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Zelenskyy awards servicemen 1 october defender Ukrainian army
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy awards a Ukrainian serviceman on the Ukrainian Day of the Defender on 1 October 2024. Photo: Zelenskyy’s Office

Five reasons the West must support Ukraine’s victory, not just survival

Ukraine’s victory is not only feasible. It is necessary to make the world a safer place.
Five reasons the West must support Ukraine’s victory, not just survival

As the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine crosses the 2.5-year mark and Russia is not showing any signs of relenting, a critical question looms over Western policymakers: should the West support Ukraine to continue fighting, or should it support Ukraine to win?

The distinction is crucial as the human and economic cost of a prolonged conflict mounts, and the current strategy of simply keeping Ukraine in the fight is becoming increasingly untenable. If continued, it will lead to Ukraine losing the war as its human and economic resources are depleted quicker than those of the Russian Federation.

Therefore, Ukraine and its Western partners should urgently adopt a strategy aimed at securing a Ukrainian victory since most of the arguments against it don’t withstand scrutiny.

1. Russia can be overcome

A prevailing belief is that Russia simply cannot be defeated due to its vast population and a continuous supply of military equipment, which it is able to replenish despite Western sanctions. This notion is bolstered by the sheer numbers in Russia’s favor— over a million active duty servicemen and a million and a half in reserve compared to 800,000 active servicemen and about 300-400,000 in reserve for Ukraine, 4,397 artillery pieces vs. 1,639, 1,169 vs. 78 aircraft and so on.

Yet, Ukraine has consistently defied these expectations. Ukraine’s success at the Black Sea, the retaking of Kharkiv Oblast, constant attacks on Russian airfields and other military objects deep inside Russia and the offensive in Kursk are just a few examples of Ukraine’s capability to exploit Russian vulnerabilities and achieve significant victories against a much larger force.

In addition, the Kursk incursion has shown that Russia struggles to generate a sufficient force to simultaneously liberate its own territory and continue aggression in Ukraine.

These successes underscore a critical point: victory is not a matter of matching Russia tank for tank, soldier for soldier. Instead, it’s about Ukraine targeting Russian weaknesses— vast unprotected territories, centralized decision-making, fear of responsibility at the lower levels of government, listless population, etc.

Victory is not matching Russia tank for tank, but about targeting Russian weaknesses.

The current Western policy, focused on avoiding any escalation, forces Ukraine into a grinding war of attrition on its own territory, trying to either defend itself or break through heavily fortified Russian defensive lines. This strategy only prolongs the conflict and increases suffering.

2. The red lines are a myth

Another argument against supporting Ukraine to win is the fear of crossing Russia’s so-called “red lines,” which could trigger catastrophic retaliation. The history of the war suggests that these red lines are more rhetorical than real. Both the West and Ukraine have crossed multiple “red lines” without provoking the feared responses.

For instance, providing weapons to Ukraine, the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, and the repeated strikes on Russian air defenses and other military targets in Crimea have not led to the dramatic escalation many anticipated. Neither have the strikes on the Russian territory proper, including the strike on the early-warning radars in May of 2024.

Russia red lines nuclear war escalation

The notion of red lines is more characteristic of Western than Russian thinking.

Gazeta.ru wrote that the idea of a “red line” first appeared in Russian political discourse on 21 April 2021, when Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered his address to the Russian Federal Assembly.

Since then, the concept has been inconsistently used by Putin and other Russian officials. They have alternated between clear and vague threats and outright statements that the West should guess what these lines were.

This ambiguity serves Russian interests by keeping the West off balance, perpetually second-guessing its actions. By succumbing to Russia’s clearly manipulative tactics, the West is deterring itself from decisive action, undermining the potential for a Ukrainian victory.

3. World War III can only be prevented by deterrence

A major concern is that Ukraine’s success might trigger a broader conflict, even World War III. This argument, however, ignores a crucial reality: there is no guaranteed way to prevent escalation if Russia is determined to push forward.

If Russia is determined to escalate, it will do so on its own terms unless a solid deterrent is in place.

