On 3 January 2026, President Trump ordered a large-scale military strike against Venezuela — a sovereign nation that posed no threat to the United States.
Like President Putin on 24 February 2022, Trump launched an armed aggression against an independent country in gross violation of the UN Charter. Not because of an imminent danger, but because Venezuela has resources crucial for great power competition. And because the United States — like Russia — seeks to restore its pre-eminence in what it considers its sphere of influence.
"With President Trump, the US are abandoning the rules-based order that has shaped us since 1945," said Roderich Kiesewetter, a prominent German conservative MP. "The coup in Venezuela marks a return to the old US doctrine from before 1940: a mindset of thinking in terms of spheres of influence, where the law of force rules, not international law."
He added: "Trump is destroying what was left of any trust in the US"
The Venezuela strike did not come from nowhere. It followed a year in which Trump consistently demonstrated that he trusts Putin over allies, intelligence services, and evidence — and treats Ukraine's president with contempt. Now he is not merely trusting Putin. He is acting like him.
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The pattern
In February 2022, just before the full-scale invasion, Trump described Putin's declaration of breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as "genius" and "savvy." He characterized Putin's move to send troops into these areas as "peacekeepers" as "very smart."
In early 2025, Trump stated he understood Putin's concerns about NATO, claiming Putin had repeatedly emphasized that NATO should not be associated with Ukraine. He argued that the Biden administration's openness to Ukraine joining NATO effectively brought the alliance to Russia's "doorstep" — which he believed led to the war.
Since his inauguration on 20 January 2025, Trump has repeatedly stated that Putin "wants peace," that Russia is "ready to negotiate," and that the war could end quickly if Ukraine and Europe were "realistic." Putin is framed as a rational actor pursuing legitimate security interests — an equal, deserving of respect, caution, and deference.
On 29 December, the Kremlin accused Ukraine of attacking Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast with 91 strike drones. No evidence was presented. The claim conflicted with initial reports from the Russian General Staff. No residents near the alleged target heard drones or air defense systems.
Trump believed it anyway.
"President Putin told me about it early in the morning. He said he was attacked. It's no good," Trump said. "I was very angry about it."
When asked whether US intelligence had provided evidence of the attack, Trump acknowledged the matter was being investigated. "You're saying maybe the attack didn't take place. That's possible too, I guess. But President Putin told me this morning it did."
US intelligence has since confirmed that Putin's residence was not targeted. Neither NSA nor CIA found evidence of the alleged attack. Only on 5 January did Trump concede "he doesn't believe" that Ukraine struck the residence.
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Talking down to Zelenskyy
Zelenskyy receives different treatment.
During their meeting at the White House on 28 February 2025, Trump accused Zelenskyy of "gambling with the lives of millions of people. You're gambling with World War III."
"You're either going to make a deal, or we're out," Trump told him. He added that Ukraine "didn't have the cards" and was losing the war. Then: "The problem is, I've empowered you to be a tough guy, and I don't think you'd be a tough guy without the United States."
In March, when Zelenskyy said a deal to end the war was "very far away," Trump responded: "America will not put up with it for much longer." He accused Zelenskyy of not wanting peace as long as he had American backing — then ended US defense, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
In April, he accused Zelenskyy of "sabotaging" peace talks by refusing to cede Crimea, calling his constitutional defense of the territory "inflammatory."
These statements came during ongoing large-scale Russian missile and drone strikes, continued Russian territorial expansion, and repeated Russian rejection of peace proposals.
Policy matches rhetoric
Trump's pressure is asymmetrical. Ukraine is told to negotiate, compromise, be flexible. Russia receives the opposite treatment: sanctions relief, diplomatic reset, and business opportunities floated as incentives.
Since Trump's inauguration, Russia has escalated long-range drone strikes fivefold, intensified attacks on Ukraine's energy sector, and expanded its "human safari" — FPV drone attacks on civilians. The number of civilian casualties is increasing. Recently, Russia began attacking foreign civilian ships carrying Ukrainian agricultural exports.
Trump does not address Russia's demand for NATO to withdraw to its 1997 borders or its ever-escalating hybrid war against the Alliance. He does not publicly accuse Putin of lying and does not treat Russian aggression as evidence of bad faith.
