Ukrainian forces are pressing simultaneous counterattacks across multiple sectors — from Kupiansk in the northeast to western Zaporizhzhia in the south — generating effects that ISW assessed on March 9 are now forcing the Russian command to make operational and strategic-level decisions in response to what began as local tactical setbacks.
In the Kupiansk direction, geolocated footage published March 8 confirms a Ukrainian advance in western Podoly, east of the city, where Russian forces were observed shelling a newly occupied Ukrainian position — itself an indicator of the advance, according to ISW. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger separately claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupiansk itself. Russian forces continued attacking southeast of the city toward Kurylivka and near Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi on March 8 and 9, while the Ukrainian General Staff reported striking a Russian manpower concentration near Petropavlivka on March 8. Russian milbloggers have continued to criticize official messaging on the sector, with one writing that Kupiansk remains a "sore subject" but that authorities have decided to portray the situation as "neutral."
In the adjacent Borova direction, Russian forces attacked near Oleksandrivka and Korovii Yar on March 8 and 9 but did not advance.
In southern Ukraine, Ukrainian counterattacks in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast have effectively halted the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces, which includes the 58th Combined Arms Army. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported March 9 that the grouping has "virtually halted" near Orikhiv and south of Zaporizhzhia City. According to Mashovets, Ukrainian forces retook Novoyakolivka and northern Lukyanivske and pushed Russian units back from northern and central Prymorske. Russian attempts to advance near Orikhiv — attacking toward Bilohirya, Mala Tokmachka, Robotyne, Danylivka, and Mali Shcherbaky — have produced no results.
The stalled southern drive reflects a broader Russian operational failure, according to ISW. The command had planned for advances in the Hulyaipole direction to complement progress near Orikhiv, setting conditions for a converging assault on Zaporizhzhia City. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment in the Hulyaipole direction stated March 8 that Russian plans to seize the city are "part of a broader plan" to advance westward across Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian counterattacks in late January disrupted that momentum before it could be consolidated, and ISW assessed that Russian forces' failure to hold newly captured ground after infiltration-tactic advances left them exposed. "Ukrainian forces' ability to take advantage of these Russian mistakes has likely deprived Russian forces of the starting offensive positions from which they intend to launch a summer offensive," ISW wrote.
The effects are cascading across the theater. Mashovets assessed that the Dnepr GoF may need to draw forces from Kherson Oblast to stabilize western Zaporizhzhia — a move he described as difficult given prior redeployments of VDV and assault elements to Donetsk's Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka directions. ISW assessed March 7 that the Russian command had already laterally redeployed elite VDV and naval infantry from Donetsk Oblast to the south in response to Ukrainian gains in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions — a shift that may compromise the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine's Fortress Belt. A Russian milblogger claimed March 9 that elements of the 137th VDV Regiment were moved from Sumy Oblast to Kherson, then rushed back after creating what the blogger called a "critical situation" near Yunakivka; ISW said it could not independently verify the report.
ISW noted that Russian forces have already drawn on operational reserves simply to sustain ongoing combat, "likely including in the Kupiansk where Ukraine has conducted a series of successful counterattacks." The institute assessed that "the Kremlin will likely need either to abandon or to substantially adjust previous plans for its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — either in Donetsk Oblast or in Zaporizhzhia Oblast or both," adding that "the Russian military simply does not have the capacity to overrun Ukrainian defenses that Russian President Vladimir Putin constantly claims."
On the order of battle across the northern sectors, ISW identified fiber optic FPV drone operators of the 7th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army) striking Ukrainian howitzers south of Kurylivka; FPV operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army, Leningrad Military District) targeting Ukrainian artillery in the Kupiansk direction; elements of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) operating in the Kupiansk area; and FPV operators of the 1432nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA) striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles near Bohuslavka, north of Borova.
