The Trump administration is reportedly offering Ukraine security guarantees similar to NATO's Article 5—legally binding and approved by Congress. A senior US official told Axios the administration7 wants to give Ukraine "a security guarantee that will not be a blank check on the one hand but will be strong enough on the other hand."
There's a catch. Under the original 28-point "peace plan," these guarantees would be deemed invalid if Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg "without cause." Both Russia and the US have repeatedly blamed Ukraine for a war Russia started.
In other words: these "guarantees" come with an escape clause designed for the guarantor, not the guaranteed.
What Article 5 actually says
According to NATO, Article 5 states that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against all members, triggering an obligation for each member to come to its assistance.
The Alliance stresses, however, that "this assistance may or may not involve the use of armed force." Each member nation determines its specific actions according to its own constitutional processes. If the Alliance is under threat, each member state will consider its own defensive needs before committing military support to allies.
NATO's collective defense pledge is not an automatic tripwire for war. It's a political commitment—one that only works if adversaries believe it will be honored.
NATO can barely defend itself
After three decades of downsizing and underfunding, European member states are fundamentally dependent on support from allies who—except for the United States—are unable to come to their assistance.
The numbers are damning:
- As of 2024, NATO member states had accumulated a collective backlog of 433 years—each year representing one member state that did not meet its 2% spending pledge.
- During the Cold War, European members invested an average of 3.5% of GDP on defense. Today, they spend just 2.27%. While all of this is a investment in European security, not all is used to rebuild the military power of NATO. Instead, a great part is invested in Ukraine. Fortunately.
- The 2% target itself is only 57% of what Europe spent in the 1980s to maintain credible deterrence.
European leaders have agreed to raising spending to 5% of GDP. NATO members have agreed to use at least 3.5 % dedicated to core military defence and up to 1.5 % for broader security and related investments—and have reaffirmed strong, continued support for Ukraine (including counting eligible Ukraine aid within this spending calculation) as part of their collective defence commitments, aiming for a total of 5 % of GDP by 2035.
This is an acknowledgment that current levels are not deterring Russia. But as Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda pointed out: "There was a promise to invest 2% eleven years ago. Now we are talking about 3% spending. Despite long discussions, despite nice plans, we are still below the threshold of 2%."
If NATO deterrence worked
Consider what's actually happening:
- The full-scale war would never have happened. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept pledged to use political and military means to end wars that threaten the security of the Alliance. Instead, the 2022 Strategic Concept became a commitment to do less.
- Russia would not be waging hybrid war against NATO members. More importantly, the Alliance would be responding in kind. It isn't.
- NATO wouldn't be preparing for a possible Russian attack as early as 2030. German intelligence warns Russia intends to test NATO's collective defense commitment. Some analysts believe aggression could begin within three years.
When discussing security guarantees for Ukraine, Europe has indicated it can provide a mere 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers as a deterrence force—conditional on US military support.
Foreign military aid to Ukraine plunged 43% in July and August compared to the first half of the year, due to US policy shifts, uneven burden-sharing among European donors, and fiscal constraints.
If the Alliance cannot deter attacks against its own members, why would it deter future attacks against Ukraine? This is why Ukraine's Defense Minister has underscored that the fastest way to strengthen European security is to support Ukraine—which has several critical military capabilities its European partners lack.
The built-in excuse not to respond
The US has explicitly ruled out deploying combat troops to engage directly with Russia. It is instead signaling that Europe must take responsibility for Ukraine and its own security.
A reset of US-Russian relations—including business opportunities a "peace" would bring—appears to be the administration's main objective. The US plan bears more similarities to a business arrangement than a peace plan. Given experience, the Trump administration would likely have no qualms about blaming Ukraine for any future restart of hostilities.
As Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on the anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum: "Having had such a bitter experience in the past, Ukraine does not trust empty pledges anymore—we trust the strength of our army and weapons."
Trump's credibility problem
President Trump has sowed doubt about whether he would honor NATO's Article 5 commitments since his first presidential campaign, conditioning US protection on political demands like higher defense spending.
In March 2025, he told reporters: "If they don't pay, I'm not going to defend them. No, I'm not going to defend them." Three months later, when asked about Article 5, he said: "Depends on your definition. There's numerous definitions of Article 5. You know that, right? But I'm committed to being their friends."
The new National Security Strategy makes this explicit. It links cooperation to ideologically aligned partners and, according to War on the Rocks, "elevates the culture wars into a governing logic for national security," using ideological tests to judge allies.
The Kremlin welcomed the strategy, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling it "largely consistent with our vision."
US credibility has been further undermined by:
- Its failure to live up to the Budapest Memorandum
- Its failure to reciprocate Europe's persistent support for American-led military operations globally
- Threats of annexation against allied territories
- A trade war against Europe exactly as it urgently rearms
- The end of defense aid to Ukraine
- Persistent support for Russian demands for Ukraine's capitulation
The trust deficit
European and American discord is becoming increasingly open. Media reported a tense phone call on Wednesday between Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, and Donald Trump. Trump said "pretty strong words" were exchanged.
According to the Guardian, nearly half of Europeans see President Trump as "an enemy of Europe." In a Pew Research Center global survey, 64% said they had no confidence in Trump—compared with 57% for Putin. Roughly three-in-four or more lacked confidence in Trump in Germany, Sweden, France, Spain, and the Netherlands.
If Europe no longer trusts the US's commitment to collective defense, why should Ukraine trust US "security guarantees"?
Why should anyone trust a US security guarantee after Washington stepped back and stopped helping Ukraine defend itself during this full-scale war? Why should we believe it will step forward during the next?
US "security guarantees" come without either security or guarantees.
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