomats label a meeting “peace talks”, they usually mean negotiations over the core political questions that decide whether a war ends, on what terms, and with what risk of resumption. The current Ukraine–Russia–US meetings in Abu Dhabi do not yet meet that description. What is taking place is narrower, more cautious, and more revealing for precisely that reason.
Abu Dhabi is about the plumbing beneath peace: the pipes, valves, and pressure gauges without which a ceasefire cannot function.
Abu Dhabi is about the plumbing beneath peace: the pipes, valves, and pressure gauges without which a ceasefire cannot function, but which do not themselves decide the shape of the house. That distinction matters because plumbing can work perfectly while the building above remains uninhabitable.
A moment of focus
One detail from the talks captures their character more clearly than any communique. Russia is reported to have demanded that Ukraine withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk Oblast as a precondition to further discussions. Ukraine has rejected that demand and has instead argued for freezing the conflict along the current front lines.
A requirement that one side vacate territory it still controls before peace talks even begin tells us how far the parties are from a political settlement.
Nothing else needs to be added. A requirement that one side vacate territory it still controls before peace talks even begin tells us how far the parties are from a political settlement. It also explains why so much of the Abu Dhabi agenda has retreated into technicalities.
What is actually on the table
The most tangible outcome publicised after the second round of meetings is a major prisoner exchange: 157 prisoners of war returned by each side. The US envoy, Steve Witkoff, described this as flowing from “constructive” discussions focused on “conditions for a durable peace”.
Reporting points to a cluster of issues that all sit firmly in the category of making conflict management possible rather than ending the conflict.
Prisoner exchanges are humanitarian, visible, and technically manageable precisely because they do not require either Ukraine or Russia to concede on sovereignty or borders. They are also historically common in wars that are far from ending.
Beyond this, reporting points to a cluster of issues that all sit firmly in the category of making conflict management possible rather than ending the conflict itself:
- The restoration of high-level US–Russia military-to-military communication is presented as a measure to reduce the risk of escalation.
- Discussion of an energy-related truce and alleged violations of it, probing whether limited ceasefire arrangements can be made to hold in practice.
- The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, both a strategic infrastructure and a latent hazard, is a test case for how any form of “international cooperation” might operate over territory Russia occupies, while Ukraine insists the plant must return to its control.
These are not trivial matters. They are, however, implementation questions: where forces would stand, what would be monitored, which infrastructure would be insulated from attack, and which rules militaries would follow to avoid accidents. They are the mechanics of a ceasefire, not the constitutional settlement of a war.
Who is in the room
The level of representation reinforces that point.
On the US side, the visible figures are Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy, and Jared Kushner, alongside him. The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has commented from Washington rather than leading a delegation on site.
Parallel tracks involve senior military officers, including the commander of US European Command, in restoring military communications, while the Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, signals that sanctions remain a separate lever.
Ukraine is represented by Rustem Umerov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, who has stressed “concrete steps and practical solutions”. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, remains active diplomatically but is not presented as the principal negotiator in Abu Dhabi, again suggesting a working-group process rather than a final political bargain.
Peace, when it comes, will require decisions that only a very small circle can take.
On Russia’s side, the most prominent figure is Kirill Dmitriev, who has been involved in discussions about restoring Russia–US relations and possible economic cooperation. Russia’s foreign minister is not the public face of the talks. Nor is there a clear indication that Moscow has delegated the authority required to trade territory, security guarantees, and sanctions relief as a single package.
Peace, when it comes, will require decisions that only a very small circle can take: heads of state, foreign ministers empowered to commit, defense leadership able to translate commitments into orders and, for Ukraine, arrangements that can withstand constitutional and democratic scrutiny. Abu Dhabi does not yet have that profile.
Why plumbing is all that is possible
There is a structural reason these talks gravitate towards the technical.
The central questions of a sustainable peace are brutal:
- Territory, including legal status, the rights of people living under occupation, and the practicalities of movement across any line.
- Security guarantees, where Ukraine’s insistence on robust external commitments collides directly with Russia’s resistance to arrangements she sees as hostile.
- Sequencing and enforcement: who moves first, how violations are verified, and what follows if they occur.
- Justice and accountability, which may be deferred but cannot be erased.
Against that background, Abu Dhabi functions as a site for partial agreements and risk management. Prisoners can be exchanged. Hotlines can be restored. A nuclear facility can be discussed in operational terms. None of this requires either side to concede the logic of its war aims.
That is the language of process engineering, not of final-status negotiation.
Rubio’s public framing is telling. He has spoken of “technical military teams” and warned that progress may not be visible until a “breakthrough”. That is the language of process engineering, not of final-status negotiation.
The danger at the center
This is the point at which technical talks become politically dangerous.
Russia is able to pursue maximalist demands, such as insisting on Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk, while simultaneously benefiting from warmer channels with Washington. These channels are not abstract. They mean restored military communications, reduced risk of direct US–Russia incidents, exploratory economic discussions, and the quiet erosion of Russia’s diplomatic isolation.
None of that depends on Russia making concessions to Ukraine.
For the United States, technical progress allows claims of momentum and responsibility without forcing immediate choices over sanctions relief, security guarantees, or enforcement mechanisms.
A process branded as “peace talks” can become diplomatic cover for Russian rearmament.
Ukraine, meanwhile, faces a more delicate calculation. Kyiv participates because not participating carries its own risks. Refusing talks would be portrayed as intransigence, potentially weakening Western support.
Participation keeps Ukraine inside the room where decisions affecting her security environment are being shaped. It also delivers real, if limited, gains: prisoners returned home, some restraint on attacks against energy infrastructure, and channels to expose violations.
But the risks are real. A process branded as “peace talks” can become diplomatic cover for Russian rearmament, repositioning, and consolidation under improved international conditions. Technical success can create the illusion that the scaffolding is the house.
Why Ukraine stays engaged
From a legal and strategic perspective, Ukraine’s participation is best understood as defensive diplomacy. She does not concede that Abu Dhabi is a peace process in the full sense. She treats it as conflict management, aimed at minimizing harm while preserving her legal position on sovereignty, occupation, and aggression.
The calculation is that limited, concrete deliverables may be worth the risk, provided the distinction between plumbing and peace is maintained publicly and politically.
So are these peace talks?
They are connected to peace, but they are not peace itself. Abu Dhabi is, for now, about making a ceasefire or a later settlement technically possible and about managing escalation risks, while the central political bargain remains untouched.
The test is straightforward. When delegations are led by figures who can credibly trade territory, security guarantees, and sanctions relief in one package, and when the agenda is described openly in those terms, the process will have moved from plumbing to architecture. Until then, the danger lies not in the talks themselves, but in outsiders mistaking their outputs for a settlement.
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