Russia is covertly collecting mobile SIM cards from European countries and plugging them into their Shahed drones to make these weapons deadlier, according to an investigation by the Molfar Intelligence Institute.
This tech was tested in Kazakhstan before being unleashed against Ukraine. By harnessing civilian 4G networks, the Shaheds can better evade air defenses and tell the Russians where these defenses are concentrated.
This helps Russia conduct its terror strikes against Ukraine’s civilians and infrastructure, to kill people and plunge the country into cold and darkness.
But Russia’s designs may extend beyond Ukraine — Moscow may be preparing for drone operations against European countries.
Molfar reviewed Russia’s operation to acquire European SIM cards and found that the list closely matches the countries whose airspace was violated by unknown drones in Fall 2025.
“The internal documents and the SIM-card purchase records show that Russia was using cards from a wide range of countries to test its drones,” Molfar wrote.
“That list of mobile operators almost exactly matches the countries where ‘unidentified’ drones were spotted.”
How the SIM card trackers work
In the opening days of the full-scale invasion, Russian commanders were lambasted for trying to use unsecured mobile phones on Ukrainian networks to communicate, causing some of them to blunder into traps. The Russians have come a long way since then.
4G modems are part of the Shaheds’ GPS navigational package. Adding functional SIM cards allows these drones to connect to Ukrainian (and other countries') data networks.
These trackers are able to send information back to Russia through these networks, possibly employing Telegram bots for this purpose, according to Ukrainian engineers.
Russian operators are able to track the drone’s speed, altitude and location. Shaheds’ onboard cameras can take pictures of their surroundings, then beam them back to their handlers through the network.
If a connection goes down, the Russians can mark off the area as a potential site of Ukrainian air defense or electronic warfare.
Most Shaheds are made at the sprawling Alabuga factory complex in Russia's Tatarstan region. According to the investigation, Alabuga staff tested these trackers, which performed “exactly as intended.”
However, further testing was required in the field, which is why Russian operatives went to Kazakhstan.
Field testing in Kazakhstan and Türkiye
In March, an object closely resembling an intact Shahed was discovered in Kazakhstan's Taskala district, which borders Russia, according to reports by Kazakh media. This is most likely a relic of Russia’s weapons tests there.
Molfar's investigation found that a 20-year-old Russian operative named Timur Konovalov was involved in the testing operation.
Konovalov is an employee at Alabuga and a student at Alabuga Polytech, a school linked to combat drone production, which issues state-recognized diplomas.
Internal documents obtained by Molfar found that Konovalov had traveled to China and Kazakhstan before being assigned to test if the trackers were working properly on Kazakhstan’s territory in July 2024.
“Kazakhstan, [which is] ‘friendly’ to Russia, was a convenient testing ground to see how SIM cards from non-Russian mobile operators would work with drones outside of Russia,” Molfar wrote. It is unclear if the Kazakh government was in on the plan.
Alabuga representatives subsequently tested their navigation equipment in Türkiye, around February 2025, traveling to Istanbul under the guise of tourism.
The employees were instructed not to draw the attention of Turkish intelligence, to flush the SIM cards down the toilet if they were discovered, and to call an Alabuga security officer codenamed “Uncle Sergey” if they were detained.
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Collecting SIM cards from across Europe
Molfar’s examination of the use of Shahed drones suggests that the Russians know “exactly where to get Ukrainian SIM cards.”
Getting them in Ukraine is complicated by Ukrainian security services that track down and detain anyone trying to buy local SIM cards and pass them to the Russians. “That may be why it is easier for them to obtain and use SIM cards from European mobile operators,” Molfar wrote.
Institute analysts got their hands on Russian tables listing mobile operators in multiple European countries, the SIM cards these operators use, their prices, and terms of service.
“The Russians planned to buy these SIM cards either for testing or for use on Shahed drones in 2024,” according to the investigation.
The specific cards involved in the tests came from Russia’s Tele2 network, as well as the European GlobalSIM network that Russians often use while abroad. Other tests included cards from Luxembourg's MTX, China's CSL and Lithuania's Ezys.
“Notably, Timur Konovalov had brought GlobalSIM and Ezys cards to Kazakhstan in July 2024, suggesting that those earlier tests were particularly successful,” the investigation found.
According to a draft internal document, Alabuga officials created a plan to buy 2,000 activated and topped up SIM cards registered to real people. The operation was placed in the hands of then 17-year-old Ayaz Mansurov, another student from Alabuga Polytech.
Testing Europe’s security and resolve
In late 2025, unidentified drones were detected in Poland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Finland, and Lithuania. A number were spotted near military sites, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
In Belgium, whose government is currently blocking Ukraine from receiving frozen Russian funds, unidentified drones have been detected on an increasingly-frequent basis, forcing two airports to halt operations in early November.
These incidents are separate from Russian drones’ violation of the airspace of Poland and Romania on 10 September.
“The Russian defence industry is taking every opportunity to test these improvements: acquiring foreign mobile SIM cards, sending personnel on covert trips abroad and even testing weapons on the territory of other sovereign states,” Molfar wrote.
“The full-scale war in Ukraine has shown that halting Russia’s military machine is far from easy — a reality that has also given Moscow new opportunities, including testing the patience of democratic Europe.”
