Western countries have publicly declared their readiness to provide Ukraine with post-war security guarantees. However, the effectiveness of these guarantees depends not on the wording of documents, says Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history Serhii Plokhii, Ukrainska Pravda reports.
According to him, there are no absolute guarantees in international politics, only a balance of interests, fears, and calculations.
The historian explains that security guarantees only work when fulfilling them aligns with the national interests of the states providing them, and when the potential aggressor is convinced that these states are truly prepared to go to war.
Historical lesson from 1939: why paper guarantees did not prevent war or restrain the aggressor
Plokhii notes that a similar situation has occurred in European history before. In 1939, France and Great Britain gave Poland security guarantees, hoping to deter Adolf Hitler from attacking.
However, the German dictator did not believe in the real willingness of Paris and London to go to war for Poland. As a result, the invasion occurred just weeks after the guarantees were announced, and the deterrence system collapsed completely.
“Guarantees are only as strong as the national interest of those who give them and the aggressor’s belief that they will be enforced. Otherwise, they remain on paper,” Plokhii emphasizes.
This is why the key question for Ukraine is not the number of declarations but whether Russia will believe that violating these guarantees would automatically trigger direct military confrontation with the West.
Europe may take the risk, the US probably won’t: where the real limits of post-war guarantees lie for Ukraine
According to Plokhii, a realistic chance of effective security guarantees exists primarily from European countries, but under a clear condition. If Europe concludes that it is safer and more advantageous to contain Russia on Ukrainian territory rather than allow war on its own soil, such guarantees could gain real meaning.
“If Europe decides that it is better to fight Russia on Ukrainian territory than in Poland or Germany, then these guarantees can become a reality,” he notes.
At the same time, Plokhii is far more skeptical about the US. In his view, any American administration will seek to avoid direct military confrontation with nuclear Russia.
Guarantees in which a Russian attack on Ukraine would automatically be treated as an attack on the US are, according to Plokhii, practically unrealistic. Russia’s nuclear status remains the key deterrent for Washington, regardless of political changes in the White House.
