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Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 255: US to provide Ukraine with $400 million aid package

Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 255: US to provide Ukraine with $400 million aid package
Article by: Zarina Zabrisky

The Russian troops launched 6 missile and 21 air strikes, carrying out more than 60 MLRS attacks and damaging areas of about 20 settlements. The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart its Donetsk offensive and are setting conditions for an orderly withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River; they conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City. Russian occupational forces continued forced evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove. US to provide Ukraine with $400 million aid package

Daily overview — Summary report, November 5

The General Staff’s operational update regarding the Russian invasion as of 06.00 am, November 5, 2022 is in the dropdown menu below:

Situation in Ukraine. November 4, 2022. Source: ISW.

The two-hundred-fifty-fifth (255) day of the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people to a russian military large-scale invasion continues.
The enemy is trying to keep the temporarily captured territories, concentrates efforts on restraining the actions of the Defense Forces in certain areas. Conducts offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka directions.
Over the past day, units of the Defence Forces have repelled attacks by the occupiers in the areas of the settlements of Bilohorivka in the Luhansk oblast and Spirne, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Klishchiivka, Ozaryanivka, Mayorsk, Kamianka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Mariinka, Novomykhailivka and Pavlivka in the Donetsk oblast.
The enemy is shelling units of the Defence Forces along the contact line, carrying out border fortification equipment in separate directions and conducting aerial reconnaissance.
It continues to strike critical infrastructure and civilian homes in violation of International Humanitarian Law, the laws and customs of war.
During the past day, the enemy launched 6 missile and 21 air strikes, carried out more than 60 MLRS attacks.
Areas of about 20 settlements of the Lviv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Vinnytsia regions were hit by the russian occupiers.
The threat of new strikes by the enemy and the use of attack UAVs remains, including such a danger from the territory of the republic of belarus.
In the Volyn and Polissya directions, the situation remains without significant changes. The republic of belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine, accepts and hosts russian servicemen, and provides training grounds. It is also known that on the territory of the republic of belarus the units of the armed forces of the russian federation are being re-staffed at the expense of demobilized persons arriving from the territory of russia. Activities for combat training and coordination of these units will last about two to three weeks.
The enemy shelled in such directions:
in the Siversky direction – from mortars and barrel artillery, in the areas of Hrinivka, Liskivshchyna, Karpovychi, Tymonovychi, Leonivka, Chernihiv oblast, as well as Katerynivka, Novomykolaivka, and Zapsillia in Sumy oblast;
Kharkiv Battle Map. November 4, 2022. Source: ISW.
in the Slobozhansk direction – from mortars and barrel artillery, in the areas of Zolochiv, Hlyboke, Starytsa and Ohirtseve settlements;
on the Kupiansk and Lyman directions – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery, in the areas of the settlements of Dvorichna, Kislivka, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, Berestovka, Vyshneve, Novoyehorivka, Makiivka, and Nevske;
in the Bakhmut direction – from tanks and artillery of various calibers, in the areas of the settlements of Spirne, Bilohorivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Opytne, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Zelenopillia and Ozaryanivka;
Donetsk Battle Map. November 4, 2022. Source: ISW.
in the Avdiivka direction – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery, in the areas of Avdiivka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, Mariinka, Paraskoviivka and Novomykhailivka settlements;
in the Novopavlivskyi direction – from mortars and artillery of various types, in the areas of Vodyane, Bohoyavlenka, Vuhledar, Pavlivka, Novoukrainka, Prechystivka, Zolota Nyva, Vremivka, and Velyka Novosilka settlements;
in the Zaporizhzhia direction – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery, in the areas of settlements of Novosilka, Olhivske, Hulyaipole, Shcherbaki and Mali Shcherbaki.
Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle. November 4, 2022. Source: ISW.
Areas of more than 20 settlements near the contact line were damaged by fire in the South Buh region. The settlements of Tryfonivka, Kherson oblast, and Nikopol were directly affected by the fire of rocket and barrel artillery of the russian invaders.
The enemy continues to suffer losses. According to updated information, on November 3, as a result of fire damage to an enemy crossing near the settlement of Antonivka, Kherson oblast, a tugboat was destroyed. Two other vessels were damaged and require repair. It was also confirmed that the convoy of the occupiers, which was waiting for the crossing in the area of ​​the settlement of Olhivka, was damaged. Information regarding the loss of enemy manpower is being clarified.
In addition, on November 4, in the area of ​​the settlement of Novovasylivka, Mykolaiv region, 6 enemy fuel stations were destroyed.
On November 3 of this year, the city of Melitopol marked the arrival of about 80 wounded occupiers. The medical units of the occupiers lack qualified personnel, in particular surgeons. The available medical staff is unable to provide quality medical care.
In Kherson, the russian occupiers are trying to identify local residents who refused to evacuate to the territory temporarily controlled by the russian invaders. The city is being looted, the infrastructure is being destroyed.
Aviation of the Defence Forces during the past day struck the enemy 11 times. 4 areas of concentration of personnel, weapons and military equipment, as well as 7 positions of the enemy’s anti-aircraft defence, were affected. Air defence units shot down an Orlan-10 UAV, 11 Shahed-136 drones and 2 Kalibr cruise missiles.
During the day, units of missile troops and artillery of the Defence Forces struck 2 enemy control points, 7 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, an ammunition warehouse and 4 other important military objects of the occupiers.

