After the declaration of independence in 1991, Ukraine inherited 800,000 forces from the Soviet Union. Not even in the worst nightmare could one imagine that 23 years later Ukraine would need to protect the right to its own existence and combat military aggression on its own territory with a force of 6,000 battle-ready soldiers and officers. In addition to a nearly million-strong army, Ukraine also inherited more than 6,100 tanks, 8,000 armored vehicles and 1,100 aircraft. The quantity and quality of heavy weapons in the Ukrainian Army were second only to American, Russian and Chinese armaments. In just two decades, this armada was “optimized”, “reduced”, “reformed” and “restructured” to a state of almost non-existent combat readiness. Thousands became rich through the destruction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but responsibility was shared by only a few individuals. So, what is the answer to our question? There is a clear answer, or rather… many answers, many names, decisions and inaction that led to catastrophic consequences. In our opinion, these names have been totally forgotten. We wish to remind our readers so that historical truth may be restored.Ground Forces manpower- 41,000; 20,000 should be ready… now I’m reporting the actual state of our army – only 6,000 are ready. - Ihor Teniukh, Acting Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada session, March 11, 2014
Kravchuk and Soviet legacy
President Leonid Kravchuk (first President of Ukraine-Ed.) laid the base for the collapse of the Armed Forces. Ukraine was in a hurry to get rid of its large army and went somewhat “too far”. The numbers were huge – the Verkhovna Rada decided to reduce the number of soldiers in the Army by 350,000, i.e. from 800,000 to 450,000. We wish to underline that we will not comment on political and economic conditions that influenced certain decisions; we will just assert facts.
Leonid Kravchuk – during his presidency (December 1991 to July 1994), Ukraine effectively got rid of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Giving up the strategic arsenal was part of political bargaining, but the relocation of tactical warheads to Russia in December 1991 was essentially Kravchuk’s fault. Not only did he not do anything to prevent it, but he did not even know that this was actually being done!
The launch of strategic nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine was fully controlled by Moscow until they were removed and relocated, so it is questionable whether their ownership can really be attributed to Ukraine. Tactical weapons were controlled by the commanders on the theater of operations, so it was absolutely necessary for Ukraine to preserve them. But, this was not done…
Another question concerned the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine's position on this issue went from “division on an equal footing” to “15-20% of the ships”. The final figure – 18.3% - was decided under Kuchma.