Russia imported 14% more food in 2025 while slashing purchases of industrial machinery by nearly 9%. For the first time, full-year data quantifies a trade-off Western policymakers have long hoped to force: Moscow is eating its seed corn, feeding the population today rather than equipping the factories that build tomorrow’s weapons.
Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service released the figures on 4 January. They land as evidence that Western sanctions and Ukrainian strikes are working—not by collapsing Russia’s economy overnight, but by forcing choices that degrade its war machine over time.
With energy earnings down 34% and the National Wealth Fund depleted from $185 billion to $35.7 billion, Russia faced a choice: groceries or machines. The Kremlin chose groceries.
The numbers
Investment goods imports—machinery, equipment, and vehicles—fell 8.7% in 2025. Consumer goods moved in the opposite direction: food imports increased by 14.2%, and chemical products rose by 2.6%.
Energy’s share of Russian exports dropped to 54.9% from 61.6% the previous year. Nothing replaced the lost revenue. Agricultural exports, once considered sanctions-proof, fell by 10.3%.
Even China is buying less.
Meanwhile, the tanker fleet willing to carry Russian oil is shrinking—Greek-operated vessels, which accounted for 24% of Russian crude voyages in June, dropped to just 10% by November.
Even China is buying less. Russian oil exports to Beijing dropped 7.6%; coal shipments fell 11%.
Why the West should care
The machinery decline hits where it hurts most: Russia’s ability to sustain weapons production.
Russia’s machine tool industry relies on foreign equipment for 98.3% of its sophisticated, computerized machines, according to a report by Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service in April.
These CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machines—computer-controlled tools that cut metal parts with extreme precision—are essential for making missiles, tanks, and aircraft. No CNC machines, no modern weapons at scale.
Chinese equipment can’t match the precision of German or Japanese counterparts.
The EU has banned the export of CNC machine tools, advanced semiconductors, and specialized refinery equipment. China now supplies 71% of Russia’s machine tools—up from 20% before the invasion—but Chinese equipment can’t match the precision of German or Japanese counterparts.
By mid-2024, Russia had already spent $18.2 billion on machine tools and components through evasion networks in Türkiye, China, and Central Asia, according to Ukraine’s Economic Security Council. The actual figure must now be significantly higher.
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Chips from dishwashers
The machinery crisis mirrors an acute shortage in microchips. An investigation by OSINT for Ukraine catalogued over 5,000 foreign components across nearly 200 Russian weapon systems, including Texas Instruments and Analog Devices chips in Iskander missiles and Xilinx components in cruise missiles.
Some weapons have been found containing chips harvested from dishwashers and refrigerators.
Hong Kong front companies, Turkish intermediaries, Malaysian logistics firms, and Kyrgyz banks keep chips flowing.
Over 70% of Russia’s semiconductors now come from China—but that creates its own problems. Russian sources report 40% failure rates on Chinese chips, compared to 2% on Western components before the war.
Hong Kong front companies, Turkish intermediaries, Malaysian logistics firms, and Kyrgyz banks keep chips flowing—but smuggling can’t replace reliable supply chains at scale.
The price of survival
These networks keep factories running. But they cannot reverse the underlying economics.
Ukrainian strikes on refineries have forced a revenue collapse, making these trade-offs inevitable. The Kremlin budgeted for $70 oil; it got $35. China refused Moscow’s request for macroeconomic support—the kind of help the EU gave Ukraine. Instead, Chinese companies are exploiting a buyer with no alternatives.
Russia is being forced to choose between feeding its people and arming its military.
The World Bank projects 0.8% growth for Russia in 2026. The number of registered businesses has fallen to 3.17 million—its lowest count since 2010.
For Western policymakers debating whether sanctions work, the 2025 trade data offers an answer: Russia is being forced to choose between feeding its people and arming its military. Nearly four years into its war against Ukraine, Moscow is choosing food—and stuffing missiles with chips from kitchen appliances.
That is what slow strangulation looks like.