Military Updates

Shelling by Russian troops. Icelandic Data Analyst.

Russians have tripled the intensity of hostilities in certain areas of the frontline, with up to 80 attacks per day, said the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi during a telephone conversation with the Supreme Commander of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe and the Commander of the US Armed Forces in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli.

The most brutal hostilities throughout the week are concentrated in the Donbas area – these are Bakhmut and Soledar, according to Zelenskyy. “We hold our positions. On these and some other directions in the Donetsk Oblast, the Russian army has already wasted as many lives of its people and as much ammunition as it apparently did not spend in the two Chechen wars combined.”
Russia has used almost all available Iranian drones, said Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov. However, Russia and Iran have previously signed contracts for the supply of drones, about 1,500-2,400 devices. Although, considering that things are not going well for Iran itself, it is not a fact that the Russians will wait for their “Shaheds” in full.

Regional Updates

In Kyiv Oblast,

In Kherson Oblast, 

In Russia,


According to British Defence Intelligence, (last 48 hours): 

  • Russia is probably struggling to provide military training for its current mobilisation drive and its annual autumn conscription intake. The Russian Armed Forces were already stretched providing training for the approximate 300,000 troops required for its ‘partial mobilisation’, announced on 21 September 2022. These issues will be compounded by the additional regular autumn annual conscription cycle, announced on 30 September 2022 and starting 01 November 2022, which is usually expected to bring in an additional 120,000 personnel.


  • Newly mobilised conscripts likely have minimal training or no training at all. Experienced officers and trainers have been deployed to fight in Ukraine and some have likely been killed in the conflict.


  • Russian forces are conducting training in Belarus due to a shortage of training staff, munitions and facilities in Russia. Deploying forces with little or no training provides little additional offensive combat capability.

Losses of the Russian army 

As of 5 November, the approximate losses of weapons and military equipment of the Russian Armed Forces from the beginning of the war to the present day:




Italy filled its gas storage facilities by more than 95% in preparation for the winter. Supplies from the Russian Federation may stop. Italy was a big importer of Russian gas, but by switching to supplies from other countries, notably Algeria, it filled its storage tanks and reduced consumption. “The result achieved is important for the coming winter and did not look likely back in July, when the 90% target seemed quite a challenge in itself,” said Snam gas network CEO Stefano Venier.

The president of Motor Sich JSC and the head of the Department of Foreign Economic Activity of the enterprise is suspected of working for the Russian Federation. All property is seized, according the Security Services.


The US is providing Ukraine with an additional $400 million aid package. It includes MIM-23 Hawk air defense systems, 45 T-72 tanks, 250 M1117 armored personnel carriers (for the first time such armored personnel carriers will be handed over), 40 armored boats, 1100 Phoenix Ghost drones

More than 70% of Germans are against increasing military aid to Ukraine. According to a poll: 20% of Germans believe that military aid to Ukraine should be increased; 41% of respondents consider Germany’s assistance sufficient; 30% – excessive.

