Washington tried to take 50% of the profits from Ukraine's reconstruction—using assets that Europe froze. And bill European taxpayers €100 billion on top. Europe, apparently, was supposed to say thank you.
While attention to the Witkoff-Dmitriev "peace plan" focused on its scandalous capitulation demands—Ukraine surrendering all of Donetsk Oblast without a fight—a less-discussed provision revealed something more fundamental about Washington's intentions. That provision contained what was essentially Russia's bill for an indulgence from aggression. But look closer, and it was also Washington's bill to Europe.
How the Witkoff plan would divide frozen Russian assets
The plan envisioned one-third of the $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets going to US-supervised Ukraine reconstruction—with Americans taking 50% of profits. Europeans would add another $100 billion from their own taxpayers. The remaining $200 billion would go into a joint US-Russian investment vehicle.
Here is what the Witkoff plan means for each party:
- Ukraine—the victim of Russian aggression that caused $590 billion in damages by February 2025—would see reconstruction funds controlled by Washington, which skims half the profit
- Europe—which froze the assets in 2022—would be billed an additional $100 billion from its taxpayers
- Russia—the aggressor—would receive a $200 billion investment vehicle as reward for stopping a war it started
Washington positioned itself to profit from Ukraine's destruction while billing Europe for Russia's rehabilitation. The cards are now on the table.
This should end the debate. Europe has spent months agonizing over legal risks and liability guarantees while Washington was negotiating with Moscow to pocket 50% of the profits from assets that Europe froze. Belgium's hesitation no longer looks like prudence—it looks like a gift to Washington and Moscow.
Why the EU's reparations loan is better than the Witkoff plan
Given Washington and Moscow's apparent willingness to divide these frozen assets between themselves while billing Europeans for reconstruction, one might expect EU partners to act faster and more decisively.
The EU has a better option. Since September, European institutions have been discussing a "reparations loan"—funds extended to Ukraine against its unconditional right to reparations from Russia, with collateral from assets frozen in EU financial institutions. Under this approach, Ukraine would receive up to €210 billion, repayable only if Russia compensates for war damages. No American middleman. No 50% profit-skimming. No $200 billion gift to Moscow.
Key differences between the two approaches:
- EU reparations loan: €210 billion to Ukraine, repaid only when Russia pays war damages, controlled by Europe
- Witkoff plan: $100 billion from frozen assets (US takes 50% of profits), $100 billion from European taxpayers, $200 billion to joint US-Russia vehicle
Instead of moving forward, negotiations have hit a wall. Belgium, whose Euroclear depository holds €183 billion in frozen Russian assets, has promised to veto unless it receives legally binding guarantees from other EU member states and equal distribution of legal risks.
With the 18-19 December EU Council summit approaching—and the Witkoff plan's intentions now exposed—continued delay serves no one's interests but Washington's and Moscow's.
Can Russia win a lawsuit over frozen assets? Legal analysis
We assessed risks of Russia or its central bank successfully challenging EU measures in international and national courts. The analysis provides clear grounds to assert that neither Russia nor the Bank of Russia has any chance of even being recognized as having legal standing in the ICJ, EU Court, or ECHR—let alone winning on merits.
Russia's legal options for challenging frozen asset seizure:
- International Court of Justice: Russia lacks standing; no realistic path to success
- EU Court of Justice: Russia lacks standing; EU treaty provisions block claims
- European Court of Human Rights: Russia lacks standing after Council of Europe expulsion
- Belgium-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty: Only semi-realistic path, but Bank of Russia's role in financing aggression undermines any claim
Moreover, since 2022, the EU Council has allowed Euroclear to maintain a reserve totaling €5.58 billion for litigation and contingencies. These funds could hire the planet's best lawyers to defend cases that already have poor odds of Russian success.
Against this backdrop, Belgium's continued obstruction raises uncomfortable questions. Since 2022, Euroclear has paid Belgium €3.39 billion in windfall profit taxes. For comparison, Belgium's bilateral aid to Ukraine over the same period totaled just €2.2 billion. Belgium has its own interest in not "releasing the goose that lays golden eggs."
How the EU can bypass Belgium and Hungary on frozen assets
The EU Council has a range of tools to protect frozen assets and neutralize Belgium's excuses. Political will is what remains elusive.
Currently, decisions to extend asset immobilization require unanimity every six months—giving Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán leverage to hold the EU hostage, constantly extracting concessions. But EU regulations don't require this arrangement. Council instructions allow an alternative approach: lifting sanctions only if goals have been achieved, with the burden of proof falling on Orbán and other advocates of Russian interests.
Another option involves Article 122 of the EU Treaty, which allows member governments to make decisions "in a spirit of solidarity, appropriate to the economic situation." The Commission wants to interpret this as shifting to qualified majority voting—requiring support from at least 15 countries representing minimum 65% of EU population—until "Russia ceases hostilities and pays reparations."
EU options for bypassing veto threats on frozen Russian assets:
- Reverse burden of proof: Require Orbán to prove sanctions goals achieved before lifting
- Article 122 qualified majority: 15+ countries with 65% of EU population can approve, bypassing Hungary
- Commission three-layer guarantees: Legal protections for Belgium and Euroclear with shared risk across member states
If the Council reaches no agreement now, not just the reparations loan but asset immobilization itself faces risk. The next sanctions extension deadline falls at the end of January. Failed extension would deliver a major gift to Russia's war machine—and hand Washington and Moscow exactly what they want.
Why Europe must act now on frozen Russian assets
We won't appeal to moral arguments—the language of interests is far more convincing.
Europe must determine which poses greater risk: finding ways around Orbán's veto, providing justified guarantees to Belgium while pushing it past its excuses, finding a complex solution that keeps Ukraine in the fight—or through inaction watching Washington and Moscow carve up European leverage between themselves.
Europe still has a chance to avert its own major war with Russia—at Russia's expense. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz put it plainly: "This is a European matter, and I see no way, in any form of economic benefit, to transfer the money we then mobilize to the United States of America."
He's right. Washington has shown its hand. Moscow has shown its hand. Europe holds Russia's billions and has a plan to use them.
The only question left: Europe, you ok with being the mark? Or will you act?
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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