On January 6, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the UK and France are prepared to establish military hubs in Ukraine in the event of a genuine ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Dmytro Zhmaillo, Director of the Ukrainian Center for Security and Cooperation, stresses that military hubs are not equivalent to full-fledged military bases, UNIAN reports.
By contrast, military hubs or centers lack autonomous combat capabilities and are not intended to function as a standalone deterrent force.
A network of military centers: aid without direct combat
Military centers form a developing network that may include advisory hubs where military advisers provide consultations.
“They may also serve as training facilities for Ukrainian troops and platforms for exchanging combat experience,” Zhmaillo explains.
Such hubs are intended to demonstrate presence and support, rather than acting as an independent or self-sustaining military component.
Their primary mission would be to support Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces, rather than participate directly in combat operations.
At present, there is no clarity regarding the number or locations of such centers. However, Zhmaillo noted that several months before the signing of the Paris Declaration, French and British military representatives visited Ukraine to discuss technical aspects, including weapons, troop contingents, and the format of a potential presence.
Troop numbers, rotation, and political constraints: why implementation will be difficult
Zhmaillo pointed out that public discussions have cited potential contingents of 10,000, 20,000, or even 30,000 troops. Yet even deploying around 10,000 personnel would require 30,000–40,000 troops to sustain proper rotation.
“This would pose a serious challenge, especially for France and the UK, whose armed forces are not accustomed to operating under the conditions in which Ukraine’s military is fighting,” the expert emphasizes.
According to Zhmaillo, foreign troops typically require rotation every six months.
He adds that the creation of such hubs represents a significant political step, one that would have been unthinkable just a year or two ago. At the same time, the initiative is contingent on key preconditions: a ceasefire, a stable line of contact, and the absence of large-scale missile and drone attacks.
Zhmaillo cites the historical example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a similar network of foreign forces operated after the cessation of active hostilities.
At the time, leading roles were also played by France and the UK, with Germany contributing in areas such as demining assistance.