New Developments 

The US and Ukraine have agreed on what will be considered a victory for Ukraine in the war. According to the head of the Presidential Office, this plan includes:
  • complete de-occupation of all territories of Ukraine (i.e. including Donbas and Crimea)
  • payment of reparations by Russia international
  • guarantees that will not allow the Russian Federation to attack again.

Over a thousand Starlinks in Ukraine are disconnected due to funding problems. The Ukrainian military paid $2,500 a month to keep each of the 1,300 units connected. Therefore, until September, the total cost increased to almost $20 million. Eventually, the military could no longer afford to pay for Starlink.


  1. On the war. 

The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of 4 November, 2022:

The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart the Donetsk offensive but will likely still fail to achieve operationally significant gains. Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported on November 4 that Russian forces have tripled the intensity of hostilities in certain sections of the front with up to 80 daily assaults.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are currently focusing those offensive operations in the direction of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk Oblast.[2] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of troops spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi stated on November 4 that Russian forces are likely trying to seize Bakhmut and Soledar in Donetsk Oblast so that Russia can declare some type of success by announcing the “liberation” of the Donbas (even though those gains would not give Russia control over the entire region).[3] Cherevatyi also noted the presence of mobilized men in the Bakhmut direction, an area that should not in principle see many mobilized personnel given the extensive presence in this area of Wagner Group and proxy units that should not be receiving large numbers of Russian reservists.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive pushes near Bakhmut and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast on November 3.[5] The apparent intensification of Russian assaults in Donetsk Oblast likely indicates that Russian forces are repeating that mistake throughout this section of the front. The increased quantity of personnel at frontline positions may allow Russian forces to achieve some gains in Donetsk Oblast, but poor training, logistics, and command will continue to prevent Russian forces from making operationally significant gains that would materially affect the course or outcome of the war.

Russian forces are setting conditions for a controlled withdrawal in northwestern Kherson Oblast, likely to avoid a disorderly rout from the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River. Russian forces will likely need to engage in a fighting withdrawal to prevent Ukrainian forces from chasing them onto the left (eastern) bank. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command corrected social media reports from November 3 regarding the destruction of civilian boats and piers along the Dnipro River.[6] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces are purposefully destroying civilian vessels and are restricting civilian use of watercraft and access to the shore. The corrected story likely corresponds with the reports of Russian forces preparing defensive positions on the left bank and the withdrawal of certain elements and suggests that Russian forces are eliminating ways for Ukrainian forces to chase them across the river during or after a withdrawal. Local Ukrainian sources also shared geolocated footage that reportedly showed the aftermath of the recent Russian destruction of a pedestrian bridge over the Inhulets River in Snihurivka (about 60km east of Mykolaiv City), which may also indicate Russian efforts to slow Ukrainian advances amidst a Russian withdrawal.[7]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue covert mobilization, which suggests that partial mobilization did not generate sufficient forces for Putin’s maximalist goals in Ukraine despite Putin’s claims to the contrary. Putin announced on November 4 that Russian forces mobilized 318,000 men of the 300,000 authorized due to the recruitment of volunteers during the mobilization period.[8] Putin added that Russia had already committed 49,000 men to combat missions. Putin’s claims of a successful and completed mobilization are inconsistent with his November 4 decree that allows Russian officials to mobilize citizens with outstanding convictions for some serious crimes.[9] Putin also signed decrees extending the status of servicemen to men serving in volunteer formations and outlining mobilization exemptions for citizens undergoing alternative service.[10] Such decrees likely indicate that Putin is preparing to continue covert mobilization in Russia by attempting to incentivize volunteer service or setting conditions to mobilize convicts—given that he has yet to sign an order terminating mobilization as of November 4.[11] Provisions authorizing the mobilization of prisoners may also indicate that Putin is trying to preempt social tensions by setting conditions to mobilize convicts instead of civilian Russian men.

