Russo-Ukrainian War. Day 318: Bombing continues despite Putin’s Christmas “ceasefire”

1. On the war. 

The Institute for the Study of War has made the following assessment as of  January 6, 2023:

Putin war aims unchanged but lacks manpower, morale -Pentagon, Reuters reports. “President Vladimir Putin’s aim of seizing Ukrainian territory has not changed, but Russian forces continue to suffer from military weaknesses including the amount of troops they have, the Pentagon said on Friday, as Washington hopes the latest record weapons package for Kyiv will help Ukraine retake territory occupied by Russia.

Putin has not given up his aims of dominating Ukraine and continuing to acquire Ukraine’s territory, said Laura Cooper, a deputy assistant secretary of defence focusing on Russia and Ukraine. But the reality of Russian weaknesses, the Russian armed forces weaknesses has collided with those aims, Cooper said, adding that Russian troops also suffer from low morale.”

New Armored Vehicles Will Help Ukraine Take the Fight to Russia, The New York Times reports. “They will soon be covered in mud, riddled with shrapnel damage and under fire on Ukraine’s battlefields. But the three new types of armored vehicles offered to Ukraine this week signal that the Western allies are gearing up for another bloody year as the war enters a new phase of Ukrainian offensives against dug-in Russian forces.

Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian government is ecstatic: “The time of weapons taboo has passed,” the foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, said in a Facebook post, welcoming the new lethal equipment. Russia is furious: The new vehicles are “another step toward an escalation of the Ukrainian conflict,” the embassy in Berlin decried in a statement.

And frontline troops are cynical, often complaining that while the allies are not letting them lose, they aren’t letting them win, either.

But the new weapons seem to mark a policy change in Washington, Paris and Berlin, giving more lethal support to the Ukrainian infantry, indicating less anxiety about Russian escalation and angling for more decisive Ukrainian victories in 2023.

The trilateral decision clarifies Western support for Ukraine for a potential offensive in the months to come, said Ulrich Speck, a German foreign policy analyst. And it signals Moscow that we’re not on the trajectory to peace negotiations soon. The decision also reflects a temperature change in major Western capitals and a reduction in the fear factor, a sense that a diminished Russia is less able or willing to escalate, Mr. Speck said.

The French AMX-10s, German Marders and the US M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles will enter the war on the heels of two successful Ukrainian offensives that pushed Russian forces from the country’s northeast and the south. The new vehicles, known as infantry, or armored, fighting vehicles, are almost certainly intended to spearhead any future attempts to push the Russians out of Ukraine. […]

The new equipment will be arriving just in time. After more than 10 months of bloody fighting, Ukraine’s Soviet-era vehicles that mirror the capabilities of the AMX, M2 and Marder have been slowly destroyed and damaged, according to Ukrainian troops and a US official.

But if not sent in large numbers, the recent armored additions will likely change little on the broader battlefield and add to Ukraines growing logistics burden, as Ukrainian mechanics struggle with a diverse fleet of vehicles that each have their own parts and ammunition requirements.

The trio of vehicles are not the first armored vehicles sent by the West to Ukraine, but they are arguably the most advanced, occupying a category of war machines that are not quite armored personnel carriers, though some can carry troops, and not quite tanks.

The AMX-10 has a 105-millimeter cannon. The M2 Bradley can be fitted with a 25-millimeter cannon and an anti-tank guided missile. The Marder is typically fitted with a 20-millimeter gun. The three different vehicles use different ammunition types, meaning more of a logistics headache for the Ukrainian troops using them. The French one runs on large tires; the others on treads.

But the Bradley and Marder can both carry troops, making them critical for any kind of future Ukrainian offensive operations against Russia’s defenses along a front line that stretches more than 600 miles and has, in recent weeks, mostly stabilized after being reinforced by newly mobilized troops.

Ukraine has been pressing its Western allies regularly for more sophisticated infantry equipment, including armored infantry fighting vehicles and top-of-the-line Western tanks, like the American Abrams and the German Leopard II. But Washington, Paris and Berlin have been cautious […].

American officials have argued that Ukraine has enough good tanks in its Soviet-era T-72s, though it is running short of ammunition for them. The Americans and Germans argue that to train Ukrainians to operate modern Leopard or Abrams tanks — and to maintain them in the field — would take many months. The logistics chain needed for a fuel-guzzling tank like the Abrams is also extensive, added a US official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss tactical matters.

