Ukrainian forces have recaptured more than 400 square kilometers of territory in a planned offensive on the Oleksandrivka axis—nearly clearing Dnipropetrovsk Oblast of Russian forces and marking the first time since the 2024 Kursk operation that Ukraine liberated more land in a month than Russia seized, Maj. Gen. Oleksandr Komarenko, head of the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, told RBC-Ukraine on 10 March.
The operation collapsed Russia's stated plan to create a buffer zone in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and forced Moscow to delay planned offensives, plug gaps in its defenses, and redeploy troops from other fronts, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on 9 March. Russia holds nearly a three-to-one troop advantage, but Ukraine's active operations are forcing it to react rather than advance.
February was also Russia's worst month for the pace of territorial advance since at least July 2024—a reversal that went largely unnoticed as international attention shifted to the crisis in the Middle East.
How the counteroffensive worked
The offensive combined two mutually supporting drives—one toward Huliaipole launched in late 2025 and the Oleksandrivka counterattack launched on 29 January 2026—carried out by Airborne Assault Forces with support from mechanized brigades.
Together, the two drives advanced 10 to 12 kilometers deep into Russian-held territory across the junction of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The Airborne Assault Forces grouping alone recaptured 285.6 square kilometers in February.
ISW assessed the operation could disrupt Russia's planned spring-summer 2026 offensive campaign.
An unexpected factor accelerated the gains. SpaceX's blocking of Russia's Starlink satellite connection in Ukraine in early February degraded Russian situational awareness and command-and-control on the Oleksandrivka axis, according to Ukraine's Airborne Assault Forces. Russian units, having lost Starlink, switched to large antennas mounted on high-rise rooftops—which expose their positions and make them easier targets for Ukrainian strikes.
The counteroffensive was made possible by a deliberate tradeoff. As EP reported in February, Kyiv pulled elite assault units—including the 425th Assault Regiment and its Australian-donated Abrams tanks—south from the Pokrovsk axis to reinforce the Huliaipole sector, accepting incremental losses in Donetsk in exchange for strategic gains in the southeast.
As of 10 March, only three small settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast remain to be cleared. Komarenko confirmed the goal Russia had been pursuing: "Their leadership constantly says they need the entire Donbas and a buffer zone. Their goal was to create a buffer zone in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast—that was their plan." That plan has now largely failed.
Pokrovsk: Russia's priority, Ukraine's kill zone
The most intense fighting continues around Hryshyne, Rodynske, and the Svitlye area, where Russian assault groups are trying to infiltrate deep into Ukrainian defenses. More than a third of all Russian attacks on the front are concentrated here, marking Pokrovsk as Moscow's top priority axis.
After seizing Pokrovsk following a two-year battle, Russian forces are now massing reserves for a fresh push. But the terrain works against the attackers, turning the area into a kill zone where assault groups absorb heavy losses.
The advance toward Mezhova and Dobropillia has stalled accordingly—though Russian forces captured Hryshyne, opening a potential path to Dobropillia.
Kostiantynivka: phosphorus, flooding, and civilian hunting
On 25 February, Russian forces destroyed the bridge and dam near Osykovo with a three-tonne guided aerial bomb, flooding the Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka-Novoselivka road—one of two key supply routes into Kostiantynivka.
Since then, Russian forces have continued striking dams northwest of the city, forcing Ukrainian units to withdraw from flooded positions into permanent buildings in Kostiantynivka—where they become easier targets. The dam strike was part of a broader strangulation strategy that EP documented in early February, after Russian forces failed to take the city by direct assault.
The situation has worsened. Border guard pilots filmed Russian forces shelling the city with phosphorus munitions—a prohibited weapon. FPV drones are now hunting the roughly 2,000 civilians who remain. The 28th Mechanized Brigade released footage of a civilian killed by a Russian FPV drone while trying to leave the city on a bicycle—the operator could clearly see the target was not military.
On the ground, units of the 100th Mechanized Brigade destroyed and drove out most Russian assault groups from Kostiantynivka's southwestern outskirts, partially stabilizing that sector.
In January, EP reported that after being repulsed from the east and south, Russian forces opened a new infiltration axis from the west toward a gap in Ukrainian lines—threatening the city's main supply route.
The pattern continues. Russian infiltration groups are penetrating the city in a manner similar to the force accumulation that preceded the fall of Pokrovsk's residential areas. Attack intensity dropped compared to February, according to the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, but the infiltration demands sustained attention to prevent the loss of a critical urban defense hub. EP reported on 6 March that the 100th Brigade drove out the infiltrators—but the slow strangulation continues.