In strategic signaling, what is not said matters as much as what is.
What trust looks like
Trump never uses the word "trust." But his behavior fits the intelligence definition.
- Credence: He believes Putin's stated goals over observable facts.
- Reliance: His foreign policy depends on the assumption that Putin can be dealt with.
- Discounting deception: He consistently minimizes the possibility that Putin is stalling or preparing escalation.
He questions US intelligence assessments, criticizes European leaders as "emotional" or "biased," and suggests Ukraine exaggerates threats. He applies none of this skepticism to Putin's claims.
Call it what you will. In practice, this is trust.
From trust to imitation
Trump's approach assumed Putin wants a deal more than leverage, stability more than advantage, peace more than victory. The Venezuela strike reveals something more troubling: Trump doesn't just trust Putin's worldview. He shares it.
Both leaders now operate on the same principle — that great powers' national interests take precedence over international law, and military might makes right.
While Trump never formally declared support for a "US–China–Russia multipolar world," his policies and dismantling of alliances amount to effective endorsement — one where great powers negotiate among themselves and smaller nations lose agency.
Chatham House analysts noted that "Russia will use US actions to bolster its justifications for its invasion of Ukraine." The rules-based order that once distinguished Western democracies from authoritarian aggressors is being dismantled — by Washington.
If the US can invade Venezuela for resources and regional dominance, Greenland's strategic minerals and Arctic position follow the same logic.
The likelihood of American coercion—or occupation— of Greenland has shifted from theoretical to plausible.
The transatlantic chasm
European reactions to the Venezuela strike have been striking in their restraint — and their language.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot condemned the strikes as illegal: "The military operation that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro violates the principle of not resorting to force, which underpins international law."
Austrian Vice Chancellor Andreas Babler said Europe is seeing the world "move backward geopolitically," with international structures "disintegrating before our very eyes."
The EU stopped short of condemnation but pointedly stressed that "the principles of international law and the UN Charter must be respected" — language identical to what Europe uses when criticizing Russia.
Trump's policy has produced an outcome that would have seemed absurd a year ago: the aggressor, the victim, and now America's traditional allies all question whether NATO — and the United States — can be trusted.
Credibility collapse
A recent poll shows 49% of Americans "somewhat" or "strongly" disapprove of Trump's handling of the Russia-Ukraine war. Only 30% support his approach.
Globally, positive views of the US fell in 15 of 24 countries surveyed in mid-2025. The sharpest declines came in Mexico (−32 points), Sweden (−28), Poland (−22), and Canada (−20).
Ukrainian perceptions have shifted most dramatically. In December 2024, more than 44% of Ukrainians trusted Trump. By April 2025, 89% did not.
What comes next
European intelligence services assess that an open confrontation with Russia is possible within 2027–30.
Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service assessed in February that Russia "will likely be more willing to use military force in a regional war against one or more European NATO countries if Russia perceives NATO as militarily weakened or politically divided."
If the Ukraine war stops or freezes and NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, the Danish Intelligence assessed Russia could launch a local war against a neighboring country within six months. Regional war against NATO Baltic states: two years. Large-scale European war without US involvement: five years.
The transatlantic rift is empowering Russia. The present-day US has been manipulated into believing Russia waged a 12-year war for a small part of Ukraine — failing to recognize the implications of the December 2021 ultimatums. Russia seeks Great Power status, strategic parity with the US, and a zone of influence over parts of NATO's area of responsibility.
Europe is mobilizing. The continent now faces two strategic adversaries: Russia and the United States. European allies — led by the UK, France, and Germany — have intensified consultations to coordinate support for Ukraine without relying solely on Washington. The US has accused them of "sabotaging" the peace process.
Ukrainian expectations have shifted toward alternative security models. The Coalition of Like-Minded countries may prove more attractive than a NATO without American credibility — after all, Ukraine's most important European partners share the perception of Russia as an existential threat.
Once Europe achieves strategic autonomy, there is no returning to dependence on the United States.
Europe is learning who its friends are. And who they are not.