Currently, Ukrainian forces are using their Soviet-era tanks in more of a support role, keeping them protected behind the lines and employing their large main guns like artillery. They often rely on armored personnel carriers to move troops quickly in offensive maneuvers. […]

“It’s another step forward for Germany, which has been going one step at a time since Feb. 24,” said Ulrike Franke, a German defense expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Ukraine has been asking for these weapons since April, she said, but for Germany it was a self-imposed taboo. In Berlin, “we keep having these slightly absurd debates — offensive versus defensive, light versus heavy, modern versus old — and then a few months later we change our lines again, she said. It’s an important evolution, mostly in the German imagination, she said.

But it is also a bad look for the Franco-German relationship, she said, looking either like Berlin needs a push from Paris or that the two countries can’t work well together, with Mr. Macron pre-empting matters on his own.”

Russia prepares for escalation in February, asking for a new Minsk agreement, Ukrainska Pravda reported on 4 January, citing Suspilne. “Oleksii Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, has said that Russia is getting ready for an escalation of the situation on the front line in February, while Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration, is having meetings with Europeans and trying to persuade them to sign “peace deals” akin to Minsk-3 [a series of international agreements which sought to end the conflict in Donbas].

Danilov is sure that Ukraine will have powerful weapons at its disposal: “Sooner or later, we will have powerful tanks, completely different planes, and this will happen in the near future.”

Commander of Kyiv defence forces explains why it will be difficult for Russians to advance beyond the border with Belarus, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavliuk, the Commander of Kyiv defence forces. “We have formed a group, which is ready to meet Russian forces with dignity on the border with Belarus. Kyiv Oblast has been quite prepared for possible new offensive: these are several lines around Kyiv with a total length of about 1,000 km, where a powerful defence system has been created based on fortification positions and long-term defensive structures; it will be impossible to pass through it easily.”

Pavliuk has noted that Russians would not be able to move past the Ukraine-Belarus border, as it is “full of rubble and minefields”. In addition, artillery fire, work of sniper groups and mobile fire groups is planned [to fire on – ed.] them, he said, adding that we do not plan to let them pass beyond the border.”

On Thursday, 5 January, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus said that personnel, weapons, military and special equipment of the Russian armed forces would continue to arrive in Belarus.”

Russia prepares for a new wave of mobilisation in January – General Staff, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. “To maintain its offensive capabilities and replenish its losses, Russian forces continues to carry out mobilisation measures.

The military and political leadership of the Russian Federation is implementing measures to prevent the mass departure of men of conscription age abroad before the next wave of mobilisation, which is expected in January this year. A complete ban on crossing the state border for men of conscription age cannot be ruled out.”

Defence Minister Reznikov: There is no need for mass mobilisation in Ukraine, Ukrainska Pravda reports. “Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s Defence Minister, has stated that there is no need to conduct a mass mobilisation in Ukraine yet, although the situation may change.

We are recruiting, and we are replenishing. Unfortunately, there are also losses. We are replenishing those losses in our combat brigades, and we are hiring particular specialists that we need for certain tasks, but I do not see the need for such a mass mobilisation as of today.”

Russia transfers another 50 military vehicles to Belarus, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus. “Another convoy with servicemen and military equipment, which are part of the RGT [regional grouping of troops, the joint force deployed by Russia and Belarus – ed.], has arrived in the Republic of Belarus. The convoy is currently being unloaded.

Belaruski Hajun noted that many Russian trucks that arrived in Belarus have the Z mark on them [a typical symbol that became strongly associated with Russian military aggression – ed.].

On  28 December, Serhii Deineko, the Head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, reported that currently, Russia deployed a group of 10,200 troops in Belarus and that this number was not enough for an attack on Ukraine.

On 2 January, it was reported that Russia and Belarus extended the training of the regional joint force of the so-called Union State [Russia and Belarus] until at least 8 January.

On 5 January, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence asserted that personnel, weapons, military and special equipment of the Russian armed forces will continue to arrive in Belarus. The Belarusian army received another 34 armoured vehicles from Russia, which were sent to the Brest district of Belarus.”

Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council make a forecast for 2023: Ukrainian troops to launch an offensive, Ukrainska Pravda reports. “Oleksii Danilov, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), anticipates the beginning of an “offensive war” for Ukraine in 2023.