Intensive diplomatic efforts by the US and its allies to prevent the invasion in the first place failed, as did various attempts to influence the course of the conflict. Moreover, Russia does not only threaten the West rhetorically, it is already attacking Western interests in other regions, such as Africa, regardless of the situation in Ukraine.

If Russia is determined to escalate, it will do so on its own terms unless a solid deterrent is in place (and it very often isn’t). The West’s hesitation to fully support Ukraine out of fear of wider conflict simply gives Russia more time to find more vulnerabilities, build up its capabilities, learn to bypass sanctions, and convince its population that the war is a necessity by subjecting them to radical anti-western propaganda.

By ensuring that Ukraine wins, the West can stop Russian adventurism, removing a major threat to security and prosperity in Europe and Western interests elsewhere.

4. Russia’s nuclear threats are a bluff

Another argument for restraint is the fear that a Russian defeat could lead to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

While this is a serious concern, it is one that has been addressed by both Ukraine and the West. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has stated that Ukraine will not be deterred by nuclear threats and will continue fighting. A public opinion survey commissioned by the Munich Security Conference in 2023 showed that even in the event of a tactical nuclear strike by Moscow, 89% of Ukrainians intend to continue the fight.

The message this is sending is that a strike is not likely to end the war on Russian terms, while consequences for Russia will be catastrophic.

The United States has been explicit about the consequences Russia would face if it resorted to nuclear weapons. According to the former CIA director David Petraeus, together with its allies, the US would destroy Russia’s troops and equipment in Ukraine – as well as sink its Black Sea fleet.

So far, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has been encouraged by the knowledge that the West will not interfere directly. However, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a different matter. The clear and severe consequences outlined by the US are likely to change Putin’s calculations, making it unlikely that he would cross that line.

In addition, veteran Russia watchers such as Keir Giles explain how Russia uses nuclear intimidation to achieve its goals and how this has been a habitual tactic for many years.

5. Russia is already at war with NATO

One of the key points of NATO’s current policy is that it is not a party to the conflict. However, Russia has framed the war from the outset as a struggle against NATO in Ukraine, portraying the conflict as a fight against NATO forces.

This narrative, though derided in the West, reflects Russia’s broader strategic goals and view of the conflict. Its attacks on Western interests and exploitation of Western vulnerabilities are part of the Russian strategy to weaken a potential victim first.

By refusing to acknowledge the reality of Russia’s perspective, the West hampers its own strategic response. Western self-restraint leads to reliance on peacetime democratic processes, slows decision-making, and prevents decisive action. This approach not only limits the West’s effectiveness in supporting Ukraine, increasing the chances of Russia’s victory, but also hinders its preparation for the broader, persistent Russian threat in case Ukraine loses.

Changing the perspective, devising interim expedited procedures, and adopting a more decisive stance will lead to a quicker victory. Also, if the allies are confident that Article 5 serves as a solid deterrent, they do need to fear an attack.

The imperative of victory

Supporting Ukraine to win is not just a moral imperative but a strategic necessity. Russia’s vulnerabilities have been exposed, and with the right support, Ukraine can exploit these to achieve a victory.

The fears that have constrained Western support—whether the myth of Russia’s invincibility, the self-imposed red lines, the fear of World War III, or the nuclear threat—must be reevaluated in light of Ukraine’s proven resilience and Russia’s demonstrated weaknesses.

Ukraine’s defeat will mean the West succumbed to Russian bullying and manipulative tactics, which will embolden other potential aggressors, making the world increasingly unsafe. The Western way of life, however, depends on peace, but by trying to preserve it by avoiding confrontation, the West will fail.

Supporting Ukraine to win is feasible and necessary to make the world a safer place.

This text is part of the project “Pragmatic Dialogue with the West: Why It Is Worth Supporting Ukraine,” undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It presents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Julia Kazdobina is Head of the Ukrainian Foundation for Security Studies, Julia specialized in government policies to counter foreign influence operations online and sanctions policy. She has served as a pro-bono advisor to the Information Policy Minister of Ukraine and holds a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the University of Rochester.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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