
Three things make this difficult task even more so, Mozheyko says:The Belarusian state plays a role but hardly the lead one -- at least in public because “there is the need after Crimea to balance the influence of the Russian world with the other side” but that “any sharp move” away from Russian influence will have exactly the opposite impact that Minsk wants.
- “The absence of a tradition of a strong strategy of cultural policy,”
- “The infiltration of the state apparatus by supporters of the Russian world,” and
- “The previous policy which for many years was pointed in exactly the opposite direction.”
What one sees, he said, is that “the orientation toward Russia has not been reduced, the orientation toward Europe has not increased, and the process in the masses is not yet sufficiently developed to be felt … And Belarusianization has been de-depersonalized unlike, for example, Polish identity, which has an enormous number of names and events.”“This concerns us directly for you know that the ratings of the Russian media in Belarus are higher than those of Belarusian outlets,” he continued. And he argued that one still doesn’t feel any impact “in the mass consciousness” of the government’s support of “soft Belarusianization.”
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