 Danilov reports that the Ukrainian army will enjoy the supplies of weapons received from Western allies: M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, Marder armoured personnel carriers, Bastion armoured personnel carriers, AMX-10 RC armoured vehicles, Patriot air defence systems “and many other things – less public and not public at all.”

According to Danilov, “Ukraine’s missile and drone program” will have its own role on battlefields as well. The NSDC Secretary reiterated that Western weapons in the hands of Ukrainians had changed the course of the war in their favour.”

With false flag attack on churches on Christmas, Russia aims to put blame on Ukraine, Ukrinform reports, citing Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk. “They intend to commit terrorist attacks outside churches, where there will be large crowds, and blame Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian Army. We understand this, so we act preventively. We warn our people and explain to them the threat of such actions by Russian forces. Don’t believe a single word uttered by occupiers; if possible, refrain from attending church services in the areas where shelling continues because the occupier will use people as the target of terrorist attacks, said Vereshchuk.

According to the Vice PM, information about the intentions of Russian invaders to once again commit evil had been received from intelligence sources. The senior official urged Ukrainians to be especially vigilant during holidays.”

 

1. Consequences and what to do? 

Martin Herem: We must be ready for the next phase of Russian aggression, ERR.ee reports. We naturally have to focus on Ukrainian victory right now, since this is the primary and inevitable goal on the way to securing a better future, Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) commander Lieutenant General Martin Herem writes. This is, however, only the first goal. Second, we have to be prepared for Russia’s next aggression against us in Estonia, against our allies and our values, Herem continues.

We are all waiting for the end of the war between Ukraine and Russia. It is widely believed that, in order to end the conflict, the Russian Federation must withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory. This includes eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This is what we all desire, and hope for.

We imagine that will transpire. But what will our situation then be? There are some circumstances which do not allow us to see the future in a too positive of a perspective. For now, let’s put aside the scenario whereby the [Russian] troops have physically left the territory of Ukraine, but Russia still has the ability to strike it from a distance. We imagine that the war will at least become “frozen” for some time, at the state borders as they were in 2014.

First of all, Russia has declared officially and publicly a large proportion of Ukraine as its own territory. No matter how wrong that is according to international law, Russia has repeatedly and publicly made this declaration: “This is a part of Russia, and we intend to defend it if necessary”. It is difficult to imagine what pretext Russia will give for ending hostilities in a situation where it no longer controls these territories. How would “powerful Russia” be able to given an account of such actions to its own people, plus demonstrate it to the West, its competitor? If Russia does not give up on these demands – and this is unlikely at the moment – then peace will be built on very weak foundations.

Second, the justification for the war has changed during its course. This is true both within the Russian leadership, in the media and in society. Whereas initially, the desire was to de-Nazify and demilitarize the “dangerous Ukraine” and was mainly related to the Ukrainian government in Kyiv, expressions of this kind are not used much anymore. We are instead hearing more and more about the “satanists” and “pedophiles” of NATO or the EU, which Russia is waging war against. This war has increasingly become a “crusade”, a struggle against a completely unacceptable and dangerous phenomenon, in relation to Russian culture and values. But how does the Russian leadership explain the loss of territory and the falling short of its values?

Third, the attitude towards Ukrainians as a nation has changed. Since the summer months, the Russian media has increasingly started to mock the suffering of the Ukrainian people (as opposed to its government). […]

Millions of Ukrainians are without electricity, but the [Russian] news pokes fun at the “fact” that Ukrainians do not know how to use generators or gas stoves, as a result causing house fires. Those people talk about Ukraine’s “killer generators” with a smirk on their faces. The TV shows suggest annihilating civilian infrastructure since it would force the Ukrainian population(!) to surrender. Otherwise, they would end up drowning in their own feces ,or die from an epidemic resulting from that, it is argued.

It was openly stated on one TV broadcast that if necessary, a whole generation of Ukrainians, millions, must be killed, so that Ukrainians would never again have a non-hostile attitude towards Russia. Step-by-step, an emotional justification for genocide is being created. However, at the same time, Ukrainians are conversely portrayed as a ridiculous, amorphous mass, which Russia could take down any time it chose to.