Russian opposition and online outlets have reported that Russian authorities and businesses are preparing for a second mobilization wave by modernizing military recruitment centers and preparing lists of eligible men.[12] Rostov, Kursk, and Voronezh Oblast governors have also previously spoken about conducting a second wave of mobilization, and a few men reported receiving summonses for 2023.[13] While it is unclear if the Kremlin will double down on covert mobilization or initiate another mobilization wave, Putin’s decrees are indicative of the persistent force generation challenges that have plagued the Russian military campaign.

Russia’s costly force generation efforts will continue to weigh on the Russian economy and could ignite social tensions if the Kremlin does not fulfill its financial obligations to the participants of the “special military operation.” Putin signed a decree granting a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles (about $3,150) to mobilized men and individuals who had signed a contract after the declaration of partial mobilization on September 21.[14] By committing to pay mobilized men and giving the status of servicemen to volunteers the Kremlin is adding another financial burden to Russia’s economy.[15] Russian governors are already releasing statements attempting to justify delays in compensating mobilized men and their families citing budget issues and the need to finance supplies for Russian servicemen.[16] Failures to make payouts to mobilized men are already causing social tensions in Chuvash Republic, for example, where 1,800 men are demanding that the region immediately pay the promised 400 million rubles (about $6.5 million) to the mobilized population.[17]

Iran is likely already exploiting Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapons systems to request Russian assistance with its nuclear program. CNN reported on November 4 that unspecified US intelligence officials believe that Iranian officials have been asking Russia for help in acquiring additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication.[18] Nuclear fuel could allow Iran to shorten the breakout period to create a nuclear weapon depending on the kind of fuel and the kind of reactor for which it is being requested. CNN reported that it was unclear whether Russian officials had agreed to Iranian requests.[19] ISW has previously reported that Iranian plans to send more combat drones and possibly ballistic missile systems to Russia will likely strengthen Russia’s growing reliance on Iranian-made weapons systems.[20]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Yusov stated on November 4 that GUR has not received information confirming that Iranian missile systems have arrived in Russia despite intelligence that confirms the contract for the transfer of those systems.[21] Yusov also stated that another shipment of 200 Iranian-made combat drones to Russia is currently underway.[22] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov reported on November 4 that Russian forces have almost completely used up the first set of 300 combat drones from Iran.[23] Reznikov reported that Russia currently has contracts to receive 1,500 to 2,400 more Iranian-made combat drones, assuming Iran can fill the orders.[24] Russia’s growing reliance on these systems allows Iran to exert greater influence on Russian officials, and Iranian officials have already likely started to exploit that influence in support of its nuclear program. The Iranian requests for Russian assistance with its nuclear program may be an indicator of an intensifying Russian Iranian security partnership in which Iran and Russia are more equal partners.

Russian forces may be deploying extreme measures against deserting personnel in an attempt to respond to severe morale issues. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 4 that Russian forces in Ukraine probably have started deploying “barrier troops” and “blocking units”, units that threaten to shoot their own retreating personnel to compel offensives.[25] The UK MoD reported that Russian generals likely want their subordinate commanders to shoot deserters, including possibly authorizing personnel to shoot to kill their own deserting servicemen.[26] Desertion in the face of the enemy is a capital offense in many militaries, including America’s.[27] The deployment of designated units or individuals behind friendly lines to shoot deserters is nevertheless indicative of just how low the morale, discipline, and cohesion of Russian military forces in parts of Ukraine have become.

Key Takeaways

  • The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart its Donetsk offensive but will likely fail to achieve operationally significant gains.
  • Russian forces are setting conditions for an orderly withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River to avoid a rout in Kherson Oblast.
  • President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue mobilization covertly despite claims that partial mobilization produced sufficient forces.
  • Russia’s costly force generation measures will likely continue to weigh on the Russian economy and generate social tensions.
  • Iran is likely exploiting Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapon systems to request Russian assistance with its nuclear program.
  • Russian forces may be deploying extreme measures against deserting personnel in an attempt to respond to severe morale issues.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
  • Russian forces continued to prepare existing and new defensive lines in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
  • Russian forces continued forced evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian and occupation officials continued to set measures for the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation.

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