The recent clash between Trump and Zelenskyy revealed a deeper reality: America’s strategic ambiguity is no longer sustainable. After three years of full-scale war, the real question isn’t whether Ukraine can outlast Russia, but whether the West can afford the cost of inaction.
The piecemeal US support reveals a fundamental flaw in its Ukraine strategy — the belief that a prolonged war would weaken Russia without serious consequences for the West.
This Cold War-era mindset, treating Ukraine as a battleground rather than a true ally, has shaped US policy across administrations, resulting in a dangerous stalemate.
By treating Ukraine as a strategic lever rather than a true ally, the US has prioritized Russian attrition over Ukrainian victory. But Ukraine is not a peripheral conflict — it is a battle at the heart of Western security. Anything short of a decisive Ukrainian victory risks prolonging a destructive geopolitical stalemate that threatens global stability.
The strategic misstep America made with Ukraine
Successive US administrations have repeatedly positioned Ukraine as a strategic tool to weaken Russia.Under the Bush administration, US policy on Ukraine focused on supporting its post-Soviet transition and curbing Russian influence in Eastern Europe. While Washington championed Ukraine’s sovereignty rhetorically, it stopped short of making meaningful security commitments.
The 2004 Orange Revolution, in which civic society victory led to the rise of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, was seen as a win for US interests. However, American support remained cautious. When Ukraine requested a NATO Membership Action Plan in 2008, it was rejected, ensuring Washington could avoid direct confrontation with Moscow.
The Obama administration forged a shift in US-Ukraine relations after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In response to the invasion, Washington imposed economic sanctions on Russia and provided non-lethal military aid to Ukraine.
However, the hesitation to provide direct military support left Ukraine vulnerable, turning it into a strategic pressure point rather than a fully supported ally. The ongoing conflict in Donbas persisted, pressuring pressure Moscow without prompting full-scale Western intervention.
Washington’s limited military assistance signaled that Ukraine’s role was to absorb Russian aggression, rather than being integrated into a broader Western security framework.
During Trump’s first term, US policy on Ukraine was full of contradictions. While initially doubtful of Ukraine’s strategic value, his administration approved lethal aid, including Javelin anti-tank missiles, breaking with Obama’s reluctance. Yet, Trump’s trancational foreign policy and attempts to use Ukraine for domestic gain turned it into a battleground between great powers, rather than a nation fully backed in its sovereignty.
The Biden administration, faced with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, took a far more assertive approach. It provided unprecedented military aid, intelligence support, and economic assistance, making the US Kyiv’s largest weapons supplier.
However, the piecemeal supplies, combined with the lack of a clear strategic vision, raised crucial questions: Was the goal a decisive Ukrainian victory, or merely weakening Russia? By blocking Ukraine’s direct NATO accession while increasing its dependence on Western aid, the US only cemented Ukraine’s role as a proxy war theater.
Now, with Trump’s return to office, US policy seems to be shifting once again. Growing pressure on Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, combined with the White House leveraging critical arms supplies, raises serious concerns about Ukraine’s long-term security and the real calculus behind Washington’s support.
The fatal flaw of the “Bleed Russia” strategy
The idea that Ukraine could just be a battleground to drain Russia has proven dangerously wrong.As Ukraine integrates into European economic and security structures, a prolonged conflict only harms the Western interests, rather than advancing them.
A prolonged war puts immense strain on NATO, the EU, and the broader transatlantic alliance. European economies are reeling from the energy crisis sparked by sanctions, while NATO has been forced to redirect substantial military resources to support Ukraine, limiting its capacity to tackle other global threats.
The longer the war drags on, the deeper the political divisions within the West grow, with some nations calling for diplomatic solutions while others push for continued military support. These cracks in unity give Russia an opening to exploit, potentially weakening the West in ways far beyond the intended outcomes of a proxy war.
The information age has also reshaped the game of attrition. Unlike Cold War proxy wars that could drag on unnoticed and with little political fallout, Ukraine’s conflict is unfolding in real time for a global audience. As war fatigue sets in across the West, sustaining military aid and public support grows harder, undermining the “bleed Russia” strategy.
Russia’s push to erase Ukraine starts beyond the battlefield
While Western support focuses on boosting Ukraine’s defense, the true essence of this war goes far beyond the question of borders and territorial control.
The Kremlin sees Ukraine as a direct ideological challenge to Russian authoritarianism. For Putin’s regime, a Western-integrated Ukraine is an existential threat — not due to NATO expansion, but because it stands as a model for an alternative future. A sovereign, democratic Ukraine shatters the Kremlin’s narrative that former Soviet republics are doomed to corruption, instability, or dependence on Russia.
If Ukraine strengthens its democracy, institutions, and ties with Europe, it will become undeniable proof that Moscow’s imperial ambitions are not just outdated, but flatly rejected by its former dominions.
This ideological battle explains why Russia has labeled Ukraine’s government illegitimate, painting its leaders as Western puppets and its democracy as a failure. Yet, Ukraine’s resilience directly contradicts this propaganda. Its democratic elections, growing civil society, and closer ties with Western institutions offer a powerful alternative to the autocratic model Putin aims to preserve.
The Kremlin fears not just Ukraine’s military capabilities but the political implications of its success.
Beyond Ukraine, the war has inspired change across the post-Soviet space. In Belarus, the opposition to Lukashenko draws strength from Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. In Russia, opposition figures continue to defy Putin’s narrative that no alternative exists to his rule. The more Ukraine proves that post-Soviet states can thrive outside the Kremlin’s control, the greater the threat to Putin’s authoritarian order.
Why full US commitment to Ukraine is a must
This is why the stakes of this war go far beyond military attrition. A drawn-out, inconclusive conflict might drain Russia’s resources, but it won’t shake the ideological roots of Putin’s regime. If the West aims to do more than just weaken Russia — if it seeks a stable, democratic Eastern Europe — it must recognize that Ukraine’s decisive victory is essential .
Only a secure, independent Ukraine, fully integrated into Western political and security structures, can tip the balance in the broader fight between democracy and authoritarianism in the region.
America must move beyond outdated Cold War thinking. The path ahead is clear: Ukraine’s success isn’t just a moral imperative — it’s a strategic necessity. A prolonged war weakens the West as much as it weakens Russia, and an unresolved conflict creates far more long-term instability than a decisive Ukrainian victory ever would.
The US must commit to a clear strategy that ensures Ukraine’s future as a key member of the Western alliance. America’s decisions will determine not just Ukraine’s fate, but the strength and credibility of Western alliances. There’s no middle ground: either the West guarantees Ukraine’s victory, or it faces global strategic failure.
Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.
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