Kramatorsk and Sloviansk: building up, but limited gains
Russian troops continue to build offensive capabilities toward the fortified cities of northern Donetsk Oblast. Assault operations were recorded near Mankivka, Pryvillia, and Lipivka, west of Nykyforivka. On the southern flank, Russian forces made minor advances near Makove. None brought meaningful tactical advantage.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine are strengthening Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and Dobropillia with additional defensive lines in the rear—preparing for a fight the Russians have not yet managed to bring to them.
Kharkiv: Russia's second buffer zone attempt
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In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian forces appear to be building a buffer zone along the border—the same concept Komarenko confirmed Russia was pursuing in Dnipropetrovsk.
EP documented the pattern in February: probe, flank, lose troops, repeat—with small bridgeheads established but no deeper breakthrough achieved for months.
After occupying the ruins of Vovchansk, Russian troops attempted to expand their zone of control: they stormed the village of Zybine east of Vovchansk without success, and after taking the abandoned village of Dehtiarne, pushed toward Kruhle along the Vovchansk-Zemlyanki road. Similar activity near Velykyi Burluk suggests Russian assault units are trying to move toward each other from separate axes to stitch together the zone Putin first declared in 2024.
Unlike in Dnipropetrovsk, this buffer zone effort has not yet been dislodged. Zelenskyy responded on 3 March by calling for a buffer zone on Russian territory instead—arguing that only pushing artillery out of range can protect Kharkiv.
Rotation and reinforcement
The High Command approved a plan to rotate units that have spent more than six months continuously on the front line. Personnel are being directly replenished and equipment added to brigades deployed in critical areas. For units like those defending Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk, fresh troops and gear could mean the difference between holding and gradual erosion.
500 prisoners exchanged, then Hungary turned it into a spectacle
On 4 and 6 March, Kyiv and Moscow exchanged 500 prisoners for 500, as agreed during negotiations in Geneva. Soldiers held captive for as long as four years, including defenders of Mariupol, returned to Ukraine.
The exchange was overshadowed by what followed. During a meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the transfer of two Ukrainian prisoners of war with Hungarian citizenship directly to Hungary. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry called the move a gross violation of international humanitarian law, a provocation, and a PR stunt ahead of Hungary's 12 April elections.
Then a more damaging detail emerged. One of the returned Ukrainian soldiers revealed that Hungary had been cooperating with Russia to offer Ukrainian prisoners from Transcarpathia their freedom—in exchange for propaganda.
"The condition was that I had to record a video in which I would speak negatively about the Ukrainian government and positively about Russia. I refused and therefore did not make it onto the list. Fortunately, in 2025, I was finally released from captivity."
The testimony fits a broader pattern. An EP article published 10 March documented a recurring cycle since 2018: provocation in Zakarpattia, amplification by Budapest, weaponization against Ukraine—preceding every major Hungarian veto.
With the opposition party TISZA leading Fidesz 55–35 in polls and six weeks to the vote, Orbán's government has intensified the cycle: deploying troops to the Ukrainian border on 27 February, blocking a €90 billion EU military loan, and vetoing the 20th sanctions package against Russia in the same week.
![A woman looks up at a Fidesz "Nemzeti Petíció" billboard in Hungary featuring a black-and-white image of Volodymyr Zelenskyy laughing, with the Hungarian text: "Ne hagyjuk, hogy Zelenszkij nevessen a vi[lágon]"—"Don't let Zelenskyy laugh at the [world]."](https://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Anti-Zelensky-Poster-Hungary-1.jpg)
The fabricated crises in Transcarpathia that help win Hungarian elections—and block Ukraine’s path to Europe.
Middle East crisis: draining Patriot missiles, filling Russia's coffers
The Iranian crisis has created an immediate problem for Kyiv: the reorientation of US and allied military resources risks reducing the supply of PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot air defense system—the only system in Ukraine's arsenal capable of intercepting Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
President Zelenskyy noted that in three days of Middle East operations, some 800 PAC-3 missiles were fired—more than Ukraine has received during the entire war. Germany has since delivered a batch of PAC-3 missiles to Ukraine, which Zelenskyy confirmed on 11 March—a partial but insufficient stopgap.
The crisis is also funding the enemy Ukraine is fighting. Russia earned an additional €6 billion ($6.9 billion) in oil revenue in the first two weeks of the US-Iran war as global energy prices spiked, according to a 12 March analysis by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). The Middle East conflict is simultaneously draining Ukraine's air defense supply and filling Russia's war chest.
But the same crisis has opened a window. Ukraine has three years of direct combat experience against Shahed-type drones, having built a multi-layered defense combining acoustic reconnaissance, electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, and aviation. Kyiv has publicly offered to share that expertise with partners now facing the same threat. Zelenskyy confirmed that Ukrainian specialists are already working in the Middle East.
The offer extends beyond advice—Ukraine is positioning its defense technology, including interceptor drones, as exportable solutions that could be traded for the Patriot missiles its own air defense desperately needs.
