- The battle for Huliaipole ended quickly as outgunned, outnumbered Ukrainian territorials retreated
- But the defeat wasn't necessarily the territorials' fault
- Wider problems with Ukrainian command and recruitment mean many front-line formations fight on their own and with no chance of relief
Outnumbered, outgunned Ukrainian territorial troops broke and ran in Huliaipole—once the anchor of Ukrainian defenses in Zaporizhzhia Oblast—just before Christmas. The Russian 57th Motor Rifle Brigade marched into the town, likely capturing all or most of it. If there are still Ukrainian troops in Huliaipole, they're probably clinging to the western outskirts.
The shockingly swift battle for Huliaipole—it lasted just weeks—was a defeat for the 102nd and 106th Territorial Defense Brigades, which formed the main garrison in the town. But that doesn't necessarily mean the defeat was the territorials' fault.
"These troops held their positions for a long time and suffered extremely heavy losses over recent months, yet were not rotated to the rear for rest and reconstitution," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team noted. "Holding positions under such conditions eventually became almost impossible, especially when Russian forces intensified their pressure."
The territorials may have been the victims of circumstances beyond their control: the lack of a coherent, unified command among Ukrainian forces in southeastern Ukraine, and the deliberate decision on the part of Ukrainian commanders to prioritize other efforts—the Ukrainians' fighting withdrawal in Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad and their counteroffensive in Kupiansk, to name two.
More than anything else, however, the critical factor in the failed defense of Huliaipole is the main factor shaping all Ukrainian command dilemmas all along the 1,100-km front line of Russia's 35-month wider war on Ukraine: Russia has enough troops to sustain its war effort; Ukraine doesn't.
No rotation, no relief: how the 102nd and 106th were ground down
The 102nd and 106th Territorial Defense Brigades struggled for months to defend the fields and villages east of Huliaipole as well as the vital road threading north toward the village of Dobropillia. As the Russians consolidated their control over Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in neighboring Donetsk Oblast and fell back in Kupiansk farther north in Kharkiv Oblast, the Ukrainian command was able to chop additional forces to the Dobropillia-Huliaipole sector, including several elite assault regiments and brigades.
But it was too little, too late. On 17 December, an assault group from the 57th Motor Rifle Brigade infiltrated into central Huliaipole. The battered remnants of the 102nd and 106th Territorial Defense Brigades fell back. But the territorials may not have had much choice.
Yes, the assault units that rushed toward Huliaipole starting in November helped, but they were "unable to fully stabilize the situation," CIT reported.
Russians capture Ukrainian battalion command post in Huliaipole with laptops still running
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Command chaos: battalions swapped between brigades mid-battle
The Ukrainian defenders were disorganized and poorly led. "One of the main problems in this direction is chaos in command and control, which is exacerbated by the practice of attaching individual battalions to other brigades," CIT explained. "For example, one of the battalions of the 106th [Territorial Defense] Brigade deployed in the Sumy direction was transferred to the operational control of the 102nd Territorial Defense Brigade."
Ukraine's new corps structure, which was supposed to organize brigades into balanced groupings with consistent overall command, is a year old. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced the transition in early February 2025. But the various corps are still swapping brigades and battalions between them in a way that defeats the purpose of the reforms. To be fair, many of the most heavily committed corps have too few troops—and have no choice but to borrow forces.
As long as Ukraine struggles to recruit enough fresh troops to replace losses and build up a meaningful reserve, the problems are likely to persist. The wider crises in Ukrainian manpower and command aren't the fault of the troops on the front line, including the survivors of the defeated 102nd and 106th Territorial Defense Brigades.
But those crises are certainly the front-line troops' problem. Lacking reinforcement, relief, and coherent leadership, the defenders—and the settlements they defend—ultimately pay the price for the dysfunction much higher up the Ukrainian chain of command.
