Moscow believes that this situation will continue more or less forever, but, the historian says, “the Kremlin is playing with fire. The present weakness of Ukraine is conditional. At its basis is the paralysis of the political will of the nation and not the absence of real resources for resistance.” Specifically, he says, “the unreadiness to fight must not be confused with the inability to do so.” Ukraine has options.“Russia [thus] supposes that it can allow itself to carry out practically any act of aggression without facing punishment except a really direct mass invasion of regular forces in Ukraine and the seizure of its main industrial centers.”
That situation ended only in November 1994 when Ukraine ratified the non-proliferation accord and sent these weapons to Russia. “The idea of Ukraine’s exit from the non-proliferation treaty is not new,” the historian says. Former Ukrainian Leonid Kuchma who signed it proposed doing so in 2015. The reason for his position and the justification for considering this possibility is that Ukraine’s decision to hand over the weapons to the Russian Federation was the Budapest Memorandum.“It is sufficient to recall,” Pastukhov says, “that for three years, from 1991 to 1994, it was a nuclear power, possessing the third largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world, an arsenal left to it from the USSR.”


Once they do, he says, “the situation could change in a significant way – and not at all in the direction Moscow assumes.” “But for this, three conditions must be met,” Pastukhov says.“Thus,” Pastukhov says, “Ukraine if it devoted the necessary effort could create a situation when it would be capable of inflicting on Russia unacceptable harm.” That possibility is going to become an increasing subject of discussion as Ukrainians recognize that the West isn’t coming.
- First, “the nation must experience the unbearable pain and shame of a catastrophic defeat,” the kind Moscow seems to want to inflict.
- Second, Ukrainians must “stop waiting for help from abroad.” That isn’t likely to come.
- And third, there must appear in Ukraine “a leader who is not going to compromise.”
Further Reading:
- Budapest memorandum: non-proliferation diplomacy twenty years later
- Non-fulfillment of Budapest Memorandum showed the absurdity of disarmament, Turchinov says
- Moscow refuses to discuss Budapest Memorandum
- Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding accusations of Russia’s violation of its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994
- Five reasons why supporting Ukraine is in the USA’s interests
- Was Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament a blunder?
- Russian aggression against Ukraine and international law: 25 key theses