There are four more, still growing attitudes that could sustain the anger and hatred for decades. Tens of thousands of Russian citizens have lost their lives at the hands of Ukrainians, and because of Western support. However, this concerns the millions of family members and friends [of the deceased], who really believe that Russia’s enemies, i.e. Ukraine and the western countries that support it, are to blame for these losses.

Even more Russians have lost their health and well-being. Injured soldiers will continue to characterize the street scene and commemorate the (lost) war. In a grotesque way, the by-product of mobilization also appears here: Society is caught up in the hatred.

Against all this background, it must be emphasized that in Russia, the foolish decisions of generals and officials get criticized, rather than the government’s mistake in escalating the war from February 24. Furthermore, among those people who fled Russia, there are many who were not willing to go to war but were at the same time not necessarily opposed to the Russian government’s decisions to behave, as a country, as it does. The enmity sown by Vladimir Putin has found fertile ground. We hope that is not the case, but at the moment it doesn’t look like it can be any different.

Let us now imagine again a situation where troops from the Russian Federation have left Ukrainian soil. However, according to Russia (children’s) opinion, they would have left territory rightfully belonging to Russia. They left because the Ukrainians, who are a joke, and represent the decadent western values, and who received aid from the West, have somehow been able to kick out the “mighty Russia”.

The accompanying outcome is relatively substantial economic decline, isolation, the anger of the relatives of those who lost their lives in the war, and war invalids in the streets being a constant reminder of that loss, while Kyiv rules over territory declared Russian. There is no need to fantasize about what the motivation for Russia to demonstrate its military power somewhere and some day might be; to take revenge. After all, everyone knows the efforts made by the three Baltic states in supporting Ukraine, as well as those by Poland, the U.K., the U.S….but the latter are big countries. […]”

 

Hans Petter Midttun: On 15 December, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that Ukraine needs 300 tanks, approximately 700 infantry fighting vehicles and 500 howitzers to be able to achieve the next major objective.

Next major objective. Not defeat and evict Russian forces from Ukraine.

While I applaud the decision to deliver an unknown number of French AMX-10s, 40 German Marders and 50 US M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the decision must be seen in the context of the stated requirement. The last pledge only provides less than 20% of the infantry fighting vehicles, 10% of the howitzers, and none of the main battle tanks needed to achieve the one major objective.

The decision not to deliver M-1 Abrams or the German Leopard-1 and Leopard-2 is slightly bizarre at this stage. Enabling Ukraine to conduct a “limited offensive”, while denying it the possibility to evict the Russian forces over fear of escalation makes no sense after the war has escalated continuously for 9 years. Less so after having witnessed Ukraine cross all of Russia’s “red lines” over the last 10 months without any repercussions. More so as increasingly more countries grow to realise that peace is not possible as long as Russia occupy parts of Ukraine.

The deliberations being made – whether it is about concern over the time needed to operate and maintain western tanks or whether the weapon is defensive or offensive in nature – are indicative of the Western decision-making process. If the training had started when the deliberations began 10 months ago Ukraine would be able to both operate and maintain most systems operated by the NATO member states today. This includes the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter aircraft.

While the deliberation itself is crucially important for governments, parliaments, ministries and agencies recently awakened from decades of “peace in our time” it still reflects a lack of urgency as the world’s second-greatest military power is waging war against the West. Equally important, it shows that the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsular and parts of Donbas in 2014 did not serve as a wake-up call. Nine years later, the West is still struggling to catch up with the “new” security and defence realities.

While I remain convinced that the scale and scope of Western defence aid will continue to evolve, a greater focus on timing needs to be introduced into the defence planning process.

The decision to supply AMX-10s, German Marders and US M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles will most likely have limited impact on the battlefield. They will probably not arrive in time to support a winter offensive giving Russia much-needed time to regenerate and build new military formations.

The timing – the decision to start training after the decision to supply the weapon systems – might also indicate that Ukraine’s ability to conduct combined arms operations still lies 9-12 months into the future. In the meantime, it will still need to rely on massive artillery fire to be able to break through the Russian lines. Consequently, it will still need massive support of artillery systems and ammunition that the US and European defence industries are unable to produce in the required numbers.

When that happens – maybe 9-12 months from now – Ukraine might be needing replacements for the AMX-10s, German Marders and US M2 Bradley that will be delivered in the next couple of months.

As previously argued, Russia is not the only one suffering from flawed logistics and decision-making processes.

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