Peace is an attractive, yet elusive, concept. It can mean different things to different people at different times. Ukraine is a case in point.
The quest for peace in Ukraine could yield either of two fundamentally different outcomes: a Vichy-style capitulation, with an interim ceasefire that buys Russia more time to rearm and prepare its next attack, or a robust defense of a frozen frontline, as one on the Korean Peninsula.
The Kremlin’s vision for peace in Ukraine is clear. Russian forces would directly occupy swaths of illegally seized Ukrainian territory, and a compliant, helpless Ukrainian government (lacking any meaningful military capacity) would take orders from Moscow.
Something quite similar happened in France during World War II, when the part of the country not under direct German occupation was run by General Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist government and took orders from Berlin.
Thus, for most of WWII — roughly between 1940 and 1944 — the situation on the ground in France was “peaceful.” The Vichy regime under Pétain regularly boasted that it had protected France, while blaming the Resistance — French guerrillas — and periodic Allied bombing raids for any disturbances to the “peace.”
This option has been on offer for Ukraine since the first hours of Russia’s large-scale invasion. Yet having witnessed the executions, rapes, and other atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Bucha and elsewhere, the Ukrainians have understandably refused to capitulate.
The alternative is the type of peace that kept Germany peaceful for decades after WWII, and kept the Korean Peninsula peaceful since the 1953 armistice. In each case, the peace was secured by accepting de facto borders, fortified with massive defensive military buildups, boots on the ground, and credible security guarantees.
While West Germany enjoyed NATO membership after 1955, South Korea relied on a bilateral alliance with the United States. Even today, the US keeps around 28,000 active-duty troops in South Korea and 50,000 in Germany.
Such backstops made the former wartime frontline almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop, and remain at peace.
The equivalent of a West German or South Korean model for Ukraine today would require a freezing of the frontline and either NATO accession or a deployment of tens of thousands of Western troops to its Ukrainian territory.
The French government has pushed for this kind of solution since February 2024, and it now features prominently in discussions among European leaders. With the new US administration demanding that Europe do more to ensure its own peace and security, at least a half-dozen European governments are said to be seriously considering it.
Of course, if Europeans dislike the first model — a Vichy-style peace — but prove unable to deliver a sufficient security guarantee, that will create the conditions for a third possible scenario: a bogus peace leading to another war.
A temporary ceasefire — like the one that prevailed under the Minsk agreements after 2014 — would allow Russia to regroup, rearm, and attack again sooner rather than later. Not only might this cycle be repeated more than once; it also could implicate countries beyond Ukraine – such as the Baltics or Poland.
With enough prodding and hybrid warfare, Russia could test the limits of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and either expose it as a dead letter or precipitate a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Such are the consequences of a bogus peace.If Ukraine does not get enough support in the coming months and years, Europe will find itself confronting a dangerous new strategic reality that would challenge NATO and leave EU territory perpetually vulnerable.
The immediate task for the West, then, is not only to navigate US President Donald Trump’s unilateral pursuit of a settlement with Russia that could offer Ukraine on a platter to Russia, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war in the near future.
Many think that if Russia could not conquer Ukraine in 2022, Russia would not dare challenge NATO and the European Union. That is dangerously wishful thinking.
Occupying Ukraine would allow Russia not just expand its territory, but also unite Europe’s biggest and word’s second-biggest armies under Kremlin command.
Occupied territories bring in new people, defense production capacities, and resources – from rare-earth minerals to gas and nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity — which has been impressive in multiple areas, from sea drones to the sheer capacity to produce equipment en masse — would be a welcome bonus for Russia as well, and it could be used against Europe.
French President Emmanuel Macron already publicly warned that the combined armed forces of Russia and Ukraine would be unstoppable.
The bottom line is that avoiding a Ukrainian capitulation or a fake peace will require a European commitment to, at the very least, freezing the current frontline. Otherwise, vulnerable EU and NATO members could be the next targets.
The only alternative is something that no one wants: a perpetual threat of war for much of Central and Northern Europe, with all the security and economic uncertainty that comes with it.
Copyright: Project Syndicate. This article was published by Project Syndicate on 21 February 2025 and has been republished by Euromaidan Press with permission.
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